Full Text | India-Turkey Relationship Before and After the Recent Conflict With Pakistan

Following the recent conflict with Pakistan on the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, India's relationship with Turkey has taken a hit owing to the latter's support for Pakistan. In a conversation with veteran diplomat, columnist and author Talmiz Ahmad, Sidharth Bhatia talks about the background and consequences of the latest chapter of India-Turkey relations. Ahmad specialises in the Gulf region where he has spent long years including as ambassador to the UAE, Oman, and twice in Saudi Arabia. Full text:

Sidharth Bhatia: Hello and welcome to The Wire Talks. I'm Sidharth Bhatia. Turkey, or Türkiye as it's known now, is a country with whom India has had a generally warm relationship. Links between the two countries were growing of late in trade, education and also tourism. Indians generally viewed the country favorably as an attractive holiday destination.

But that was till recently. Now Indians are cancelling vacation plans in large numbers and all those ties are being severed. The government recently announced it would discontinue a contract given to a Turkish company which handled baggage at Indian airports. This has been spurred by the revelation that the Turkish government had supported Pakistan during the India-Pakistan conflict and supplied drones to the country which were used in the attacks.

But going beyond, what about cancellation of holiday plans, what are the wider implications of Turkey's close relationship with Pakistan? Does it mean that the country is showing greater interest in South Asia? And since Turkey is a very important member of the OIC, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, who are India's friends in the Islamic world?

My guest today is Talmiz Ahmad, veteran diplomat, columnist and author. Ahmad has worked in different parts of the world including in the US, Britain, South Africa. His expertise is in the Gulf region where he has spent long years including as ambassador to the UAE, Oman, and twice in Saudi Arabia. Talmiz writes regularly in the newspapers on foreign affairs and has had four books to his credit including his latest "West Asia at War: Repression, Resistance and Great Power Games." Talmiz Ahmad, welcome to The Wire Talks.

Talmiz Ahmad: Thank you very much, Sidharth.

Sidharth Bhatia: How would you describe India's relationships with Turkey till before this conflict took place?

Talmiz Ahmad: Before this conflict, the relationship was developing gradually though unremarkably. We had substantial trade relations which had finally reached about $10 billion. We had certain investments in each other's countries valued at about $200 million each. Many of their companies had become active in India.

Particularly the most remarkable of them was Celebi which was active at the airports. It was handling ground handling in nine major airports in our country and there was a sense that the ties would go forward. We had been particularly active when Turkey had its earthquake and under the rubric of Operation Dost we had provided considerable humanitarian assistance at that time but there had always been a certain niggling concern relating to President Erdogan's propensity to speak about Kashmir quite often. Even during a bilateral visit to India, President Erdogan had raised the issue of Kashmir.

He had mentioned Kashmir as a matter of concern. He had talked about the interests of the Kashmiri people and he had indicated that there was a concern and a need to address this issue. This went completely against India's interests and India's formal position and therefore there had always been a certain constraint on our side with regard to dealing with Turkey. So I think that there had been all of that but till then, till the recent conflict, the kind of hostility that has erupted all across the country had not been manifest.

Sidharth Bhatia: Indians suddenly had discovered Turkey as a vacation destination. Turkish goods were coming into India. As you said, $200 million worth of investment in each other's country with a lingering suspicion or lingering wariness on India's side. But even so, has this come as a surprise to you, the virulence with which India has reacted?

Talmiz Ahmad: India's reaction is completely understandable. In the course of the conflict you see Turkey providing its lethal drones and there are reports of Sungur missiles also coming in. So this is something unacceptable that Turkey is seen as arming the enemy in the midst of conflict. That means if certain casualties and certain damage is experienced in India, it is attributable to Turkey. So in that sense the anger can be fully understood and I think that there should be no shock about it.

India is particularly concerned that while Turkey criticised our military response to Pakistan on 7th May, Turkey made no reference whatsoever to the Pahalgam episode. At that time in that horrific episode, 26 people had been killed. The people's religion has been specifically asked and men were shot dead all in public display. This was not even mentioned by the Turkish government or the Turkish president and instead a retaliation was criticised. So for all these reasons, yes, it does make complete sense for us to be angry with what has happened.

Sidharth Bhatia: So it's gone up several notches you would say then, rather than merely pointing out Kashmir or bringing up Kashmir even in India. And of course President Erdogan had gone to Pakistan in February where he discussed defense cooperation but this has now gone up a notch. But does it mean that Turkey is looking at South Asia as an area, as a theater where it could have interests over and beyond simply trade?

Talmiz Ahmad: My personal assessment is that Turkey has very important and very serious strategic interests in the region and is anxious to expand its influence, presence and influence all across the region. Turkey is now on a high. The president has a very sharp strategic mind. He understands regional geopolitics. He also has a vision of recovering Turkey's Ottoman grandeur – both military, civilisational and Islamic – because if you remember the Ottoman Sultan was also the Khalifa of the Muslim community globally.

He has all these impulses. But the most important point to consider, Sidhnarth, is the strategic aspect that Turkey has up to now taken very deep interest in expanding its presence and influence in West Asia. It has armed forces present in Iraq. It has armed forces present in Syria as well as in the East Mediterranean. It has just scored an extraordinary victory in getting regime change in Damascus and planting a person totally with American support. Planting a person in the Damascus presidential palace who is entirely a Turkish protégé. So Turkey is on a high.

When I look at the map of our region, I cannot but note that if Turkey forms the western edge of West Asia, Pakistan forms the eastern edge. You are aware that Pakistan was artificially constructed by British imperialism because of its geopolitical value that Pakistan has borders in Central Asia as well as with West Asia and has a coastline in the Indian Ocean.

As western powers are now turning their back on Pakistan, it is not surprising that Turkey should now seek to fill in that vacuum. Turkey is taking an important stride forward. What does Pakistan bring to Turkey? Pakistan brings extraordinary geopolitical value. It has a long border with Afghanistan as well as with Iran and very short border with Central Asia and China.

But Turkey also has extraordinary interest in Afghanistan. And between the two of them, I would say to you that they would be a formidable presence, a formidable alliance in the space that is important to India's strategic interest. So yes, I believe that there is not much Islamism and much more a strategic perspective that is impelling Turkey in terms of its ties with Pakistan.

Sidharth Bhatia: Surely India could have not been unaware of this in the last few years. But is the supply of drones weaponry during the conflict a red line which India never anticipated?

Because this alliance, this Pak-Turkey's interest in this part of the world, Pakistan looking at China as well as other countries because the US now is cooling off – did this not get factored in or you think it was?

Talmiz Ahmad: I have not seen enough literature with regard to our diplomacy with Turkey. What I did notice and it was a matter of concern for me that every time Erdogan mentioned Kashmir in terms that were not satisfactory from our point of view, we would have a knee-jerk reaction and start talking to Greece and Cyprus and Armenia – pretending that these were serious foreign policy outreach.

They were not. They were knee-jerk reactions that had no strategic perspective whatsoever. I am opposed to this. I believe in diplomacy. I believe that diplomacy is very important not with your friends but with those who disagree with you. I'm not challenging our right to be unhappy with Turkey. But I am concerned that we do not maintain diplomatic channels so that we can convey our unhappiness and at the same time over a period of time see how we can subserve our political and economic interest.

Therefore I regret the fact that the kind of relationship, the kind of focus we should have had on our ties with Turkey they appear to be missing and I believe that this business of knee-jerk responses that suddenly we start supporting Greece on Cyprus and with regard to Armenia we go rushing ahead – India has no strategic interest in these areas. Where India's strategic interests lie, they lie within South Asia and West Asia and here is where we should have been much more familiar with what was pushing Turkey. We should have prioritised our engagement with Turkey just as we had been focused so far on Saudi Arabia and the UAE and to some extent Qatar.

Sidharth Bhatia: So if Saudi Arabia – I was coming to those countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar as well as Oman and UAE, we'll come to the Islamic part later. This has been an ongoing effort for several years. I remember hearing even from you and I have seen many of your pieces and interviews where you have said that this has been an ongoing effort and we have slowly built this warm kind of relationship in which we could argue very successfully that we have somewhat weaned away those countries from the Pakistan ambit.

Why did this not happen with an important country like Turkey or why was this missed? This knee that you're talking about is for example apart from the Greece and all that – oh send back Celebi. Now Celebi is suing you so that will take its own course but why was this missing in this?

Talmiz Ahmad: Well, to go back a little bit – sorry to go back a little bit – our ties with the Gulf countries are of historic value and they go back several millennia. We've had cultural, civilisational, people-to-people links which are well known and well established and therefore it is quite natural that in these modern times it is these Gulf countries that should have obtained our priority attention.

With regard to Turkey, the scenario has been much more complex. Firstly, Turkey is very far from us. And while there was during the Khilafat movement a certain concern for the restoration of the Sultan of Turkey, which Turkey itself had rejected, we did not have that kind of continuing uninterrupted substantial ties with Turkey of the kind we had with the Gulf.

Most of the time Turkey in modern times particularly after the second world war, Turkey was a member of NATO. It was part of the western alliance and obviously we were on the other side but during this period Turkey and Pakistan built up very close ties. They were part of the western alliance. They had very strong defense affinity with each other. In 1964, the Shah of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey had set up the Regional Cooperation for Development entity which was revived later on in 1979 after Iran had withdrawn, 1984 when Iran had withdrawn.

Therefore, there has been a much closer Pakistan-Turkey relationship largely due to the bonding, their bonding on the same side during the cold war. Do recall that our own political ties with the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia have taken place after the end of the cold war.

After the end of the cold war, we were able to build the ties because new opportunities had arisen. At that time, Turkey did not figure in our set of priorities. Turkey itself till then as you will remember for several decades was focused on affirming its European identity and becoming part of the European Union, had very little time for the eastern countries including West Asia and South Asia including Pakistan.

However, it is from the Arab Spring under Erdogan that you find Turkey has become much more interested, number one in West Asia and number two in South Asia and expanding its strategic influence in the region. So the problem lies not so much with India. It lies primarily with Turkey. But since then over the last 15 years Turkey has become much more active in West Asia.

Initially its activism was relatively benign. It used to talk about itself as a model – a model of democracy and secularism in an Islamic environment. But much of that was given up quite quickly after the Arab Spring agitations had abated and the forces of counterrevolution had asserted themselves. What you found was Erdogan now asserting the Islamic identity which Turkey had from the Ottoman period.

And therefore once again on that basis he started taking certain positions which had a kind of reference to Islam or Islamic values etc. and Pakistan seized on that. At some stage a few years ago, Erdogan abruptly gave up on that largely because of economic crisis at home. Erdogan needed to have a fresh set of relations with the countries of the region and he reached out to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt which are robustly anti-Islamism.

It is only with regard to Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmir issue, that from time to time he would irk India by referring to the Kashmir issue as an Islamic issue. But I think that we tried our best – let me say over the last 5 years we certainly engaged with Turkey much more robustly than we had done before. But the Islamic element in his utterances never went away. I would say to you that now what Turkey is doing is to recover the close ties it had with Pakistan during the cold war and is now giving it a new context in terms of Turkey's expanding influence across West Asia and penetrating into Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Sidharth Bhatia: Tell me, you've brought up the Islamic element. Turkey is an important member of the OIC and no doubt must have brought this issue of Kashmir or supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir perhaps on Islamic ground.

Now while these countries in the Gulf regions are anti-Islamism, they have also been in the past – Saudi Arabia has been a big supporter of Pakistan if I may. You'll correct me if I'm wrong. How does this now –how does India now balance that part of it? Not merely economic or strategic ties but also to ensure that the Islamic part because Pakistan plays that card regularly. How does India balance these two heavyweight shall we say elements?

Talmiz Ahmad: The main point to note, Sidharth, is that the Islamic element in the domestic and foreign policy content of Gulf countries has effectively withered away. Even earlier when Saudi Arabia talked about Islamic solidarity and bringing Islamic countries together within the ambit of the organisation of the Islamic cooperation, there was a certain political factor that animated the kingdom.

The kingdom wanted to safeguard its interest and build a broad influence base on the basis of Islam. But let us be very objective here. Islam as a faith very rarely influenced the politics of the region. The politics of the region was defined by their national interest. Now it no longer serves the interests of the region to pander to Islam.

Saudi Arabia has effectively given up all references to Wahhabism and talks much more the language of nationalism. UAE never was particularly serious about Islam but now talks about becoming a technology hub. The only country that till recently used to affiliate itself with political Islam and that was Qatar. Even Qatar has now diluted that link.

This was something – it was serving a political purpose in the background of the 9/11 attacks. The United States had assessed the significant need for reform in West Asia and had identified at that time the Muslim Brotherhood as a crucial role player in this reform process. The instrument that the Americans used in this regard was the state of Qatar.

Qatar deliberately affiliated itself with Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood entities in order to see to what extent the American agenda could be promoted. And it worked in the early days of the Arab Spring when a number of countries that had thrown away their potentates got Muslim Brotherhood affiliated rulers. Saudi Arabia and the UAE immediately intervened to ensure that the Morsi regime in Egypt would not work.

And within a year of the president being elected, the regime was overthrown. Overwhelmingly, a role was played in this by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It is well documented.

So now I would say to you that Islamism as a political force which had brought together Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood in different areas and extremist jihad – much of that has now abated. I don't think it is Islam that is agitating and impelling politics in West Asia anymore. India does not have to worry itself with regard to Islam as a political force.

Pakistan is a very different entity. Pakistan uses extremist Islam as an instrument of state power. That is, Pakistan is a state sponsor of extremism. In all the other parts of West Asia extremist Islam was hostile to state order. Pakistan is a very rare exception to this where the state authorities themselves promote extremism. Today there are hardly any takers for this kind of extremism. I think the last major act that the region witnessed was the attack in Mumbai. And with that I think the tide turned in favour of India because they understood finally what we had been saying that the problem that we have with Pakistan is not the Kashmir issue.

It is the problem of cross-border terror. I think that has since been accepted and understood and I don't think India needs to worry itself very seriously on this account. Pakistan remains a state sponsor of terror. There is no doubt about it. But this has no takers as far as the rest of the region is concerned. What is going to be the future policy with regard to this aspect from Ankara remains to be seen. I cannot imagine Ankara supporting extremism. After all, it has itself been a victim of extremism, not so much from Islam as from the Kurds. And it is only a few weeks ago that the Kurds in Turkey have finally announced that they are ending their policy of violence once and for all.

So I think in that background what our diplomacy should focus as we did in Saudi Arabia and the UAE and in other places in the Gulf – if you remember we had to work very hard possibly over a full decade or more from the time we opened political ties with the kingdom in January 2001 and finally got Dr. Manmohan Singh visiting the kingdom in February 2010.

It took a decade to finally win over the region and convince them that India is a victim of cross-border terror. But separately India is also a worthy political, economic, military partner. It is on that basis that we were able to give substance and value through the meaning of strategic partnership which we had with the Saudis.

In that time when we were working very hard on this, most opinion in India tended to be black and white and say they are all pro-Pakistan and there is no point in working. That is a mistake. Diplomacy must be constantly the instrument that India uses. India should use in order to promote its diplomatic and political interest and I don't think we should give up on Turkey. I'm not saying we should have any fanfare. Diplomacy works behind the scenes. It is most effective behind the scenes. It doesn't need to be on the television screen. But we must be engaged with Turkey once again. We should not allow peevishness to come in the way of a diplomatic effort over the longer period.

Sidharth Bhatia: That's a very, I would say a very cogent background of how things have emerged over the last few years. Would you then say two things that the relationships with countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar should be now based on economic ties. I was just reading the other day about how Indians are finding opportunities in Saudi, of course in UAE as techno as tech people.

So these are being attracted – they are being attracted by what Saudi Arabia has to offer, what UAE has to offer. So that means a certain futuristic kind of relationship is emerging. So these are the elements of strategic partnership. So that's point one. So point two is do you think despite your suggestion that we should be working hard with Turkey behind the scenes? Would you say that the West Asian countries, influential West Asian countries are a kind of counterbalance to what Turkey is doing with Pakistan? Two questions.

Talmiz Ahmad: Number one, we are very close to all the countries of the Gulf. The original base was our purchase of their energy resources and our providing them with human resources for their requirements. Much has happened since then. Both these remain important. India is going to depend on the hydrocarbon potential of the Gulf for the next 25 to 30 years and we will continue to provide human resources that they need. Today we have 9 million people in the six countries of the GCC and they are sending back to India $40 billion.

What has changed from time to time is what our people do. Many years ago you will recall that 90% of our personnel used to be blue collar workers. Today blue collar workers are about 60%. And we have a very large number of professionals who are today in different sectors of the Gulf economy as engineers, as doctors, as architects, as managers, accountants etc.

We also have some of the most prominent businessmen. You could even call them tycoons. These are not people who went as major businessmen from India. These are people who emerged from within the community and don't often figure in our consciousness but they are the ones who have provided employment locally and are a central part of the local economy.

Now what are we looking at for the future? This region is in a churn. It is in a churn for all the reasons that are apparent to us. The revival of the Palestine issue and the violence in Gaza, the destruction of the axis of resistance and the possibility of conflict with Iran alongside the prospect of a nuclear agreement, the very substantial ties that Saudi Arabia and UAE and Qatar have already built with Iran. So the kind of divide they had earlier no longer exists. And then you have the uncertainty relating to Donald Trump. None of us can pretend to know what his next action will be.

So there is extraordinary uncertainty with regard to the immediate and medium-term future. As far as West Asia is concerned, it is in this environment that India has to navigate its interest. India has taken the position that it favours bilateral relationship and therefore we are very close to individual countries in the region but we do not have a collective view of the region.

That collective view because we did not assume any interest in regard to the promotion of security in the region – that space has been captured by China for the time being. I do not believe that India should give up on this.

Now, what should India's approach be? There's no question of balance within the region just yet because Turkey has very close ties with the United States. The person it has sponsored in Damascus also has been welcomed in Saudi Arabia as well as in the UAE. Turkey has good ties with all the countries of the region as of now. It is also reaching out to Iran. Therefore there is no question of a divide which needs a balancing balance of power. India has to navigate its ties with the countries of the region on the basis of its own diplomacy.

It is not a question of having good ties with Saudi Arabia and therefore compensating for close ties between Turkey and Pakistan. That's not happening. Pakistan also continues to have close ties with all the countries of the region. I want to make one point because it is not always accepted in India or understood in diplomacy and foreign affairs.

There is no zero sum scenario. There are all shades of gray. There is no permanent enemy or permanent friend. All of us have to constantly engage with each other in order to ensure that our interests are served. India has to be an active player in the region engaging perhaps more robustly with those who disagree with us and building very strongly with fresh ideas those who are already close to us. That would be my panacea for the future.

Sidharth Bhatia: So in practical terms you would say it's diplomacy, diplomacy and more diplomacy is it rather than as you said very eloquently – peevish, stop going there and throw out an approved contract. Though those make headlines and satisfy the soul as it were but it doesn't take you very far. So where do you see rightly handled, correctly handled, where do you see the situation emerge in the next few years

Talmiz Ahmad: In the next few years, see, firstly I must point out to my deep regret, India is not an active role player in promoting security or stability in the region. As you know, I have been a very fervent advocate of India playing a role in this regard on the basis of its crucial long-term interest in stability as well as its qualification as having millennia old ties with the region and the high degree of comfort that this region has with India.

So I regret that we have substantial bilateral ties with all the countries of the region and that will continue. Is India capable of becoming an influencer in the region? That is the challenge before us. I think that the bilateral engagements have now reached their peak. But the region remains important to India. But India is absent in terms of the security scenario of the region. What I would like to see is a more active Indian role not just on its own possibly with partners which have a similar interest in the region. We are told that we are at the cusp of a new world order and in this world order middle powers such as India are likely to be major players.

We should be in this region promoting stability along with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and others that have similar interests in regional security and therefore we may even need to work with China in this regard. After all, China and India have identical interest as far as regional security is concerned both in terms of the politics of the region as well as the maritime security of the region. We are not rivals there.

So I would say that India should have an energetic and imaginative and forceful diplomatic effort that takes into account the entire region all the way from Turkey to Afghanistan and also with regard to Central Asia. I would also add one more point because though it is unpopular in our country, it makes no sense for India and Pakistan not to be engaged with each other. I don't think we have to be forgiving with regard to their cross-border terror.

But there is no purpose served in absence of communication with each other. There are possibly sectors in Pakistan who if engaged properly would understand India's interest and would like to work with us for their own advantage as well. I feel that this non-communication for so long has not served the interests either of India or of Pakistan. We should not allow our long border with Pakistan to be a border of animosity and of hatred. It should be a border that at some stage should be a benign border for mutual advantage.

But I know the path is very difficult and I know that we have a long way to go and Pakistan has a scenario of military domination that is not easily overcome. But we have to – again I would say to you this is where diplomacy comes in rather than being angry in the confines of our capital. In fact there is an example right in front of us - trade with China continues and is growing continuously. So we have been able to – that itself confirms to me the advantages of engagement.

I'm not saying that neighbours can very easily get rid of issues but diplomacy is the instrument that humankind has invented over several millennia to address precisely these issues that have kept us apart. It is diplomacy and diplomacy alone that re-engaged India with the countries of the Gulf in this benign environment that we have today. If we had continued sulking and condemning these as pro-Pakistan on the basis of religious affinity, we would have gone nowhere.

We would have finally become fortress India and not engaged with any of our neighbors. The fact is that none of these countries is influenced by matters of faith. They are all influenced by national interest. And exactly in the same way we should also be engaged with all the countries of our region on the basis of national interest.

Sidharth Bhatia: So my last question – this thought process which is present in the establishment do you think or not or completely not? What is your sense?

Talmiz Ahmad: My sense is as of now we have tended to prioritise our domestic issues but foreign affairs and domestic efforts cannot be put in separate files or separate boxes. One impinges on the other. You are aware that the tariffs that Donald Trump has imposed has significant domestic implications for our own economy and we have to re-engage with Donald Trump on the basis of all these issues.

We have the issues relating to technology. Technology cannot be developed in modern time by one country or one company. It has to be a global collaborative effort. When you look at various other aspects which are agitating humankind – the climate change, the pandemic issues, the issues relating to connectivity – all of these have trans-border implications and those implications impinge on the domestic scenario as well.

Therefore I would say the important aspect for us today is to see that we are active not just in terms of our domestic scenario but we are particularly active in our regional and global scenario. I have just mentioned to you that we are seeing the emergence of a new world order. I would really like to see India at the heart of this debate and playing a role in shaping the world order rather being victimised by things that happen outside our control.

Sidharth Bhatia: No, but that still doesn't answer the question. Do you think that there is this thought process even in certain circles or it is completely non-existent?

Talmiz Ahmad: You see, I am not part of the inner councils of our country. In the public domain where I move around, I have seen no evidence of this kind of the larger vision and purpose that I have talked about. But I don't despair. I believe that there is enough talent in our diplomatic service and enough vision available to it for it to think anew. Very often crisis yield certain fresh approaches and I think the crisis that we have just gone through and the possibility of military combat that could have escalated out of control, I think that should now tell us that this is the time for new ideas, new thoughts, new engagements, new alignments, new purpose, new role, new enthusiasm.

Sidharth Bhatia: Well, that's a fine way to conclude this rather detailed discussion. Talmiz, you have taken us on a pretty comprehensive tour of the region but of wider issues including the need for diplomacy. Talk to your enemies all the time. Do not only talk to your friends or do not be peevish. I think I like that line of do not be peevish in this matter. That seems to sum up a lot of things that seem to be happening in this country. Thank you very much Talmiz Ahmad. That was Talmiz Ahmad, the veteran diplomat, commentator and as you can see if you have heard this, a veteran thinker of issues not just of the Gulf region but about diplomacy as a whole. We'll be back again next week with another guest. Till then from me Sidharth Bhatia and the rest of the team, goodbye.

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