There is a curious pattern of US president Trump’s references to Prime Minister Modi as his “friend” and even “great friend.” In words, he has praised Modi to the skies calling him “nicest TOTAL KILLER”, “great friend, better negotiator”, “great leader”, and a “very smart man.” But when it comes to India, Trump has been less than kind, hitting the country with a range of policy decisions that most certainly do not look like the actions of a well-wisher, leave alone friend.

Certainly, when on the eve of Prime Minister Modi’s birthday on September 17, Trump called him on the phone to wish him all the best, people assumed that the worst was over as far as the recent hiccups in US-India relations were concerned. After the call, Trump posted on Truth Social, “Just had a wonderful phone call with my friend, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. I wished him a very Happy Birthday ! He’s doing a tremendous job. Narendra: Thank you for your support on ending the war between Russia and Ukraine.”

A cautious Modi responded in a post on X, “Thank you, my friend, President Trump, for your phone call and warm greetings on my 75th birthday. Like you, I am fully committed to taking the India-US Comprehensive Global Partnership to new heights. We support your initiatives for a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict.”

This was the first phone call between the two since the one on June 17 that led to the cratering of their relationship. The gist of the issue was that Trump wanted Modi to endorse him for the Nobel prize as well and to make a detour to Washington on his way back to India from Canada where they had been attending the G-7 meet. Modi demurred, because what Tump was hoping was to get a photo-op that included Modi and Field Marshal Munir who he was having over for lunch on June 18. In what the New York Times said was a “testy” conversation, Trump once again boasted about ending the May India-Pakistan military conflict and Modi had to refuse his invitation, even while making it clear that the recent ceasefire had been decided by the two sides directly.

Last week, on September 18, speaking at a press conference in the UK ,Trump once again emphasised his closeness to India and Modi, “I’m very close to India. I’m very close to the Prime Minister of India. Spoke to him the other day, wished him a happy birthday. We have a very good relationship”. He added though “I sanctioned them” referring to the 50 per cent tariffs he has imposed on India.

But Modi’s hope that Trump and he would take the India-US partnership to new heights is likely misplaced and this has become apparent last week when India was hit by yet another set of negative US actions.

First, a day before Modi’s birthday, the US revoked the waiver it had given on its Iran sanctions of 2018 to enable India to operate a terminal in Chabahar and Indian companies to operate from there. As a result of this, in May last year, India and Iran had signed a 10-year agreement linked to its port operations as part of which New Delhi offered a credit window worth $ 250 million for infrastructure development in the port.

The Chabahar port is a very important leg of India’s regional connectivity strategy. It is a means of maintaining its relations with Iran which have been affected by New Delhi being forced to stop buying its oil on account of the American sanctions. It also enables India to provide aid and assistance to Afghanistan because the Pakistani blockade does not allow India to do so using the overland route. In May 2016, during a visit of Prime Minister Modi to Iran, a Trilateral Agreement to establish the International Transport and Transit corridor ( The Chabahar Agreement) was signed by India, Iran and Afghanistan.

Importantly, it is a leg of the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) which India has set up with Iran and Russia for multi-modal connectivity to Europe. While the main port for the INSTC is Bandar Abbas, Chahbahar is an important link which is useful for traffic to Central Asia and Afghanistan. It is also a means of competing with China which is developing and operating the Gwadar port in Pakistan which is just 72 kms to its east.

Even as the warmth of the Modi-Trump exchange of greetings lingered, on September 20, the US announced a major overhaul of the H-1B visa programme, over 70 per cent of whose beneficiaries are Indian techies. It said that it would charge a $100,000 fee for holders of the visas. Within 24 hours, however, the pushback from US tech companies compelled the Trump administration to announce that actually the fee would only be for new visa applicants. Even so, the massive fee increase will significantly raise the cost for Indian IT companies like TCS, Infosys and Wipro, and a host of smaller companies who rely on it to service their clients in the US.

This may only be the beginning of US steps to deny Indian workers jobs and push them to US nationals. The administration is also planning stricter rules on the issue of eligibility for the visas as well as third-party placements. They may replace the random lottery system by a wage-based system.

These developments were only the bitter icing on the cake. As of today, most Indian goods face 50 per cent US tariffs which were imposed in two phases. First came the 25 % reciprocal tariff, followed by a 25 % penalty for India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. Though talks on a trade deal have intensified, there is no saying as to when these will be lifted or modified downwards.

The second issue has been the US attitude to Operation Sindoor and Pakistan. Instead of backing India, its strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific and the victim of a terror attack, the US played the role of a broker to bring on a ceasefire. Indeed, President Trump was the first to announce it and claimed that the US had brought it about and that he had used trade as a leverage to get the two sides to fall in line. India was chagrined by Trump’s repeated boasts that he had helped broker the India-Pakistan ceasefire, but it got a bigger shock when Field Marshal Asim Munir was invited by the American president for a one-on-one lunch at the White House in mid-June. Using crypto deals and a commitment to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, Islamabad managed to befriend the Trump administration.

Equally bewildering have been the accusations that India is funding the Russian war in Ukraine by purchasing Russian oil. Indian purchases, below the EU set price-cap, had been okayed by the US and the EU as a means of stabilising global oil prices. But in recent months, in a bid to pressure Russia, which they have failed to do otherwise, the Trump team has turned on India and accused its oil purchases for funding the Russian war.

Shifting geopolitics

While issues relating to tariffs, trade and visas are a matter of great concern to Modi and his government, what is alarming is the geopolitical shift that they seem to underscore.

No one in New Delhi seems to know what is driving US policy towards India. While it is true that the “America First” Trump Administration cares less about its friends than its adversaries, it is time that we confront this reality.

The Russian tariffs are still there on us, and in the coming period, we may have to grapple with dealing with the application of the draconian Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). India does not have a waiver for this act, though the US has avoided penalising India for its acquisitions from Russia, principally the S-400 surface to air missile system. Now after its success in Operation Sindoor, as it contemplates acquiring more S-400/500 systems, and upgrading the Brahmos cruise missile, CAATSA could come to haunt us.

Actually, if you look hard enough you can make out the outlines of a new Trumpian geopolitical order. It may not make sense to you, but few things in the Trump universe do. Its outlines have been around for a while. For example, the first Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (2017) had made a major shift of categorising China as a competitor, rather than a friend. But Beijing was not clearly classed as an adversary.

Now, there are signs that the US may be readying for a deal with China. The signs have been there for some time in the series of agreements that China and the US have already arrived at. Among these is the truce tariff of May 2025, the refusal to penalize China for the Russian oil purchases, the resumption of trade in rare earth minerals and semiconductors, the agreement on Tik Tok. Now Trump has hit the pause button on Taiwan weapons aid and is set to meet Xi at the sidelines of the APEC summit in Seoul, followed by a presidential visit by Trump to China.

Earlier this month Politico leaked the draft of a new US National Defense Strategy. According to the document, the US plans to prioritise hemispheric defence over all other commitments, including the erstwhile “China threat.” As part of this the US had sought to purchase Greenland, re-establish control over the Panama Canal, sought to coerce Canada and Mexico and is undertaking military action against Venezuela. It is an America First move that will leave its NATO and Indo-Pacific friends and allies to take care of themselves. India needs to hold on and, indeed, deepen its strategy of strategic autonomy rather than chase a will-o’-the-wisp of friendship with Trump.

This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.

This article went live on September twenty-third, two thousand twenty five, at zero minutes past nine in the morning.

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