Excerpted with permission from Identity, Dispossession and Resilience of the Subaltern: A Study of Marginalised Communities in Kashmir, published by Routledge.

Considered as the aboriginal inhabitants (Drew, 1875), the Sheikh community migrated from the rural areas of Kashmir to Srinagar during the Dogra rule. Archival archives provide evidence that the Dogra administration initially sent members of the Sheikh community from villages to different areas of Srinagar to serve as cleaners and scavengers. (Thorp, 1980). The formation of a ghetto— ‘Watal Colony’ can be attributed to the land reforms Sheikh Abdullah, the then Prime Minister of Jammu Kashmir, implemented in the 1950s. This is supported by the oral testimonies of the older generation of the ‘Sheikh’ community in the colony. Later, they were given their designated area within the existing Sheikh communities. Despite being promised separate land plots, the Sheikh communities now live in overcrowded colonies located between the Kalai (wall adjacent to Koh-i-Maran fort) and areas inhabited by upper-caste Muslims. Most inhabitants trace their lineage to different villages of the valley, indicating that the community was settled here rather than living here through the ages. One respondent said, tracing his lineage,

“They were originally from Village, then they came here and engaged in labour work. They had come from Bandipora. However, my mother was only from here. She hailed from Aali Kadal”.

People in Kashmir’s villages have more space in their homes than in the city. And when our respondent mentioned coming to the city, he wanted us to understand the settings where we were interviewing him. In his two-room house, with no clear bedroom and kitchen, he yearned for life in the village where he could at least have had a bigger house. These spaces shaped the identity of community respondents. The reflections of these respondents offered a glimpse into how place-bound identities manifest through language, memory, and social relationships, emphasising the importance of location in understanding community dynamics.

Another respondent said,

“We migrated from Khan Sahib Budgam. My father had a job here in Municipality. Our neighbours also came from villages”.

Over the period, these colonies have transformed into highly populated areas characterised by socio-economic inequalities and insufficient infrastructure. Although the community has been living in the ‘Watal’ colonies for a long time, none of the members own property rights or land ownership. While community members recognise that ‘Sheikh Sahib’ allowed temporary residence in the colony, they do not have legal ownership of the land. A respondent added,

“My grandfather told me that this colony was established by Sheikh Sahab; he gave us land here”.

Adding to it, another respondent said,

“Sheikh Sahab had told our elder that this place would be temporary accommodation, but then he was removed, and we had to stay here. That is the reason we don’t have papers for our homes”.

One of the questions raised here is, if Sheikh Abdullah could grant the land to the landless through his “Land to Tiller Act”, why couldn’t he give the proper paper to these people, here or elsewhere?  It is the classic case of a client-patron relationship; before he could take a concrete step, he was removed from the post of Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. One of the answers can be provided by Breman’s research (1974), which emphasises that economic and social structures in agrarian settings frequently result in clients becoming trapped in a dependency cycle, wherein their economic survival relies on ongoing patron support. Even the work of Rajni Kothari (1964, 1967) highlights the process of client-patron relationship, which the Congress party used during the Nehruvian era to expand the social base among the ‘lower’ caste communities in North India. This holds true for the Sheikh community in the urban setting of Kashmir, where this client—patron relationship existed between them and the political leaders of the main political party—the National Conference. By definition client—the patron relationship is lopsided with unequal and non-comparable reciprocities and inherently coercive (Hall, 1977); the temporary residence in the Watal colony and jobs in the Municipal community was what the Sheikh community was satisfied and, in return, becoming the permanent vote bank of the National Conference. This can further be strengthened by the fact that the community holds Sheikh Abdullah in high regard, and they traditionally take part in the voting process and favour the party that Abdullah had formed. Some interpretations suggest that systematic neglect may be deliberate, aiming to confine Sheikhs to low-skilled jobs and perpetuate the need for cleaning services. The respondents stated that the government did not allocate the land. Still, Sheikh Abdullah, then head of the government, allowed them to reside there temporarily and promised them a separate plot of land. The main neighbourhoods in which this community lives are as follows:

1. Sheikh Hamza Colony, Amda Kadal Zahidpora
2. Kani Dewar Sheikh Colony, Sangeen Darwaza
3. Sheikh Colony, Bachi Darwaza Makhdhoom Sahib
4. Sheikh Colony, Androoni Kathi Darwaza Makhdhoom Sahib
5. Tujgari Mohalla, Malkha Kathi Darwaza Makhdhoom Sahib

Most residents have immense respect for Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, for they believe he gave them some kind of respect by allocating some land to the community. From our observations, we could understand that, on the one hand, they knew they were dependent on the state for the alleviation of poverty and marginality, yet on the other hand, they had that agency where they could question the state’s resource allocation. Evidently, the absence of legal recognition of the community and access to the resources sustained the cycle of marginalisation, constraining their prospects for upward mobility. Communities lacking official legal status frequently experience exclusion from vital services, political representation, and economic prospects, which we could see in the Sheikh Colonies. This marginalisation exacerbates their socio-economic fragility, fostering a sense of alienation within the broader urban context. One respondent, one being asked about if they have legal papers, added,

“No, the government has not allotted it, but Sheikh Abdullah permitted us to reside here temporarily and was promised that we would be given separate land/plot. It is said it was originally the Maharaja (Dogras) who brought us here. Then Sheikh Abdullah came, and many people complained to relocate us. However, he had asked them to let us live here temporarily”.

Although the members of the Sheikh community possess government-issued identity papers such as ration cards and Aadhar cards, the households still need legal documents for the land and property. On the one hand, this dispossession makes them weak in articulating their demands to state institutions for basic amenities and any changes in the infrastructure in the colony. At the same time, they are constantly afraid of being evicted by the state authorities. As Nasir Ahmed, who lives there with his wife and four children, says,

“Recently, we received a court notice of eviction from our houses. I have been living here all through my life and there is no other place where I can take my family. We have hired a lawyer, and we will fight against this move of the government”.

Thus, ‘Watal’ colonies for the Sheikh community in Srinagar represent the intricate interaction between historical inheritances, socio-economic inequalities, and spatial dynamics that contribute to the marginalisation of metropolitan areas. Social exclusion within the Sheikh community exposes deeply rooted social hierarchies that infiltrate multiple facets of life in Kashmir. The geographical location of communities frequently divides groups by caste, creating the perceptions of superiority and inferiority. For instance, neighbourhoods where upper castes reside might have proper civic amenities, while lower-caste groups such as the Watals are relegated to distinct, less prosperous places. This spatial segregation functions as a physical boundary and a reinforcement of social divisions, hindering significant interactions and relationships across caste distinctions.

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