On October 20, Israel’s foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar announced on X that he had spoken with Bolivia’s president-elect Rodrigo Paz, congratulating him on his “impressive victory” in the elections. Sa’ar highlighted “the history of relations between Israel and the Jewish people with Bolivia” and added, “Now, after two decades of strained relations, it is time to restore our friendship and put the ties back on track.”

In his post, Sa’ar joined previous foreign ministers who had been responsible for glossing over the darker chapters of Israel’s relations with Bolivia, particularly during the years marked by a series of military coups and dictatorships from November 1964 to 1982.

Like a game of musical chairs, members of the juntas and heads of the security apparatus rotated among themselves, but Israel maintained friendly relations and conducted security business with all of them. Some were even trained in Israel or by Israelis in Bolivia before assuming their positions in the new junta. For example, on November 24, 1978, a military coup brought Raul Lopez Leyton to the head of the interior ministry – he had parachuting wings from Israel.

Documents in archives in Israel, the United States (from the CIA and the State Department), and Bolivia indicate that the military regimes purchased aircraft from Israel and regularly acquired communications equipment, mortars and shells, Uzi submachine guns, and ammunition.

According to the documents, neither Israel nor its representatives were concerned that Nazis and neo-Nazis were active within the security forces and militias, that the regimes murdered, tortured, and disappeared opposition leaders and workers, or that they “broke strikes” in mines using machine guns, mortars, tanks, planes, and helicopters against striking workers.

Bolivia was a poor country, and its defence procurement budget from Israel was limited compared with its neighbours Argentina and Chile. However, its importance to Israel was significant, as Bolivia remained one of its loyal allies at the UN and in other international forums, and even maintained an embassy in Jerusalem during some years.

Israel was among the first countries to recognise every military regime established after a coup, beginning with the first led by General René Barrientos Ortuno on November 5, 1964. Just a month later, the head of the Bolivian embassy in Israel had already toured the country’s military industries.

In a telegram dated December 7, 1964, sent by Eliezer Armon, the First Secretary at Israel’s embassy in La Paz, to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem and Israel’s embassy in Washington, he wrote that the junta had requested Israel’s assistance in speeding up U.S. recognition of the regime. Armon explained, “We have a strong interest in trying to turn the military regime in Bolivia into an important support for us. Like most foreigners, they are convinced that Jews wield magical influence over US policy. They will not believe us if we say otherwise.”

Israel’s embassy in La Paz regularly reported on the army’s use of force to break up strikes and demonstrations. Among other incidents, in May 1965 the army dispersed protests in La Paz, with the intervention reportedly “resulting in deaths and injuries.” The reports noted that the army decided “to seize the mines by force and even occupied some of them,” leading to “hundreds of deaths.” The embassy explained that “alongside his decision to remain in power, Barrientos also adopted a domestic policy of a strong hand – that is, the establishment of a Bolivian dictatorship.”

In September 1965, the embassy reported that army units were once again sent to the mines to “break a strike” called to demand higher wages. The units “suppressed the uprisings with a heavy hand, killing women and children, destroying homes, in a lightning operation resembling a punitive campaign by an occupying army.” The embassy received reports that “the number of dead exceeded one hundred, and there were hundreds of injured.”

Despite this, a series of embassy telegrams reported that the army was pleased with the shipment of Uzi submachine guns received from Israel and with agreements for training soldiers and commanders, as well as for the purchase of mortars and shells. In March 1966, the junta’s foreign minister visited Israel, and in a joint statement issued on his behalf and on behalf of Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, it was declared that the two countries shared “a strong desire to take all measures to ensure equality for all human beings” and also to “put an end to the arms race, which diverts enormous sums toward destruction rather than construction and development.”

The embassy in La Paz repeatedly reported on the organisation, training, and involvement of Nazis and neo-Nazis, including their integration into the security forces and the right-wing fascist party (FSB). Nevertheless, maintaining relations with Bolivia’s military regimes was considered too important for Israel. According to a CIA document, in 1969 Israel concluded another deal to supply submachine guns and ammunition. A review prepared by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in January 1973 noted that “Bolivia shows understanding toward Israel at the UN as well as in other international institutions where our representatives meet. After a hiatus of several years, Bolivia reopened its mission in Jerusalem.” 

The senior Nazi criminal in Bolivia was Klaus Barbie, who had served as head of the Gestapo in Lyon, France, and was involved in the murder and torture of tens of thousands of Jews and members of the French Resistance. He was granted Bolivian citizenship in 1957 under the name Klaus Altmann, enjoyed close relations with the top echelons of the military regimes, provided services in carrying out internal repression, engaged in arms trading and helped the regimes acquire weapons, and was also connected to the FSB party. After it was discovered that Klaus Barbie was hiding in Bolivia, France demanded his extradition.

In a review prepared by Israel’s foreign ministry in March 1972, it was noted that “we have explained to the Bolivians that there is great sensitivity in Israel regarding Nazi criminals, and that we hope the man will be brought to justice.” On August 17, 1973, foreign minister Abba Eban visited La Paz and, at a press conference, responded that the matter was entirely “subject to the judgment of the Bolivian judicial system.” As if one could rely on a judiciary under a military regime that fully controlled the country, while Barbie was actively assisting that same regime in internal repression and arms procurement.

At the time of Eban’s visit, Bolivia was ruled by General Hugo Banzer Suarez, who came to power in a violent military coup in August 1971 and maintained excellent relations with Israel. In a briefing prepared by Israel’s Foreign Ministry ahead of Eban’s visit, it was noted that his regime employed “quite forceful methods of repression and persecution to maintain the order he desired.”

Among other measures, he established a network of detention and torture facilities, deployed “death squads” that kidnapped and murdered opponents, shelled universities with artillery, and used army forces to disperse protests and strikes.

For example, in January 1974, the army used planes, tanks, and machine guns against peasants protesting in the Cochabamba Valley, killing hundreds. Despite this, according to a Foreign Ministry summary from August 19, 1975, Israel sold him additional mortars, shells, and communications equipment. A CIA document from December 1975 reported that Israel also sold him Arava aircraft.

Of all the military coups in Bolivia, the one on July 17, 1980, carried out by Army Chief General Luis Garcia Meza, particularly shocked the world. The coup echoed the one led by General Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973: a state of emergency was declared and basic civil rights were suspended; political opponents were concentrated in the La Paz stadium, which became a detention and torture center; pre-trained “death squads” raided offices and homes of politicians, labor leaders, journalists, clergy, and intellectuals, using pre-prepared lists of names and addresses to abduct or execute them on the spot.

The junta that took power was financed through drug trafficking, earning the coup the nickname the “Cocaine Coup.” Three days after the takeover, on July 20, Israel’s embassy in La Paz reported that General Meza, in his speech, stated that “Bolivia should take an example from Israel.”

The administration of President Carter immediately decided to halt U.S. aid to Bolivia and refused to recognize the regime. In contrast, Israel already had good relations with General Meza, as he had initiated the purchase of additional Arava aircraft prior to the coup, and on July 31, Israel announced its recognition of his government. Shlomo Levi of the Israeli embassy in La Paz reported that he met with the junta’s defence minister on the day of Israel’s recognition, reminded him of “our close relations with the military leadership,” and expressed hope that the junta would show understanding “for our international concerns.” Although the junta was internationally isolated, Israel still considered it important to maintain its support.

On August 6, the US embassy in Washington reported that its representatives, Bentzor and Harel, were summoned to a meeting at the State Department with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Samuel Eaton. Eaton expressed surprise at Israel’s decision to recognise the junta, saying he did not understand Israel’s motives and “lectured us at length on all the crimes of the current military regime.” Bentzor replied that “Israel follows a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries with which we maintain relations.”

On September 18, Menachem Carmi, director of the Latin America Department at the Israeli foreign ministry, reported that he had met with Erwin Rubinstein, First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Carmi noted that Rubinstein explained the meeting had been requested by his superiors in Washington, who were astonished by Israel’s haste in recognising a regime defined entirely by “tyranny and repression.” He added that Israel had aligned itself with a “new dictatorial regime that most of the world rejects,” and that U.S. efforts to isolate it meant Israel was causing more reputational damage to itself than providing any benefit to Bolivia. Rubinstein also shared an internal State Department briefing paper stating that the junta admitted to detaining at least 2,500 people, torturing and executing them without trial, and that its army forces were bombing and firing from helicopters at protesters, including minors. Additionally, junta members were involved in drug trafficking.

Rubinstein asked Carmi whether Israel was supplying weapons to the junta. Carmi gave an evasive answer – rather than stating what Israel was actually doing, he replied that, to the best of his personal knowledge, Israel was not providing arms to Bolivia.

The United States was aware of Israel’s activities, and a CIA document from April 1981 noted that Israel was among the key countries relied upon by Bolivia’s security forces. In addition, Israeli weapons later served as evidence in prosecuting junta officials in trials held during the 1990s. In a letter dated September 24, 1980, General Meza wrote to another general reiterating the summary of their meeting, ordering the urgent transfer of 300 Uzi submachine guns and 3,600 rounds of 9mm ammunition to the “death squads.” The letter was later used by judges to establish the officials’ responsibility for the death squads’ actions through their arming.

Israel’s relations with General Meza continued as usual, despite the fact that, according to May 1981 cables, a “death squad” had been intercepted at the border with Brazil. Its members were neo-Nazis and agents of Bolivia’s Special Intelligence Service within the Ministry of the Interior, carrying weapons and Nazi propaganda.

This continued until August 1981, when General Meza was forced to resign under pressure from senior military officials, after holding power for one year and 18 days. Contributing factors included the severe economic crisis following the halt of US aid, as well as rivalries within the security forces themselves – there were six attempted coups. The “musical chairs” of the generals continued for another year, and in October 1982 the army “acknowledged” its failure and returned power to civilian authorities.

Just before the resignation of the foreign minister of the last military regime, on October 6, 1982, he met at the UN in New York with Israeli foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir and told him that “when the state is economically bankrupt, the army returns to its bases and from there will observe and oversee the process of democracy.” In a report prepared by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on November 16, it was noted that “the leftist nature of the new government and its ties with the Third World will undoubtedly have implications for relations with Israel.”

This is indeed what happened. With the end of the series of military regimes and the transition to civilian government, the “golden era” of Israel-Bolivia relations came to an end. In the first twenty years, there were periods of warmer and cooler relations. However, with the election of Evo Morales in 2005 – Bolivia’s first president of indigenous descent – the relations became strained and even included prolonged breaks, mainly due to the cycles of conflict in the Gaza Strip.

Unfortunately, over the years, Evo Morales’s government – which had achieved significant progress in improving the lives of the poor and the indigenous population – became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt, and among his supporters were those who acted violently against the opposition and critics.

After the October 2019 elections in Bolivia – which were alleged by the Organization of American States (OAS) to have been rigged in Morales’s favour – mass opposition protests erupted, and the security forces threatened to stage a coup against him. Morales and other senior members of his party, Movimiento al Socialismo, were forced into exile. The interim presidency was assumed by Senate Vice President Jeanine Áñez, who belonged to the far right and held racist views toward the indigenous population.

One of the first measures taken by Áñez was to sign a decree allowing the police and military to use lethal force against civilians and protesters, granting them immunity from investigation and legal proceedings. Security forces indeed shot protesters to death and launched a wave of political persecution. The new interior minister, Arturo Murillo, declared his intention to arrest and “hunt down” senior members of the Movimiento al Socialismo party, as well as anyone who incited opposition to the new government.

On November 28, 2019, Bolivia’s far-right government announced it would resume diplomatic relations with the State of Israel after a break of about 11 years. In response, Israeli foreign minister Israel Katz stated: “I welcome the announcement by the Bolivian government of its intention to renew relations with the State of Israel, which will contribute to strengthening Israel’s foreign relations and its standing in the world… The departure of the anti-Israel President Morales, and his replacement by a government friendly to Israel, makes this development possible.”

On December 6, interior minister Arturo Murillo said he had requested Israel’s assistance in training security forces to combat leftists linked to ‘terrorism.’ On February 4, 2020, Murillo posted a photo on X from his meeting with an Israeli delegation that had arrived in Bolivia.

Israel saw an opportunity to “restore the old order,” but in the October 2020 elections, Añez was defeated, and power returned to the Movimiento al Socialismo, which later experienced splits and internal conflicts.

Despite minister Sa’ar’s expectations, even if there is some improvement in relations between the countries, the new president, Rodrigo Paz, is not a far-right politician, and Bolivia faces enough internal problems—economic, social, and political—that there are more urgent matters to address than advancing Israel’s international interests.

The last thing the Bolivian people need is for the previous “good relations” to be restored, as minister Sa’ar suggested, with Israel once again becoming involved in the country’s internal repression.

Attorney Eitay Mack, together with Tag Meir Forum, supports Palestinian victims of terror and racism.

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