The Real Test for Indian Farmer Cooperatives
In 1976, around five lakh dairy farmers in Gujarat contributed Rs 2 each to produce a film. The movie, which echoed their lives, was directed by Shyam Benegal. The film, Manthan, told the story of a village where a milk cooperative is resisted by the private dairy owner and the local elite. It is finally championed by Bhola, a villager belonging to the Dalit community, after the outsider professional who founded it leaves. The film's message was simple yet historic: a cooperative belongs to those who claim it. Five decades later, the question is whether producers still hold that claim.
For an Indian farmer, ownership here is harder to locate. It is visible in the village society, as members can attend the general body meeting and elect a managing committee. The fact is, it thins out at each higher tier. District unions and state federations make decisions regarding prices, investment, and expansion. Their boards are elected indirectly. The professional managers are appointed, and the state keeps a tab over them through legal mechanisms that have instituted the registrars and nominated directors. The common producer may never enter the boardroom where these decisions are made in their lifetime.
The reason for discussing this working of the cooperative sector is the recent elections to Kolhapur's Gokul milk union. The alliance backed by Congress leader Satej Patil won 13 of the union's 25 seats, narrowly defeating the panel backed by Maharashtra's ruling Mahayuti coalition. Gokul is also a centre of political influence in Kolhapur, making control of its board a prize for rival leaders. For the farmers supplying its milk, the stakes are more immediate: who oversees the institution through which they sell their produce, and how that leadership answers to them.
Rather than ruminating on this in reductionist terms of defeat and victory, I argue that discussions centred on cooperatives must begin with the common producer's household. In fact, it is time to rethink the entire modus operandi of the constitutionally recognised cooperative sector in India.
Collective ownership for Indian farmers
How can collective ownership empower Indian farmers and give them enforceable authority over the institutions that are sustained by their labour, making these authorities accountable to them in the real sense of the law?
Government statistics estimated India's milk production at 247.87 million tonnes in 2024–25. It increased by 3.58% over the previous year. But it must be understood that increased quantities or mere expansion do not indicate how much remains with producers after costs are deducted. As a matter of fact, it hardly indicates whether their influence over purchasing institutions has increased.
A government statement records that by June 2026, the National Programme for Dairy Development had helped organise 36,611 new dairy cooperative societies, strengthen 34,557 existing societies and create 168 lakh litres of daily chilling capacity. Infrastructure can be measured and it is laudable if it is continuously improving and scaled up.
The cooperative sector in the case of milk addresses practical imbalances. Milk is a perishable commodity. A household cannot indefinitely withhold its supply for the sake of mere negotiating and getting a better deal. The processes of collection, refrigeration, processing, and marketing require resources beyond an individual producer's budget and reach. Thus, this "collectivisation" of an enterprise confers bargaining strength on this individual producer. It also delivers on the state's democratic promise that the producers retain control over the value their combined effort has generated.
However, corruption, which has infected the promising cooperative sector, threatens that promise. Where transparency and accountability are weak, contracts, purchases and recruitment can become avenues for private gain, and inflated expenditures reduce the resources available for payments, services, and investment. Where politics works as patronage, ordinary members often cannot question such decisions without seeking the protection of another politically influential person.
Historical audit evidence will illustrate the importance of the above discussion. In its report on Maharashtra's cooperative sugar factories for the year 2006-2007, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) found that Rs 72.15 crore had been collected towards enrolling farmers as shareholders by 19 of the 22 working factories it examined. But those farmers had not been enrolled, on the plea that they had not furnished the requisite documents. The government had stated that these factories had been instructed to issue certificates after collecting full share amounts. In the same audit, it recorded Rs 277.20 crore in outstanding members' cane bills in the sampled factories' 2005–06 balance sheets. It has also identified a Rs 13.26 crore fraud at Niphad and Kadva. The detection was delayed due to failures to reconcile cash books and bank balances. The commissioner had reported that FIRs had been lodged in July 2007. The above findings concern sugar factories around two decades ago. They do not establish present conditions in dairying, but they convey the lesson that safeguards must ensure membership, that the financial records must be duly checked at regular intervals as a preventive mechanism, and that producer dues must remain visible. These are risks to guard against, not allegations about Gokul or its election.
Producer-control test
Going further, there is an immediate need for a producer-control test. This is a simple way of judging whether farmers have a real say in their cooperative: Can they understand its accounts, question its decisions and get a response when something goes wrong?
This system of accountability should be built around income, information, influence, and redress, to help turn these safeguards into tangible policy. Income also requires looking beyond the announced purchase price. What goes into the process are the expenditures of these individual producers on their animals' feed and veterinary treatment, which are often supplemented by borrowing and family labour – part of the unpaid care economy – let alone registered and taken into the calculation of formal compensation. Unions should also supplement their accounts with representative assessments of producers' returns and explain their methods. Ordinary members could then judge whether the quantifiable expansion of the cooperatives improves livelihoods and whether retaining their earnings for investment is justified.
Getting information also requires keeping intelligible records. These producers should receive statements that demonstrate, in a transparent local language, milk supplied, quality measurements and parameters followed or changes therein, payments and deductions explaining a proper rationale behind them. Major borrowings and expenditures should be explained just as plainly. The directors, more importantly, should disclose their business interests and related-party transactions, with recusal where conflicts arise.
Hiding behind necessary commercial confidentiality shouldn't conceal who benefits from members' money. It's not just the influence but accountability between elections that matters. In cases where village societies send delegates to a union, these representatives should report on the decisions made and respond to members' concerns, if any. Competitive board elections matter and are necessary, but they cannot replace functioning meetings and informed participation within these primary societies that form the backbone of the rural economy in India.
Women’s participation
The main thing to ponder and work on is that women's participation – which remains unrecognised – must be reflected on throughout this assessment. Mere counting of women directors offers one measure, but examining their ability to influence decision-making offers another.
The meeting should be accessible; training for leadership and membership arrangements should help them exercise authority in the spirit of representative and deliberative democracy as envisaged by Part IXB of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court, in its 2021 judgment in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah, held that Part IXB of the Constitution applies only to multi-state cooperative societies. Gokul, being a state-registered union, therefore falls under Maharashtra's cooperative law; Part IXB nonetheless remains a benchmark.
The 97th Amendment Act inserted Article 43B into the Indian Constitution. It directs governments to encourage cooperatives that people join voluntarily, that function independently, and that combine members' democratic control with professional management. As a directive principle, it guides law and policy but does not, by itself, give a farmer a right enforceable in court. In the same breath, to foreground its envisaged principles of "democratic control" and "professional management," the redressal of members' grievances requires a common procedure for challenging unexplained deductions, disputed tests, or delayed payments. It requires institutionalising a well-documented process with clear deadlines and a suitable appeals mechanism.
The government can, through strict and legal means, make its assistance contingent on cooperatives and their management furnishing, on demand, accessible accounts, conflict disclosures, and published actions on significant audit findings. These steps will strengthen the cooperative sector and its operations in the long run.
Before the cooperatives enter into major partnerships or asset transactions, they should be required to give members explanations of valuations, liabilities, and consequences for their control, in the democratic spirit of transparency. The more substantive cooperative policy should therefore ask whether producers earn a secure income, understand the decisions, and can challenge those who exercise power.
Finally, in Maharashtra, the high-stakes Gokul election has decided who occupies its boardroom. There are many political readings of this verdict, analysing the victories and defeats. The continuing test that will determine the ethos of the cooperative sector and its motto of "each for all and all for each" is whether the ordinary farmer, who is also the producer, at the collection centre, can exercise ownership and receive an answer when asking where the money went.
Nikhil Sanjay-Rekha Adsule writes on constitutional law. He is a John Dewey Emerging Scholar and a Creighton Peden Scholar in the USA. He tweets @Surajya_Raje_.
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