Published by Stimson Centre, Washington DC, The Wellington Experience is a study of attitudes and values within the Indian Army based on interviews of US military officers who attended the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington during 1979-2017. The study’s sponsors, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and US Nuclear Security Administration, had also sponsored the precursor study, The Quetta Experience, based on interviews of US officers attending Pakistan Army Command and Staff College (PACSC), Quetta during 1977-2014.
The author, Colonel David Smith, US Army (retired) is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Centre. During 31 years of active service, for 22 years he dealt with politico-military issues in South Asia in the Defence Intelligence Agency and Department of Defence. A graduate of PACSC, he served two tenures as US Army Attaché in Pakistan.
Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, Tamil Nadu, India. Photo: Indian Army ADGPI/Twitter
Study methodology
My review is through two perspectives – as an academic with 22 years of teaching and research in US universities and as a 1981 DSSC graduate. During the study period, 63 US military officers graduated from the DSSC, but only 30 could be contacted. The author conducted structured interviews with 26 of them, the other four being abroad. By including end-of-course reports of three more officers, the total sample of 29 was still too small for quantitative analysis. Officers not interviewed had presumably migrated or were deceased and there was no selection bias. The author supplemented these with interviews of several US government officials and former US military attaches.
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The longitudinal study assesses changes in attitudes at three levels; Commandants and Chief Instructors, Senior Instructors and Directing Staff (DS) and students. For proper perspective, the author contextualized the interviewee responses with the tortuous history of Indo-US relations. The study is well researched with proper citations.
The study narrates interesting historical events, which could have receded from memories of the older generations and likely unknown to the younger lot. For instance, General K.M. Carriappa’s suggestion to Lord Mountbatten’s chief-of-staff, Lord Ismay, to hand power to the military with Jawaharlal Nehru or Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the commander-in-chief, raised suspicions and eventually triggered the downgrading of the military.
David O. Smith
The Wellington Experience
Stimson Centre (September 2020)
Salient findings
Conventional thinking
This was a key observation for the Army Wing, which did not appear to encourage unorthodox solutions. Students stuck to conventional thought since many DSs did not seem to encourage much deviation from the College solution. Serious fallout thereof is the hunt for the DSSC solution by getting hold of previous course knowledge (PCK).
Cheating
This manifested as PCK-based solutions and plagiarism, without application of mind. The author labelled it as South Asian culture since this practice is also widespread in PACSC. Such practices are taboo in the American scholastic tradition and universities severely punish defaulters even with expulsion. The impression among Indian students that DSs are constantly evaluating them for higher ranks must be disabused since performance anxiety overrides genuine learning. Further, DSSC must ruthlessly curb PCK and plagiarism.
Hindu Nationalism.
Although never broached earlier, after 2014 all US officers were asked about Hindutva. However, they did not find erosion in traditional democratic and secular values. The study, however, noted proportionately gross under-representation of Muslims in the Armed Forces.
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Insufficient attention to combined arms operations and joint training
Ab initio integration of artillery, engineers and services while evolving operational plans was inadequate from the US perspective, as was teaching and discussion of joint services operations. Intelligence too received less attention in operational planning. Reorganisation into tri-Service Theatre Commands and integrated battle groups is languishing due to narrow-minded domain considerations, which would affect operational effectiveness in the multi-dimensional modern battlefield.
Counter-insurgency operations
Although the central tenet of the Indian doctrine is winning the hearts and minds of people (WHAM), the study highlights that none of the ongoing insurgencies has been quelled. It points out the non-adherence to WHAM in J&K and occasional extra-judicial killings.
Reluctance to characterise China as an enemy
Given China’s increasing belligerence, arming of Pakistan, and its salami-slicing of our territory, such reluctance is indeed intriguing.
Inadequate appreciation of the nuclear threat from Pakistan
India is not taking the threat from Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons seriously. India needs more deliberation on her nuclear doctrine since it may not be assessing Pakistan’s red lines realistically.
Indian Army may not perform as well as expected
This fear arises from the low effectiveness of the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) and intelligence agencies, sub-optimal integration and wherewithal for modern warfare and after 1971, no experience in full-fledged modern tri-service operations.
Representative image of Indian Army officers. Photo: Reuters
Comments
It is a well-designed and extensively researched study. The findings are balanced, objective and well-reasoned, and expressed with typical academic candour, but inoffensively. While one might not agree with all its findings, nonetheless it is a useful perspective from an independent, external agency and merits dispassionate analysis.
DSSC’s top hierarchy will surely analyse the study without hubris-driven summary dismissal and will institute changes wherever appropriate. Its findings ought to be taken as well-meaning friendly suggestions from a strategic partner since India’s enhanced operational effectiveness is mutually beneficial.
Although the study focuses on the DSSC, its actual motivation is discernible from the concerns cited by the author. Did the sponsors expend so much effort and finance for the PACSC (2014) and DSSC (2018) studies merely to examine the curriculum and pedagogy of both institutions? In Pakistan’s case, it was to assess the radicalisation within its Army, given Pakistan’s duplicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden, support to Taliban and close cooperation with China. Those findings were exclusively for the US intelligence and policy-making agencies, and the Center published the book only in 2016 after the break-up.
In India’s case, the foremost concern cited is whether service officers would remain apolitical and secular, or would they become compliant and obedient to, what the author describes as, “authoritarian, nativist, nonsecular government bent on marginalising the country’s large Muslim community in the name of establishing a Hindu rashtra”. While US officers did not observe any deviation during 2014-17, no serving officer could have risked betraying those sentiments in public.
The armed forces are a microcosm of the nation and cannot remain insulated from trends therein. Religious polarisation has increased immensely since 2014 due to the virulent pursuit of the Hindu rashtra goal and unbridled hate-mongering by the media. Large numbers of veterans venting hateful rhetoric on social media against Muslims has been a shocking revelation even to erstwhile buddies. This begs the question, were they indoctrinated during their service in our strictly secular armed forces? If so, is the serving rank and file also affected by the dangerous communal virus?
Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat has expressed concern publicly about growing politicisation of the forces, which will destroy cohesion and fighting efficiency. The armed forces of all democracies, especially highly diversified as ours, must be totally secular and apolitical. Even the British had shed their “divide and rule” stratagem to instil secular ethos in the British Indian Army. Thus, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs fought together as comrades-in-arms and won laurels for their units. To remain a cohesive fighting machine, our armed forces must retain that secular tradition.
Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat. Photo: PTI
The second concern is the growing alienation of Muslims due to vilification, abuse and violence by Hindutva cadres, and the government invoking draconian provisions against Muslims, especially in J&K. From the US perspective, internal stability is imperative for a strong India to counter China. With the Middle East and Af-Pak regions gripped by Islamic extremism, it fears that constant badgering of 175 million Indian Muslims could also radicalise them. Stirring up of the caste cauldron due to Brahminical domination is also exacerbating instability.
After diluting Article 370, using a muscular rather than WHAM approach has rekindled insurgency in J&K, which Pakistan is exploiting. LoC incidents are increasing and any major incident could result in serious escalation. The US disagrees with General Rawat’s assertion about India calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and fear a tragic miscalculation of Pakistan’s red lines. Given the author’s intelligence background and prolonged stints in Pakistan, this caution merits more deliberation.
The author describes the third concern as:
“Can the Indian armed forces fulfill this role [offset China’s growing military and economic power] militarily? Is India a strategic asset for the United States or a strategic millstone around the neck in the event of a future confrontation with China?”
Strong words! These concerns stem from:
- Vast current disparities in India and China’s military capabilities, which are increasing further.
- China has completed massive restructuring and modernisation of its armed forces. India is still dithering with direly needed restructuring due to inter-service rivalries.
- China’s defence spending is several times more than India, yet our budget has been decreasing, leaving critical gaps in modernisation.
The book predates the Galwan clash and only alludes to India’s reluctance in characterising China as an enemy. Post the clash, US think tanks are aghast at Prime Minister Narendra Modi denying Chinese intrusions and not condemning it explicitly. Engaging in fruitless negotiations without countervailing actions to strengthen bargaining position betrays pusillanimity.
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The US is aware that India will never be its cat’s-paw. But, would it contribute anything substantial to the strategic partnership? How valuable is a partner who neither takes action to evict the Chinese from its own territories, nor curbs communal and caste polarisation that is dangerously threatening internal and regional destabilisation?
Deepak Sethi is a retired brigadier of the Indian Army and now a professor of International Business Strategy and Management in the US. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at 30foxtrot@gmail.com.
