BJP's SIR Gamble Paid off in Bengal, But it Wasn't the Only Factor Behind Its Win

The results of the legislative assembly elections in five Indian states have been declared. In Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal, incumbent non-Bharatiya Janata Party governments have suffered decisive defeats, while in Puducherry and Assam, the ruling BJP has been returned to power. In Assam, the BJP, led by Himanta Biswa Sarma, secured re-election with an approximately 4.6% increase in vote share compared to the previous election.

West Bengal, which had previously resisted BJP expansion, has now been captured through a combination of strategic political manoeuvres – co-optation, division, and coercion. Beyond the electoral outcome, the data suggests a deeper ideological and political shift, indicating the growing entrenchment of Hindutva-oriented politics in the region.

This development signifies the consolidation of BJP influence across eastern India. By 2024, the party had already extended its reach into Odisha through the mobilisation of Hindutva-based political narratives.

Southern India remains relatively resistant; however, in states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, governance issues such as corruption, nepotism, and misuse of power have generated public dissatisfaction. The BJP appears to be gradually capitalising on these conditions, as reflected in its incremental vote share gains and its entry into the Kerala assembly with three seats.

A critical aspect of the Bengal election is the deployment of multiple institutional and procedural mechanisms to influence outcomes. These include the use of central investigative agencies (Enforcement Directorate and Central Bureau of Investigation), the Election Commission, and the controversial implementation of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), which was characterised as constitutionally questionable and disproportionately advantageous to the BJP. The judiciary was also portrayed as having played an indirect enabling role. Additionally, security forces deployed during the final phase of the election were described as exhibiting selective enforcement patterns.

Taken together, these developments can be interpreted as indicative of systemic institutional alignment in favour of the ruling party at the national level – an occurrence framed as unprecedented in post-independence India.

From a theoretical standpoint, the election is presented as an illustration of the erosion of substantive parliamentary democracy under conditions described as “fascistic,” wherein formal democratic processes persist but lack meaningful competitiveness.

Historically, despite the spread of Hindutva politics across North India during the 1990s, Bengal remained relatively insulated. This resistance is attributed to several factors: the legacy of Congress dominance, followed by decades of Left Front governance rooted in class-based politics, the influence of Bengal’s distinct cultural-religious traditions (notably Shakta practices), and the relative incompatibility of North Indian Ram-centric political narratives with regional identity.

Furthermore, although Bengal was historically associated with early forms of Hindu nationalist thought and figures such as Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, these did not translate into sustained mass political support for Hindutva in the post-independence period.

In this context, the BJP’s electoral success in West Bengal represents a significant political shift. Consequently, any comprehensive analysis of this outcome must move beyond attributing causality solely to the SIR mechanism and instead engage with broader structural, ideological, and institutional factors.

Also read: BJP’s West Bengal Sweep Was Broad, But the Numbers Reveal a More Complicated Story

After 1967, West Bengal was governed by the Left Front continuously for 34 years. During this period, despite various challenges, Hindutva was unable to establish or expand its base in the state. However, the structural limitations faced by state-level Left governments operating within a capitalist national framework, along with governance-related issues such as bureaucratisation, unemployment, and poverty, generated growing public dissatisfaction toward the Left parties. Additionally, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies by the Left Front government transformed this dissatisfaction into intense public resentment.

As people began searching for alternatives, Mamata Banerjee, who broke away from the Congress to form the Trinamool Congress (TMC), emerged as a viable alternative. Furthermore, various opposition parties and organisations – disenchanted by the  authoritarianism of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) – extended direct and indirect support to TMC in order to dismantle Left dominance.

In a manner similar to how the BJP benefited from the anti-Indira Gandhi wave in 1977 alongside socialist groups, it began to gradually consolidate its presence by capitalising on the anti-Left sentiment in West Bengal. Grassroots political violence, which had become embedded in Bengal’s political culture, also contributed to the strengthening of TMC as an opposition force. However, TMC did not possess any fundamental ideological opposition to the BJP. In fact, it was initially part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

Leveraging TMC’s rise, the BJP entered Bengal and, as in other regions, began to expand incrementally through the support of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), alongside broader political, social, and cultural initiatives.

As the influence of the Left declined, the BJP positioned itself as an alternative, providing largely deceptive promises. Although it did not make significant gains in the 2016 elections, the political context shifted after Narendra Modi came to power at the Union government in 2014, with the state increasingly characterised as aligning with Hindutva ideology. From this point onward, Bengal became a strategic target for the BJP.

By the 2021 elections, even without mechanisms such as SIR, the BJP had already secured approximately 38% of the vote share and 77 seats, emerging as the principal opposition party. It also succeeded in attracting a substantial portion of voters from opposition parties such as the CPI(M) and the  Congress.

The 2021 factor

Post-2021 analyses highlighted that the BJP, which had secured only about 10% of the vote and three seats in 2016, dramatically expanded to 38% vote share and 77 seats in 2021, becoming the sole opposition force in West Bengal. Notably, for the first time in the state’s history, neither the Left nor Congress secured representation in the assembly. This vote share was only about 2% lower than what the BJP had achieved in the 2019 parliamentary elections.

Despite lacking a widely accepted Bengali leadership face and contesting against the highly popular Mamata Banerjee, the BJP was able to consolidate a significant vote share. Another critical dimension is the demographic factor: Muslims constitute approximately 30% (around 30 million) of West Bengal’s population. In 2021, a large majority of Muslim voters consolidated behind TMC, rejecting alternatives such as Congress, Left parties, and the Indian Secular Front (ISF). Consequently, more than half of TMC’s 48% vote share came from Muslim voters.

In contrast, among the 77 seats won by the BJP, more than half were from constituencies reserved for voters in the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). This suggests that while the BJP’s overall vote share stood at 38%, its support among non-Muslim voters was significantly higher.

This shift is not without explanation. In West Bengal, ruling parties – whether CPI(M) or TMC – have historically been associated with a political culture that involves suppressing opposition through violence. In 2011, TMC came to power largely as a reaction against CPI(M)’s coercive political practices. However, once in power, TMC replicated similar patterns of authoritarianism against its opponents.

As a result, many supporters of the Congress and Left – disillusioned and seeking protection from political violence – did not view weakened parties like CPI(M) or Congress as viable options. Consequently, a significant section of these voters shifted toward the BJP.

First Ram, then Left

Popular slogans such as “Aage Ram, porey baam (First Ram, then Left)" were heard in multiple places across Bengal. Furthermore, since these results have positioned the BJP as the sole opposition force, the failures of the TMC further consolidated the BJP. This also created conditions for the BJP to expand its communal and polarising political strategies, particularly targeting Muslim communities, who constitute TMC’s primary support base since TMC lacks a coherent ideological, political, or economic framework capable of systematically countering such politics.

Meanwhile, the CPI(M), a cadre-based and ideologically driven party that governed for over three decades, had, within a span of just 10 years, declined to a position where it struggles to secure even 5% of the vote share. The party has not, over the past decade, demonstrated a credible process of internal reflection, reform, or renewal necessary for political recovery. Its current marginal status is consequence of this failure. It is similar for the Congress.

Also read: Bengal SIR: In Raninagar, Predominance of Muslim Names in the ‘Under Adjudication’ List Unsettles Residents

SIR is not the sole factor

Therefore, the BJP’s victory in West Bengal in 2026 cannot be attributed entirely to the SIR. Even in a hypothetical scenario where TMC might have won despite SIR, the mechanism itself warrants abolition, as it is an unconstitutional process that effectively excludes marginalised and economically disadvantaged voters by questioning their citizenship status.

Particularly in Bengal, the manner of its implementation – along with the introduction of conditions applied selectively to the state – strongly suggests that SIR was deployed as a political instrument aimed at disadvantaging TMC.

However, the question remains: was SIR the only cause of TMC’s defeat?

At a surface level, electoral data appears to demonstrate the significant impact of SIR. For instance, TMC secured approximately 26 million votes, whereas the BJP obtained around 29.2 million votes – a margin of roughly 3 million. At the same time, approximately 9.3 million voters were excluded under SIR, with about 2.7 million excluded in the final stage without tribunal review. Of these, a third were Muslims – demographically considered likely TMC voters. Thus, the number of excluded voters closely approximates the margin of victory between the BJP and TMC.

This correlation suggests that the objective of SIR was to weaken TMC electorally. Regardless of whether it directly determined the outcome, both its intent and its operational design are dangerous to polity and hence should be abolished.

However, a closer examination of the results indicates that, alongside SIR, additional structural and political factors also contributed to TMC’s defeat. For example, prior reporting by The Indian Express highlighted that in 44 constituencies in West Bengal, the number of voters removed through SIR exceeded the margin of victory observed in previous elections.

To assess the impact of SIR, in these specific constituencies, the following examples are illustrative:

• In Bally constituency, the TMC had won in 2021 by a margin of 6,231 votes. However, under SIR, 11,386 voters were deleted from the rolls. In the current election, the BJP has won this seat by a margin of 11,997 votes. 
• In Howrah North, TMC had previously secured victory by 5,472 votes. Due to SIR, 11,179 voters were removed. The BJP has now won the constituency by 11,250 votes. 
• In Ketugram, TMC had won by 12,467 votes in 2021. Under SIR, 26,780 voters were deleted. In the present election, the BJP has won the seat by a margin of 27,610 votes. 
• In Pandaveswar, TMC had earlier won by 3,350 votes. However, 5,898 voters were removed due to SIR. The BJP has now secured victory in this constituency by 1,398 votes. 

Thus, in at least 10 constituencies that were previously won by TMC, the BJP has emerged victorious following voter deletions attributed to SIR. Notably, there are no corresponding instances where TMC has gained constituencies previously held by the BJP due to similar deletions.

Therefore, there is little dispute that SIR contributed to TMC losing certain constituencies. However, it would be analytically inaccurate to attribute the overall electoral defeat of TMC solely to SIR. Supporting this, a study reported by The Indian Express indicates that among the 20 constituencies with the highest levels of voter deletion, TMC still managed to win 13 seats.

Thus, while SIR contributed to the defeat of the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), it was not the sole determining factor. Several deeper structural causes can be identified, among which the most significant include:

1. On one hand, the sustained, organised, and ideologically driven Hindutva mobilisation by the BJP and the RSS consolidated Hindu votes in favor of the BJP. On the other hand, unlike in 2021, Muslim votes did not consolidate exclusively behind TMC but were instead distributed across the broader anti-BJP spectrum. 
2. Efforts by various opposition parties to challenge what they perceived as TMC’s authoritarian governance indirectly benefited the BJP. 
3. Opposition parties, including TMC, lacked a coherent alternative framework or a strong oppositional strategy to counter the social, economic, and cultural challenges posed by BJP and its ideological ecosystem. 
4. There was an absence of a clear democratic national vision or program capable of countering the narrative of a “Hindu Rashtra”. Instead, what prevailed was a form of “soft Hindutva” within mainstream political discourse. 
5. After assuming power, opposition parties failed to implement long-term policies or programs that could be seen as distinctly pro-people or fundamentally different from those of the BJP. Structurally, they are portrayed as operating within similar frameworks of elite dominance and capitalist orientation. 
6. When in power, opposition parties have also been associated with corruption, misuse of authority, nepotism, and coercive practices. While the BJP is also described as engaging in similar patterns wherever it governs, it is argued that these are often obscured through ideological mobilisation and the construction of external adversaries. 
7. Most significantly, it is argued that under BJP rule, electoral democracy itself has undergone erosion, leading to a contraction of meaningful democratic possibilities. 

In this context, the the only viable alternative democratic pathway lies in building a broad-based, anti-fascist mass movement that includes marginalised and oppressed communities. Even if such an effort does not yield immediate electoral outcomes, it may produce substantive results in the long term – potentially over a couple of decades.

Shivasundar is a columnist and activist in Karnataka.

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