It is a tragedy that minorities have become the focus of political narratives, targets of political vendettas, and victims of vicious campaigning during the Lok Sabha election. It is, however, not a simple issue of a desperate attempt by the ruling party to clinch power. Instead, it is a component of more generalised Islamophobic ideas, thoughts, philosophies, and patterns that have been pervasive on a national and international scale.
The narratives have also become a symbol of binary opposition between the majority and minority, who are not only antagonistic but also perpetual enemies. By stereotyping minorities, it creates a sense of victimhood among the majority, whilst translating the community identity into a communal identity. It attempts to resurrect the memories of historical humiliation, such as the crimes committed, the devastation of houses of worship, the conversion of nearby communities, the type of slavery, and the ensuing alienation experienced by the majority community. All these were used as political torpedoes to merge the majoritarian identity with the state.
The recent consecration of Ram Lalla in Ayodhya and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s claim of his divine ordination points to the beginning of the merger of the state with the majoritarian culture.
There are concerns, though, about whether Islamophobia – a phobia of unceasing stereotyping and condemnation – is a distinct phenomenon or a continuation of the Western, colonial, and post-colonial worlds. Further, how is Indian Islamophobia different from contemporary Western Islamophobia? Is it embedded in communalism in India, mainly developed as a fallout of the Partition of India, or is it the continuation of colonial stereotyping? How have different perspectives pushed Islamophobia in India right from the colonial period? Finally, did the Lok Sabha election campaign provide a firm ground for actualising Islamophobia in the recent past?
Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty
Initially, the political narrative revolved around winning more than 400 seats in the Lok Sabha election, given that the ruling dispensation was sure of repeating its performance as it did in the 2019 general election. “Abki baar Charsau paar” became the campaign trail’s focal point on the assumption that several factors, including the dedication of Ram Lalla’s statue, the repeal of Article 370, the elimination of triple talaq, the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act, the awarding of the Bharat Ratna to Karpoori Thakur, Charan Singh, Swaminathan, and others, populist schemes for people with low incomes and women, the PM’s charisma and his international stature, the equally awful opposition leadership, etc., would make its victory far more easy than one would have predicted.
Once its calculation slowly received flak, in each succeeding phase, the narratives and discourses during the campaign trail shifted to minorities – the latter became the central focus. The new discourse blended many myths, imagined histories, negation, and refusal despite being as old as colonialism. During the campaign, minorities were much maligned, slandered and vilified. This is where Islamophobia worked as a strong undercurrent.
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Islamophobia in history and contemporary India
Islamophobia as a thought process, as an idea, and as a conceptual category first appeared in the political narrative in the 1990s – though its origins can be found in the immediate birth of the religion and subsequently during medieval and colonial eras.
St. John of Damascus (675-749 AD) was the earliest Christian critic of Islam, considering it a form of “Ishmaelite heresy”. The call given by Pope Urban II to liberate Jerusalem from Muslims ended in the First Crusade (1096-1099), followed by three more wars. The Spanish Inquisition, which saw the widespread reconversion and expulsion of Muslims, or Moriscos, was backed by a Christian theologian Juan Ribera. Martin Luther (1481–1546), the founder of Protestantism, thought that the main responsibility of the rulers and common people should be to band together against the Turks because they were fundamentally “evil.” Aeneas Silvius, Jean Germain, and John of Cusa were other theologians who called for a larger collective of the Christian faith to contain the spread of religion and organised conferences and projected Islam as the enemy of the Cross.
Islamophobia encompassed even literature, poetry, art, and essays. The Italian poet and philosopher Dante (1265–1321), in his “Divine Comedy,” a collection of poems, refused to acknowledge Islam as a religion, and believed it was a heresy against Christianity. Incidentally, his writings sowed the seeds for a “civilizational clash” between the two Semitic religions – Christianity and Islam
Colonialism and Islam
Indeed, colonialism and Islamophobia went together, as both mutually co-existed. Colonisation brought strong memories of hatred, never-ending conflict, and conquest. It was evident when Columbus received Sanad, a gift of victory upon the fall of Grenada, the last citadel of the Muslim state in Spain, Grenada, in 1492, allowing him to set out on a voyage to the New World.
Colonialism had four tasks: one, dismissing the contribution of the faith and its followers; secondly, stereotyping; and third; creating spaces for perpetual hegemony, and four, dividing the Muslim world. It all began with critically questioning its basic structure, amorphous knowledge production, arts, science, architecture, political philosophy, and its relation to the state and mundane issues. This led to unhealthy debates. Paradoxically, ibn–Sina, a Spanish Arab philosopher who introduced great Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle to the Western world, was denied a space in the Western knowledge system.
Strangely, both Plato and Aristotle were Christianised, as the church and colonialism went on appropriating them and converted them as objects of the colonial knowledge system, which subsequently helped the tightening of colonial hegemony over the conquered world, including colonial India. Similarly, the contribution of Al Haytham in his Kitab al-Manazir for optic science, exceptionally light travels in straight lines. Al-Tusi of then Persia who worked in astronomy, ethics, mathematics and philosophy; al-khwarizmi in algebra and Algorithm; Jabir ibn-Hayan in chemistry; al-Rizvi and Ibn-Sina in medicine; Al-Battani and Phargani in astronomy; al-khazini for kinetics, etc., either were condemned or suppressed from the gaze of public domain.
The colonial powers used stereotypes to maintain their perpetual hegemony over the Islamic world, portraying the Muslim world as mysterious and lazy, as Edward Said put it in his book Orientalism. Local culture was replaced with colonial culture, and various social systems, including caste, ethnic groups, and tribalism, were enlisted and condemned using different terms, such as Moors, Criminal Tribes, and fanatics (Mopillas), and every Muslim rule, including Ottoman and Mughal, was stereotyped as being harsh, brutal, and primitive.
Finally, Islamophobia changed the course of world politics. During and after the two World Wars, colonial powers divided the Muslim world into several tiny nations that posed no threat to Western interests. After driving the Palestinians from their land, Israel was established, fostered, and planted as a hostile state – much against the wishes of the Arab world. The historical memory of crusade warfare was repeatedly invoked to claim the city of Jerusalem, the holiest site for Semitic religions.
Colonialism also created spaces for the Hindutva perspective to grow, which continues to have its spillover effect even today. Savarkar illustrated this in his Essentials of Hindutva, and Bankim Chandra Chatterjee did the same in Anand Math, Devi Chaudury Rani, and Sitaram. For Bankim, Indian nationalism was nothing short of Hindu nationalism and advocated for strong Hindu Rashtra. While glorifying the Sanyasis, mendicants, and attacks on Muslims, he projected them as primary enemies.
It is true that Savarkar, much before writing on Hindutva, supported Hindu-Muslim unity for Swarajya and Swabhimana while detailing the first War of Independence. Although traces of Hindutva are evident in his work, it never takes centre stage in the narrative. In the latter, a very well-researched work on the War of Independence, he exalted the contributions of thousands of Ulemas, various principalities, Muslim Zamindars, and Talukdars, including peasants across India. Subsequently, in his Hindutva, he saw Muslims as “outsiders” who identify with the outside Muslims rather than as trustworthy and close allies. However, the arguments of others, particularly Tilak, Gulvadi Venkata Rao in Karnataka, Aurobindo Gosh, Arya Samaj, etc, did not influence much Islamophobia.
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Postcolonialism and Islamophobia
Islamophobia as an idea and a thought surged dramatically in the 1990s, both internationally and in India. John P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, a well-known political theory, was one of the books that affected Islamophobia worldwide. It came at a time when the sworn enemy, the Soviet Union, had disintegrated, and the US was desperately looking for an enemy to market its military goods.
Huntington classified seven civilisations that have been at war with each other throughout history. He believed that Islamic civilisations constitute the Anglo-Saxon world’s primary enemy, although Islamic countries are not homogenous. This analysis served as the theoretical foundation for attacking Afghanistan, the Taliban, ISIS, and several other nations. When it spread to other European countries, it took on various forms: identity markers like the hijab, the niqab, mosques, and minarets came to be targets of constant attacks. Even international immigration to the US was prohibited. Even parties openly advocated Islamophobia; in Europe, it turned into cultural racism form. A couple of narratives were advanced again and again in the Western world: that with the population explosion, a sinister design was underway to Islamise the world, that they remain outside the mainstream and lead ghettoised life, and they extend support to extremist groups, both within the country and across the world.
Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty
In the Indian context, unlike the West, where it took a racist form, it traversed through the Hindu-Muslim binary, narrative on “appeasement”, uniform civil code, abrogation of Article 370, Triple talaq, cow protection, the consecration of Ram Lalla statue, etc. The primary forms of Islamophobia, aside from these, were history texts, medieval history, the history of partition, population explosion, identity markers like the hijab, food culture, Azan, and dress culture. The latter intensified with the rise in terrorism, militant groups, and the frequency of riots and attacks, including the attack on the parliament.
Paradoxically, COVID-19 added fuel to Islamophobia, as they were targeted as super spreaders. Even social media, including print and visual media, projected Muslims as “bad guys”, trap women in the name of “love jihad”. All these led to further stereotyping, shrinking public spaces, denial of basic facilities, such as housing, water, and roads, and an increased push towards ghettoised life. Revivalism, thereby, emerged as a counterforce.
The construction of narratives that minorities snatching away the reservation meant for OBCs, that they are multiplying to be the majority, that they are resorting to “vote jihad”, forest and land jihad, that they have the first claim over national resources, etc., shows the trajectory and the way the different forms and narratives of Islamophobia converging and the distinctive nature of Indian form of Islamophobia in the campaign trail, which tends to stereotypes, and marginalise the minorities as equal citizens of India.
This shows the direction towards India’s end of its journey. Can there be any solution? Given that two historical figures, Gandhi and Ambedkar, had opposed such a trend growing in India during the colonial period? Paradoxically, Ambedkar is being appropriated to advance the ideology of Islamophobia, and Gandhi has been accused of appeasing the minorities and is charged with all the contemporary ills, including poverty and backwardness that India is undergoing. Amidst this, the best option available is to start a fresh dialogue and reconciliation between two contending cultures – Gandhi despite criticisms becomes all the more important for contemporary India.
Muzaffar Assadi is a former dean of University Mysore. Emad Assadi is a freelance writer based in Muscat.
