Despite US, India-Russia Defence Cooperation Remains a Necessary Pillar of New Delhi's Security Strategy

Chandigarh: What went unpublicised during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s India visit last week was the quiet, but unmistakable military subtext: one both sides deliberately avoided mentioning, mindful of possibly triggering US penalties under its 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Military sources said the ‘deliberate absence’ of widely anticipated public announcements of Indo-Russian military commerce, in no way signalled, a slowdown in bilateral defence cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi; it merely reflected India’s desire to avoid a repeat of intense US scrutiny it underwent, for years, during President Donald Trump’s first term as President, prompted by its purchase of five Almaz-Antey S- 400 ‘Triumf’ air-defence systems, in October 2018 for around $5 billion.

That episode brought India perilously close to punitive measures under CAATSA, enacted in 2017 during Trump’s first term to deter countries from engaging in military transactions with Russia’s extensive defence, security, and intelligence sectors. The Act was introduced in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s alleged interference – eventually unproven – in the US presidential elections two years later.

Under CAATSA, India’s acquisition of the S-400 placed it squarely within the range of potential sanctions, after Washington had previously invoked the law against China in September 2018 and its NATO ally Turkey in December 2020, for their respective purchases of similar Russian air defence systems. In 2019, the US had also ejected Turkey from its F-35 Lightning II 5th-generation stealth fighter programme, amid concerns that the S-400’s radar could compromise the aircraft’s advanced capabilities.

Washington’s fiercely antagonistic posture towards India

CAATSA, however, conveniently included a built-in provision granting the US President authority to issue waivers – making enforcement inherently political. Analysts noted that such flexibility was intended to allow Washington to balance legal obligations with geopolitical realities, particularly in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where diplomatic nuances often outweighed sanction invocations.

But, despite the much-touted personal camaraderie between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the former never granted India a CAATSA waiver. When pressed about possible sanctions following the S-400 deal, Trump had even warned: “India will find out,” leaving the matter hanging.

The matter was ultimately resolved only under his successor Joe Biden, who in July 2022, quietly exempted Delhi from sanctions over the S-400 acquisition – an implicit recognition of India’s rising strategic weight as an Indo-Pacific partner of Washington, and a counter-balancer to an increasingly hegemonic China.

After Trump’s return to office in January, Washington’s strategic, political, diplomatic, and commercial posture towards India had shifted sharply, becoming fiercely antagonistic. The planned November Quad leaders’ summit in Delhi – bringing together the US, India, Japan, and Australia – had been scrapped, reflecting continuing turbulence in bilateral ties. Alongside, the simultaneous imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian imports, including a 25% punitive levy linked to India’s purchase of Russian crude, was further responsible for Delhi’s caution in publicly highlighting any Russian defence procurements during Putin’s visit.

Consequently, both sides last week steered clear of mentioning bilateral military cooperation in their joint declaration. Even the Foreign Ministry spokesman in Delhi pleaded ignorance of any defence initiative between the two sides following the meeting of the 22nd India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC), a day before the December 5 Modi-Putin summit.

Military planners in Delhi said this ‘delicate balancing act’ by India of continuing deep defence ties with Moscow, while expanding strategic cooperation with Washington, France and other European Union (EU) states, defined the current nuance of the India-Russia military relationship.

Underlying such discretion was the reality that, despite Russia’s pariah status over its war in Ukraine, it remained India’s largest supplier of military equipment. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for 36% of India’s arms imports between 2020 and 2024, followed by France at 33% and the US and Israel, which contributed around 13% each.

For Delhi, this critical materiel dependence on Russia has spanned collaboration on nuclear-powered strategic assets, the acquisition of high-end offensive and defensive platforms, the sustained maintenance and upgrading of legacy systems, and the procurement of a wide range of munitions and support equipment.

A cross-section of armed forces veterans and analysts agree that this reliance was never a matter of morality, but of practicality and national survival and about ensuring that essential military capabilities remained operational across all three services. It also meant that India had every incentive to keep its defence engagement with Moscow low-key, particularly as geopolitical scrutiny of such ties had intensified after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Meanwhile, the  IRIGC-MTC December 4 meeting, presided over by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and his Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov, too ostensibly radiated blandness in public. The Press Information Bureau release after its conclusion offered no revelations, except to banally reiterate that the India-Russia reciprocal defence relationship was predicated on a ‘deep sense of trust, common principles and mutual respect’.

Security sources, however, noted that despite its outwardly routine appearance, the IRIGC-MTC had in fact addressed and quietly advanced several critical Indian military projects and requirements. These involved high-end technologies that India cannot, under any circumstances, source from anywhere else, making the forum far more consequential than its seemingly anodyne public façade suggested.

For India, one of the most understated yet strategically vital pillars of its defence partnership with Moscow has been its decades-long reliance on Russian technologies indispensable to the country’s nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) programme. This highly classified initiative  – envisaging the construction of 4-5 SSBNs at the restricted-access Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam – forms the sea-leg of India’s nuclear triad and strategic deterrent.

'Unparalleled bilateral military ties between Moscow and Delhi'

This rarely talked about cooperation is understood to cover Russian assistance with the SSBNs’ compact 80-85MW pressurised light-water reactors, advanced metallurgy, pressure-hull, hydrodynamic design and ‘acoustic quieting’ techniques as well as sonar, navigation, and underwater communication technologies.

Equally important has been the flow of operational doctrines and crew-handling practices derived from Russia’s own SSBN force: patrol-cycle structuring, damage-control protocols, radiological-safety routines, and command-and-control discipline for strategic assets. These inputs from Russian engineers, technicians and others collectively accelerated India’s ability to field reliable sea-based deterrent platforms and entrenched a level of strategic interdependence that continues to anchor Delhi’s defence relationship with Moscow. So far, India has commissioned two SSBNs and is on course to induct a third, followed by yet another similar platform soon thereafter.

The IN is also awaiting delivery of a Russian Akula-class Project 971 Shchuka-B nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), it had agreed in 2019 to lease for a decade for $3 billion- its third such arrangement since 1988. The SSN was slated for arrival in 2025, but was delayed by the Ukraine war and its delivery is now scheduled for 2028, preserving an essential continuum in India’s nuclear-propulsion and deep-water operations expertise.

This leased platform is expected to complement India’s parallel programme to build at least five indigenous SSNs at the SCB, a project in which Russia is widely expected to play a discreet yet consequential role, particularly in reactor integration, hull-form optimisation, and acoustic-management techniques. Therefore, taken together, the intertwined SSBN-SSN initiatives render sustained bilateral cooperation with Moscow, not merely useful, but strategically indispensable for India’s long-term undersea deterrence and blue-water ambitions.

“Such willingness to share the crown jewels of undersea warfare constitutes a core pillar of unparalleled bilateral military ties between Moscow and Delhi,” said a two-star IN veteran, formerly associated with this programme. It is a level of trust and strategic accommodation unmatched by any other major power, he added, declining to be named.

The IRIGC-MTC talks are also believed to have touched upon the possible sale to the Indian Air Force (IAF) of either 4-5 additional S-400 or the upgraded S-500 ‘Prometey (Prometheus) air-defence systems-and possibly two squadrons of Sukhoi Su-57 5th generation fighters. The latter is expected to include an unbridled transfer of technology for their domestic production to boost the IAF's rapidly depreciating combat squadron numbers as an ‘intermediate purchase’ till the indigenous advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) programme matures around 2035 or so.

Other possible ventures believed to have featured at this meeting included development of the jointly developed BrahMos missile to BrahMos-2K hypersonic standards, based on technology of Russia’s 3M22 new Zircon missile. According to open source information, the Zircon is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads to extended ranges.

India also relies on Russia to sustain almost 60% of its in-service Soviet-and Russian-origin arsenal. This includes main battle tanks, infantry combat vehicles, missile systems, combat and transport aircraft and mid-air refuellers, varied helicopters, air-defence networks, conventional diesel-electric submarines, frigates, and even one aircraft carrier with 42-odd MiG-29K/KUB fighters, amongst other equipment. Ensuring steady supplies of spares, overhauls, and upgrades from Russia for this vast inventory remains indispensable to India for force readiness.

Equally critical is Moscow’s role in upgrading the IAF’s 260-odd Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters to the ‘Super Sukhoi’ configuration, integrating new radars, sensors, precision-strike weapons, and advanced electronic-warfare suites. Cooperation also extends to small-arms production, with the 7.62×39 mm AK-203 assault rifle being series-manufactured at the state-run facility in Amethi, Uttar Pradesh, to equip the entire Indian military, further anchoring the breadth of India-Russia defence collaboration.

That being said, even India’s warfighting doctrines have long been influenced by Russian equipment across land, air, and naval domains, and altering these deeply embedded operational foundations would not only be time-consuming but enormously expensive given the scale of replacements required. After all, the Indian Army’s armoured warfare concepts evolved around T-72 and T-90 MBT breakthrough thrusts and its air-dominance strategies were built largely on Su-30MKIs, a mix of MiG fighters, and Russian missile systems.

IN operations, too, grew within a predominantly Russian-origin ecosystem – from carrier aviation centred on MiG-29K fighters to Kilo-class submarines, Talwar-class frigates, and BrahMos-armed surface groups – directly shaping fleet manoeuvre patterns, patrol cycles, and underwater mission planning.

“Despite India steadily expanding its defence ties with the US, France, and Israel, Russia remains the stabilising pillar that keeps much of India’s legacy and contemporary materiel functional”, said the aforementioned IN veteran. In operational terms, this relationship has endured because it guarantees uninterrupted continuity in an increasingly volatile global environment, he added.

Russia has consistently kept Pakistan at arm’s length

Moreover, Russia has never armed Pakistan in any meaningful or sustained manner, a posture shaped by its long-standing strategic alignment with India. In contrast, the US and France – India’s other major materiel suppliers – have supplied Pakistan with advanced fighter aircraft, precision-guided munitions, maritime surveillance assets, and submarines, all of which significantly shaped Islamabad’s air-power and deterrent posture against India.

By comparison, Moscow has consistently kept Islamabad at arm’s length. Its lone deviation was a small, symbolic sale of Mi-35 assault helicopters in the mid-2010s – a one-off transaction widely seen as driven by counterterrorism optics rather than any alteration in Russia’s strategic intent. It neither opened its defence ecosystem to Pakistan, which, for Indian military planners, remains a pillar of trust.

Thus, Putin’s visit to India made it apparent that India-Russia defence cooperation, particularly in advanced armaments and strategic technologies, remains a necessary pillar of New Delhi’s security strategy. Also, by keeping these initiatives low-profile, India secures critical advantages while minimising friction, an approach that could also allow Washington, like earlier in 2022, to tacitly acknowledge the partnership without further escalating tensions.

By quietly managing its global partnerships, India has displayed prudence in silently handling its complex defence relationship with Russia, keeping Washington aware but not alarmed.

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