Full Text | Navdeep Suri on the Impact of the Mecca Pact on South Asia

Three Muslim-majority countries – Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have come together and signed a mutual defence agreement – popularly called the 'Mecca Pact'. What are the implications? Veteran Indian diplomat Navdeep Suri recently spoke about this to The Wire's founding editor Sidharth Bhatia in the latest episode of The Wire Talks.

The following is the full text of the conversation, transcribed by Ramsha Sartaj, an editorial intern at The Wire.

Sidharth Bhatia: Hello and welcome to the Wire Talks. I'm Sidharth Bhatia. Last month, three Muslim-majority countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, signed a defence pact which states that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all. The three founders bring together their collective strengths: Saudi Arabia with its financial muscle, Turkey with its deep defence production industry, and Pakistan, the only Islamic country to possess a nuclear weapon. Analysts have broadly said that this pact is an effort by regional powers to develop their own security arrangement and does not in any way seek to replace the United States. The US has welcomed this pact and the three members have invited other countries to join.

What are the implications for India? India has officially remained neutral so far, but the questions remain: in any future conflict with India, will the other two countries lend their support to Pakistan? My guest today is someone who knows the region well. Navdeep Suri, a veteran Indian diplomat, has been India's ambassador to several countries, including High Commissioner to Australia and Ambassador to UAE and Egypt. He is also a translator of books from Punjabi into English. I should also mention that he speaks Arabic fluently, so he is certainly well-versed in matters concerning the Arab world. Navdeep Suri, welcome to the Wire Talks.

Navdeep Suri: It is a pleasure to be back, Sidharth!

Sidharth Bhatia: Navdeep, you're a close observer of the Middle East scene. What was your immediate reaction when you read about this pact?

Navdeep Suri: We have been hearing bits and pieces about it for a while. There had been meetings between senior officials, between defence personnel, between foreign office people. A great deal of attention has obviously been focused on that one clause which states that an attack on one is an attack on all, language borrowed from Article Five of NATO. To me, Sidharth, there is very little beyond that which we know about this pact yet. There is very little in the public domain, and what we are aware of is that since the announcement in Mecca, there have been a bunch of meetings at the foreign minister and defence ministers. They have agreed that the secretariat will be in Saudi Arabia and that perhaps the first head would be from Pakistan, but beyond that we don't know a whole lot of detail at this point.

The reason I say that is that when you look at the fear factor that has been propagated around the point you raised in your introduction, that this could potentially mean they gang up against India, I genuinely think those concerns are far-fetched at this point, for one key reason: we independently have very good relations with Saudi Arabia, and I do not see any conceivable scenario where the Saudis would come to Pakistan's protection and defense in an Operation Sindoor type of scenario. Turkey has provided support to Pakistan, including during Operation Sindoor, and we are aware that it is something of a world leader in drone technology. It has already been providing that kind of support, but beyond that, what more does it entail? A key point here, Sidharth, is that when you have an agreement like this, with language like Article 5 of NATO, have you defined the triggers that constitute crossing the threshold where the other countries are bound to step up in support? Does an attack by the Houthis, who are proxies of Iran, on a Saudi refinery constitute a qualifying attack? We saw, for example, that a similar bilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last September received considerable attention, but since then the Saudis have been attacked multiple times by Iran and others, and the Pakistanis have not done very much in response. So that is why I take these things with a pinch of salt. Let us not jump to early conclusions. 

Sidharth Bhatia: There are quite a few points you have raised there and I will pick them up a little later. What is the local media in many of these countries saying? What is the media saying in Saudi Arabia, in the region, in the UAE; which has certainly had a somewhat fractious relationship with Saudi Arabia, and in Egypt. So, what is the media saying in these places?

Navdeep Suri: I think each one has a different position. The UAE has refrained from commenting on it editorially and has only been doing factual reporting. In Egypt, there has been considerable speculation that Egypt would be the next candidate to join the agreement, and the media has published pictures of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey sitting together. Egypt also realices that it is heavily dependent on the UAE at this point. The UAE committed a $ 38 billion package about a year and a half ago, which effectively rescued an Egyptian economy that was in freefall at that point of time. It rescued the Egyptian currency. Strangely, for a country of that size, the Egyptians feel they cannot afford to antagonise the UAE, so they will bide their time on this for a while. The other Gulf countries have mixed views. Apart from the UAE and Egypt, none of the others truly has the military capacity to contribute meaningfully. My sense of the agreement is that, right now, its primary impact is diplomatic and psychological. It gives a sense of security, and the military impact could come in due course. Once you begin to see what you'd mentioned in your initial comments, a combination of Saudi Arabia’s capital, Turkish industrial strength, and the Pakistani army's professionalism and scale, if you started seeing a convergence of all those elements, then potentially we would have an even more militarised Pakistan, one perhaps even more tempted towards adventurism whenever it feels it is in a favourable position. 

Sidharth Bhatia: So are you suggesting it could encourage Pakistan to become more adventurous? 

Navdeep Suri: It is a country run by the army, and we have seen in the past how they create an inflated sense of their own power. It is one thing to project that image to their own people, but when it translates into misadventures, as we saw in 1965 and again in Kargil, and as we have through the use of non-state actors, terrorist groups in various forms, there has always been that temptation within the Pakistani defence establishment to exploit what might appear to be an opportunistic scenario. But they have usually fallen flat in such endeavours. 

Sidharth Bhatia: India has been broadly neutral on the matter so far, but there have been comments by experts, like Mr Shyam Saran, said the other day in an interview that India should remain concerned, though India has not formally expressed any opinion on it. What you're saying is heading in that direction as well, that we should be a little watchful.

Navdeep Suri: No, we should be very watchful and we should engage bilaterally with with the key players. We should make our position clear to them, and I'm sure we're already doing that. As I said, we have a very good line with the Saudis. We have a reasonable relationship with Turkey, though not a particularly strong one, and it does fluctuate from time to time, but we continue to engage with these countries bilaterally. With Egypt also, President Sisi is going to be in Delhi next week for the BRICS summit. Their ministers have been coming to India in large numbers. We have a very good bilateral relationship and I think we can use our bilateral channels to convey our sensitivity and concern to these countries. I'm not saying that we take a hands-off approach, nor am I saying that we shouldn't be concerned. I'm saying that just because we have not spoken publicly about it doesn't mean we are not watching it very carefully or taking action.

Sidharth Bhatia: Allow me to offer a kind of a contrarian opinion. Would not the fact that the Saudis, who have reasonably good relations with us, are part of this pact, along with other potential members, actually temper Pakistan's overt and covert ambitions?

Navdeep Suri: Well, if that happens, it would run contrary to all precedent until now. It would run contrary to our own lived experience with our neighbour. But I think, Sidharth, the more interesting point for me, as I observe these developments, is twofold. 

Why did it come about? 

There has been considerable discussion about the Saudis' disappointment, in particular, with the US security umbrella over the last six months. Some people then quickly jump to the conclusion that the Saudis are creating an alternative to the Americans. The way I see it, they are creating a US-plus environment. I do not think they are in a situation where they are going to jettison the US umbrella. They are a long way from that, and the Americans still retain the overwhelming capacity to project power in the region. But the experience has been deeply sobering, and not just over the last six months. It is something that I think dates back to 2019, when Aramco was targeted by Iranian proxies, as is widely understood, knocking out a quarter of Aramco's production capacity at that time, and the Americans did not lift a finger to help the Saudis. And so the Saudis started questioning. 

Sidharth Bhatia: That was the Houthis.

Navdeep Suri: The Iranians carried out a number of actions at that time, including attacking ships with underwater mines, limpet mines, always maintaining plausible deniability. While their fingerprints were evident, they never claimed responsibility. In some cases, it was the Houthis. In another case, it was widely seen as an attack by a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq that targeted the Saudi facilities. So you had both things happening. The first point I wanted to make is that  the Saudis are looking at a US-plus scenario where they are hedging and creating additional options for their security. The second thing I find quite interesting is that everybody, particularly Western analysts, has almost reflexively seen this as an alliance against Iran, and the language used in the agreement describes it as a defensive pact not directed against anyone. But nobody has really made an effort to deny that Iran looms large in their collective consciousness. My sense is that Iran serves as a useful stalking horse to secure American buy-in. The moment you express concern about Iran, you would see the Americans very willing to endorse the entire alliance, whereas had you framed it around Israel, you probably would not have received the same reaction from the Americans. But make no mistake, at least as far as the Saudis are concerned, there is genuine worry about the belligerence that Israel has displayed over the last couple of years. The manner in which it has struck at Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar, and that is without even mentioning Gaza and the West Bank. Beyond that, Turkey is extremely concerned about Israel’s attempts to position itself as the regional hegemon. There has been something of a war of words between Netanyahu and President Erdoğan. The more right-wing Israeli analysts have not been shy about saying that after Iran, Turkey is the next target. So keep that subtext in mind: today, whether it is the Turks, the Saudis, or the Pakistanis, they have long been worried that Israel could target their nuclear programs, much the way it targeted Syria’s nuclear program, and Iraq's before that, and now Iran's. All of that is happening in the background and we should be mindful of it.

Sidharth Bhatia: Which brings us to Israel, which is exactly where I was headed. All three countries are strong critics of Israel. Saudi Arabia was close to normalising some form of relationship with Israel. Pakistan has been a thoroughly trenchant critic, and as you mentioned, Turkey has been worried about what the Israelis might do next. A pact like this must also have dimensions that are not purely offensive in nature. You spoke about the defensive posture, ensuring that Saudi Arabia has a US-plus defence shield. So would Israel have been at the forefront of their thinking when they came together? 

Navdeep Suri: I think both Israel and Iran are triggers. Iran's attacks on the Gulf countries, particularly on Saudi Arabia, were clearly a more immediate trigger, and the sense of vulnerability experienced by the Saudis certainly contributed to that. One Saudi official has commented publicly that it appears the US air defense umbrella exists only to protect American and Israeli interests, and that they have been left exposed. Iran is definitely not ruled out. But I try to place this in the context. The Saudis spent years negotiating with

the Iranians to reduce the level of hostility. The Omanis were very actively involved in the process, and then the Chinese were the ones actually who ultimately brought the parties together. Diplomatic relations were restored and the two sides began engaging more cordially. The Saudis had realised back in 2019-2020, that they cannot count on the Americans to sort out regional problems. They have to step up as a major regional power and take the initiative to resolve some of the long-festering issues. They had problems with Qatar at that time, if you recall, and Qatar had been subjected to a boycott. So they mended fences with Qatar and with Iran. With Turkey, those of us who remember the Khashoggi affair in Istanbul will recall that there was extreme bitterness between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and historically there has been at least a century of difficult history between the two countries. 

Sidharth Bhatia: However, Iran has been cautious but has not condemned the pact. So is that something of a positive step forward?

Navdeep Suri: The Iranians are being quite smart about it. They are happy to see a diminution of American influence in the region. If this agreement contributes to a reduced American military presence in the area, then it's something that they would welcome.

Sidharth Bhatia: The country where you were formerly head of mission, the UAE, you have largely kept out of our discussions. You mentioned that the UAE has good relations with Egypt, but beyond that, why should the UAE be concerned about this at all, given that from its perspective, this represents quite a formidable bloc?

Navdeep Suri: Emirati policy is in something of a state of flux right now. I say that because the UAE was the most enthusiastic partner in the Abraham Accords. The thaw between the UAE and Israel was genuine, involving not only the opening of diplomatic missions but also a wide range of initiatives in technology, investment, and direct flights between Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Tel Aviv. There were even kosher restaurants opening in Dubai and the Chief Rabbi visiting. We witnessed a remarkable range of developments, and the Emiratis demonstrated considerable sincerity in implementing the spirit of the Abraham Accords. They went so far as to have their textbooks cleansed of anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli references. But I think there's no doubt that the Emiratis felt let down by the manner in which the Israelis responded to the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, and the kind of extreme statements made by cabinet ministers like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir over the last year or two have been deeply embarrassing for the Emiratis, as indeed for any friend of Israel who would assess them objectively. Yet the Emiratis must balance this against the very tangible support that they got from Israel when they were being targeted by the Iranians. You know, the Iranians fired 3,000 projectiles at UAE, almost more than all the other Gulf countries put together and certainly far more than what they pumped into Israel.

The fact that Israel was quick to deploy its Iron Dome system and provide meaningful air defense to Abu Dhabi and Dubai did count for a great deal. So you have that duality kind of

situation in Emirates, where there's recognition that Israel stood by them at a difficult time, but there is deep discomfort with the policies that Netanyahu is pursuing, particularly in the West Bank today, which run completely counter to the spirit of the Abraham Accords and the expectation that they would somehow improve conditions for the Palestinians. One indicator of that is that Netanyahu has been desperately trying to visit Abu Dhabi, if only for his own political and electoral purposes, but he has not been able to secure an invitation from Abu Dhabi in the last two years. They have engaged with other Israeli leaders, but not with Netanyahu directly. That is a very clear indication of their discomfort with the policies Netanyahu is pursuing. When I ask my Emirati friends about their ambassador being in Tel Aviv, the answer is that having an ambassador there has allowed them to emerge as the largest contributors of humanitarian assistance to Gaza, which is indeed a fact. They have used that channel of communication in ways that others probably could not. They have coordinated with Egypt to channel considerable aid through Sinai, through Al Arish.

Sidharth Bhatia: So where do you see this going? You said these are early days. As you have noted, we've concentrated on one article, but where do you think this heading?

Navdeep Suri: I think it is heading towards closer defence cooperation, and that is what we should focus on rather than Article Five type of scenario. Everybody tends to focus on “an attack on one is an attack on all”. To me, that is perhaps the least material element the farthest from ever being invoked. Remember that NATO has not invoked it in 80 years. Not once. It exists on paper, but that does not mean NATO wasn't a potent force until Trump came along. The very existence of Article 5 was itself a deterrent. So I would focus on the kind of defence industrial cooperation, the joint exercises, and the interoperability of systems that develops among these countries, and certainly keep track of who might next be invited to join the grouping. Certainly Bangladesh comes to mind. The murmurs coming out of Dhaka would be a source of concern for us, given how fraught our relationship with Bangladesh currently is. 

Siddharth Bhatia: Who do you think will raise their hand to join?

Navdeep Suri: It will depend on the incentives on offer and the kind of structures they are able to put in place. I have seen the temptation to label it not just an Islamic NATO but also a Sunni alliance against the Shia. I think that really oversimplifies the complexities of the region. I do not think Turkey would have the slightest interest in provoking a Shia-Sunni conflict with Iran, given the length of its border with Iran and with Iraq. Nor do I think Pakistan would have the slightest interest in provoking Iran, given the fraught state of their shared border in Balochistan, where the two countries have previously clashed on at least a couple of occasions.

This is a space that will take time to develop. I do not see anything immediate emerging that resembles a NATO-type defence pact, but in the longer term, keep watching where it goes. If they are able to demonstrate substantial collaboration and offer incentives to other countries in the region to join together, and there is this curious element where Iran too is said to be welcome to join, you could see some very interesting developments unfold. But for now, you are beginning to witness a shift in the regional security architecture and it will manifest in unexpected ways. If you recall, when we hosted the G20 summit in Delhi, one of the notable outcomes was the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC. I wrote about it at the time. It is a complicated project, but the contours envisioned a near-seamless connection from Nhava Sheva or Bombay port to Jebel Ali or Al Fujairah, then by rail to Saudi Arabia and onwards to Jordan and Haifa. But much of this was predicated on normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia has declared on multiple occasions that it is ready for normalisation with Israel. But that normalisation is predicated on a clear, time-bound pathway towards a Palestinian state, something the current Israeli government is not willing to countenance, and perhaps the next one will not be either. 

What I am saying is that within this broader reorientation, there has been an interesting report that the Saudis and the Turks have been meeting, not on defence matters, but to explore reviving the old Hejaz Railway, which used to run from Damascus to Medina, built by the Ottomans in the early part of the 20th century, and to see whether it could be extended to Istanbul. In a future trade corridor, one could potentially bypass Haifa and route through Syria towards the Mediterranean port of Tartus, which has curiously now been taken over by DP World. There are interesting changes being contemplated that go well beyond this defense architecture and look at reshaping the economic map of the region, particularly as Syria returns to the mainstream.

Sidharth Bhatia: Interestingly, I will mention one small factoid, as they say. You spoke those old routes, Bombay to Mangalore to Kerala to uh Dubai and then further on to Bandar Abbas and even downwards towards Zanzibar where old trade routes which were very active for a long long time. So it's not as though cross-continental or cross-border roots are not possible. 

Navdeep Suri: It is interesting that you bring that up. The Arab sailors around the 11th and 12th centuries were actively exploiting these routes. There was a very famous Arab navigator, believed to be from present-day Ras Al Khaimah, Ahmed ibn Majid, who mastered the monsoon winds to travel between the Gulf countries and India and back, and that is why you have a large Arab community even today in northern Kerala, known as the Mappila. There is growing evidence of trade links as far as Aden, or present-day Oman, and then via land routes through other countries and even to Egypt and beyond.

Sidharth Bhatia: Well, you have made many interesting points.

Navdeep Suri: Sidharth, I will just make one additional point, and that is because I have spent the last year and a half working on a book that examines India's relations with the UAE, particularly from a historical perspective. It is genuinely fascinating when you read the broader history of the Gulf to discover that there was a thriving free trade system, particularly out of the Malabar coast with the Arabs, for several centuries, and the people who disrupted it were the Portuguese, who were not free traders. They wanted to establish trade monopolies backed by naval power. Then came the British and the East India Company. Throughout that period, their only interest in the Gulf countries, from Aden all the way to Hormuz, was to establish fortified positions that would guard the lucrative trade route to India. Then for a long period during the Raj, the entire region from Aden all the way to Basra was administered from Bombay.

Sidharth Bhatia: And earlier Surat was also involved. We certainly look forward to your book, Navdeep. That is what you get when you have an expert, an absolute expert, on these subjects. He looks at things not just through the lens of the present but also through the deep past.

Thank you, Navdeep. That was most fascinating. You have raised many points which viewers will find interesting, and the most significant point for us at this moment is that this pact could once again stoke the impulse towards Pakistani adventurism, as you described it. This pact therefore needs to be watched carefully, as far as India is concerned. Thank you very much for this wide-ranging and analytical look at this Mecca Pact.

That was Navdeep Suri, former Ambassador to Egypt, the UAE, and Australia, and a man who views these matters through a historical lens. We very much look forward to your book.

Navdeep Suri: Thank you.

Sidharth Bhatia: We will be back next week with another guest. Until then, from me, Sidharth Bhatia, and the rest of the Wire Talks team, thank you.

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