On May 1, in an interview to discuss the April 29 story in The Washington Post, which he was one of the authors of, Gerry Shih said the attempted assassination of one of the leaders of the Khalistan movement, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, had “the hallmark of Indian state sanction”.
Shih’s article says US intelligence agencies have assessed that the operation targeting Pannun was approved by the R&AW chief at the time, Samant Goel.
The 43-minute interview also looks at the US’s policy of accommodation with India.
The full transcript is below, with some edits for style and clarity.
Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to a special interview for The Wire. On Monday, the Washington Post published at length a story which gives details of an assassination plot allegedly hatched in India targeting one of the leaders of the Sikh Khalistan movement, who India considers a terrorist, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun – an American citizen on American soil – and that raises two critical questions.
What exactly is the picture of India that emerges from the Washington Post article? And secondly, how embarrassing might this be for the Narendra Modi government?
Joining me for today’s discussion is one of the journalists who wrote that article, the chief of the Bureau of the Washington Post in New Delhi, Gerry Shih.
Gerry Shih, your article in the Washington Post has revealed that the mastermind responsible for the alleged attempt to assassinate Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a US citizen on US soil, is a R&AW officer called Vikram Yadav. Doesn’t that mean that this is the work of a government of India employee, not a non-state actor, not a terrorist, not a criminal?
Gerry Shih: First of all Karan, thanks very much for your invitation for me to come. It’s a great honour to be here. I’ve watched your show for quite some time and I’ve been a fan. As to your first question I would say that, yes, most of what you state is correct. From what we gather, the operation was handled by an officer on duty at the Research and Analysis Wing named Vikram Yadav. Again, I would contest your assertion that he was the mastermind because in fact there are many parts and many details about this plot that we still don’t fully know. We know the identity of this person, we know that he was a CRPF officer on deputation to the R&AW but who exactly drew up the plot, that and some other questions, still remain to be answered.
KT: As you say, he may not be the mastermind, but he was an officer of the Central Reserve Police Force on secondment to R&AW and therefore, he was the government of India employee and claims made by government officials, whether made officially or whether made sotto voce – that these are the works of terrorists and criminals – is not true.
GS: Yes, I think that our reporting has shown that, at a minimum, this bore the hallmarks of an Indian state-sanctioned, state-sponsored assassination on US soil.
KT: An Indian State-sanctioned Indian state-sponsored assassination attempt.
GS: …that was not the work of an individual terrorist or a rogue agent.
KT: You have a very interesting point to make in your article about Vikram Yadav. You say, and I’m quoting you, “Yadav lacked training and skills needed for an operation that meant going up against sophisticated US Counter Intelligence capabilities.” Is that why in the end, the attempt was botched?
GS: In our analysis or piecing together what had happened I would say that the attempt probably very nearly succeeded if anything, it was a, a string of mishaps that led to its failure, including the fact that the middleman that the R&AW used, Mr Nikhil Gupta, who’s currently in custody in the Czech Republic, unwittingly hired a US government informant to carry out the assassination. What I think we point to is this sense in the wake of this botched operation. I think among people in the Indian security establishment, within the R&AW, that this was I guess, an appalling turn of events. How could this happen? We understand that morale has been quite dented. There’s been a lot of sort of recriminations raised inside the agency; this is a storied agency; it’s India’s premier external intelligence agency. These are men who hold themselves to the highest standards.
KT: So there is internal questioning going on within the agency both about the fact that Vikram Yadav, who has very little training for this sort of operation, was used and also for the fact that it hasn’t ended in success, it’s ended in embarrassment.
GS: I think, yeah, if we were to sort of look at the fact that there have been questions raised. How was it that, according to the US indictment, that that Mr Nikhil Gupta’s co-conspirators presumably inside the Indian intelligence agency were allowed to be seen on camera during a meeting…
KT: If I recall correctly, Mr Gupta himself actually swivelling the camera around to show them?
GS: Yes, yes, things like that I think that, you know, we understand that, you know, within Delhi’s sort of security circles, there’s been quite a bit of consternation. Mr Yadav from what we understand, was brought into the R&AW as part of this programme to sort of expand its ranks instituted in the last 10 years.
KT: Now you point out that not only did Mr Yadav come to R&AW from the Central Reserve Police Force, but you add he was transferred back to the CRPF after the parliament block unraveled. Do you have any sense of what might have possibly happened to him after the Washington Post published your story on Monday?
GS: I have no idea. Our understanding is that he was transferred back before the publication of our story, and there have been fears that perhaps that media like ourselves may seek to reach out to him and our attempts certainly to locate him…
KT: So he was got out of the way, so to speak; people got him out of the way in case the media tried to reach out to him, and he made the mistake of talking.
GS: He’s never spoken, as far as I’m concerned.
KT: The next critical question is, was Yadav a rogue agent? You write and I’m quoting you, “US intelligence agencies have assessed that the operation targeting Pannun was approved by the R&AW Chief at the time, Samant Goel.” You also say that Indian intelligence security officials have told you Goel was under extreme pressure to eliminate the alleged threat of Sikh terrorists overseas. How confident are you that Goel approved of what Yadav was attempting?
GS: As you said, Karan, that is the assessment from what we understand of US intelligence agencies. Again, this was not sort of a one-off a rogue actor, that this had higher up approval from within the agency including from the secretary Mr Goel, and if we also take into consideration what our sources have told us about the pressure that Mr Goel was under to eliminate these threats, that has contributed to this understanding that this was an operation.
KT: So you’re fairly confident Goel was fully in the picture?
GS: Yes.
KT: Therefore, you’re fully confident Yadav was not a rogue agent; he was acting on instructions from his boss, in fact, from the most senior boss in R&AW?
GS: That is what our reporting has led us to believe.
KT: Now you’re right; Goel stepped down as R&AW chief on June the 30th, the day Nikhil Gupta, Yadav’s contact, was taken into custody in Prague. Weeks earlier, you add, Goel had sounded confident about securing a contract extension. Is that just a series of coincidences or did Goel hurriedly step down?
GS: I think it would be too speculative to say that Gupta’s arrest in the Czech Republic and the botched operation led to Mr Goel’s stepping down. He had already served for a term of two years, plus two extensions. I think to get a further extension would have been quite out of the ordinary and remarkable, and I think the timing was such that, had the Modi administration decided to find a successor, sort of, the wheels likely would have been already in place.
KT: So his stepping down on the day that Nikhil Gupta was taken into custody is probably just a coincidence.
GS: I think we have no evidence to suggest that it is more than a coincidence.
KT: Let’s come to Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor. You write, he was probably aware of R&AW’s plan to kill Sikhs activists. You add that Goel would not have proceeded with assassination plots in North America without the approval of his superior and protector, and finally, you say CIA analysts have assessed that Doval probably knew of or approved R&AW plans to kill Sikhs his government considered terrorists. Now there’s clearly no smoking gun but how confident are you of these claims about Doval?
GS: My understanding is that the US assessments of Doval’s involvement are much lower as, as you say.
KT: How much?
GS: the confidence level is much lower. As you say there is no smoking gun, and of course Mr Doval has offered to lead the investigation into what exactly happened, and there are many American officials who also tell us that they have agreed to that and that they have taken Mr Doval’s word in good faith.
KT: But nonetheless, you quote, “CIA analysts have assessed that Doval probably knew of or approved R&AW’s plans to kill Sikhs, his government considered terrorists.” On balance, CIA analysts believe that Doval probably knew of this.
GS: In some shape or form I think – again, this is one of those questions that we have not fully answered – I don’t think we are alleging that he knew of this precise operation or precise
KT: But probably he did?
GS: There is a chance that it is our understanding that he did.
KT: Now the question is how much did the Prime Minister know? Ajit Doval is the Prime Minister’s National Security Adviser. Samant Goel the R&AW chief would have had direct access to the Prime Minister. So too would Ajit Doval, so how much did the Prime Minister know?
GS: Again, there is no smoking gun that leads to Mr Doval or Mr Narendra Modi, now, of course. We have to look more holistically at the posture of the Modi government when it comes to countering these – what it views to be – terrorist threats. This is a government that has presented itself sort of as a tough protector of the country. It has acted very assertively to crack down on the farmers’ protest movement which it saw as being sort of inflamed by overseas Khalistanis. If we were to also look at the anecdotal context – there was recently a report that came out in The Guardian alleging that the R&AW was also involved in the targeted killings of nearly a dozen or more Khalistan operatives in Pakistan. In the wake of that, Prime Minister Modi went on the campaign trail and of course, you know the famous lines…
KT: “We enter their homes and kill.”
GS: Humara dushman bhi ko pata hai.
Also read: Modi’s Pannun Plot Has Made India Hostage to US Pressure
KT: Let me quote what your article says specifically about Narendra Modi. Us and Western security officials said it’s unlikely that R&AW would have launched such operations without a clear understanding that doing so would be met with approval by the Prime Minister. Are you saying that he would have approved if he had known, or are you saying he was aware and approved. Which of the two?
GS: We’re not saying the latter, and I think that’s an important distinction to draw.
KT: So if he had known, he would have approved.
GS: I think perhaps another way to say it is that had he known, he may not have necessarily disapproved of this.
KT: In other words, this would have been something he would have accepted as necessary and that needs to be done; he wouldn’t have disapproved of it?
GS: Indeed, but we are not alleging, by any means, that he sat in a room and signed an order that said “Kar do!”
KT: You’re not alleging that he signed an order that specifically gave permission.
GS: No
KT: But you are suggesting that it’s the sort of thing he would have acquiesced in or agreed to.
GS: I think that’s certainly possible.
KT: Now, it’s not just in the United States that concerns have arisen about R&AW behavior. Your article reveals that in Australia, Germany and Britain. There have been what you call “clashes between raw and domestic security services,” You write, “R&AW officers and agents have faced arrest, expulsion and reprimand in these countries.” Can you give me some details about this?
GS: Yeah, I think you know, of course, the Khalistan movement has been kind of a leading threat in the eyes of the Indian establishment going back decades. It continues to be sort of a major target of its intelligence gathering overseas in recent years. These activities have expanded I think in terms of the level of intensity, arguably.
Sometimes the activities of the Indian officers have rubbed foreign governments the wrong way. In our article we go into some detail about the fact that that members of the Indian diaspora of the Sikh diaspora living in Germany who have been recruited by the R&AW, to be its agents, have been arrested by German authorities and put on trial. There was another previously undisclosed case in Australia in 2020-2021 in which two R&AW officers who were undeclared to the Australian government were found out by Australian Counter Intelligence and expelled from the country, and since then, the agency has not had a presence in Sydney and this remained a sort of a very ‘hush hush’ kind of incident. Let me reiterate that the case in Australia had nothing to do with the Khalistani movement.
KT: But it’s another example of the sort of work that R&AW is doing in countries outside India.
GS: Indeed, and India is a country with increasing global interests, and I think in India’s defence, these are kind of activities that you might sort of see as part and parcel of it’s expanding footprint.
KT: There were articles in two major publications in Australia yesterday, April the 30th, the Sydney Morning Herald and ABC News. Both of them claim, and they’re substantially long articles, that there is a nest of spies (one attributes those spies directly to R&AW), was broken in Australia roughly 3-4 years ago and they were expelled. Would you be surprised to learn about that?
GS: I think that’s the incident that we referred to. And Australian officials have confirmed to us that that statement by the Australian Intelligence Chief Mike Burgess – by the “the nest of spies,” he was, in fact, referring to this R&AW operation, this presence that they caught and expelled from the country. At the time, it was assumed that perhaps the “nest of spies”, he was referring to was Russia or it was China, but in fact, it was India.
KT: It was India?
GS: Indeed.
KT: In the British case, you write that in 2014-2015, when Samant Goel, incidentally, was the R&AW station chief in London, Britain’s domestic security Services delivered warnings to Goel. Does this mean that the British have direct experience of Goel’s behaviour?
GS: Indeed, and I think it kind of fits into this pattern of Indian intelligence and security officials acting in very assertive ways to pursue what they perceive to be the Khalistani threat. In this instance Mr Goel, was warned repeatedly by Britain’s MI5.
KT: Repeatedly warned? Not just once?
GS: Yes, repeatedly warned by MI5, according to our sources, about what they believe to be his overstepping of his role as the Chief of Station in London. At the time he was warned, we understand that British officials considered expelling him. When they delivered the warnings to Mr Goel, he was very angry and said, ‘These Khalistanis posed major threats to the national security of India, and it’s something that is well within our rights to take care of,’ and that’s a line that we hear over and over again. It is difficult to understate the seriousness with which the Indian government, particularly the Modi government, views this threat. These are designated terrorists by the NIA, and you know, even in recent weeks, we’ve heard Indian officials say that, sort of officially, none of these allegations are true, ‘we don’t engage in targeted killings or anything of the sort’. But, unofficially, [they say] ‘This is a major national security threat, and at some point, we have to take matters into our own hands if we are to preserve the sovereignty and security of our country.’
KT: So if you take the example of Samant Goel and try to connect the dots. He was clearly, to use the euphemism, following a very assertive role when he was station Chief in London and got reprimanded and warned. He may even have got expelled by the British…
GS: But he was not expelled.
KT: But they considered expelling him, and he’s also followed a similarly assertive role as R&AW chief in this particular case that we’re talking about concerning Vikram Yadav and Pannun. In other words, assertiveness pushing the line is part of his behaviour, part of his trait.
GS: In his defence, he’s also been, from what we understand, a loyal and capable and aggressive officer.
KT: Loyal, capable and aggressive?
GS: He has personally been involved in the pursuit of India’s most-wanted terrorist Dawood Ibrahim. I think in many ways he’s really sort of impressed many people in The Indian establishment with his record of service.
KT: So he’s made a track record in his career of aggressively pursuing people India considers terrorists.
GS: Precisely.
KT: You also mentioned a wave of violence in Pakistan, and I’m quoting you now, “where at least 11 Sikh or Kashmiri separatists living in exile and labelled terrorists by the Modi government have been killed over the past two years.” And as you said a moment ago, stories along these lines have appeared in The Guardian, stories along these lines have appeared on websites, possibly also in Pakistani newspapers. Do you believe that in this specific instance, the finger of suspicion points at India?
GS: I think, certainly. We have also seen that in each of these instances, there have been a wave of celebratory responses in media outlets that are generally seen as close to the Indian government. These operations, these killings have been hailed as sort of professional. In some cases people have wondered, ‘Oh well, even before the Gurpatwant Singh Pannun case was foiled by us authorities we already saw in Indian television cable networks people wondering out loud, ‘I wonder what will happen to Mr Pannun?’.
KT: But does that suggest that the government of India is somehow involved? These may just be what they call bhakts being celebratory, but do you believe the finger of suspicion actually points at the government?
GS: I would say that the government has certainly not dispelled the finger of suspicion. In fact, after the publication of The Guardian story, we have seen many senior BJP leaders reiterate. They have never said that the scope of these operations extended to the west but they have, when asked, ‘Will India pursue terrorists to Pakistan,’ in the context of allegations, that these targeted killings were being carried out in Pakistan, many senior government officials including the defence minister, Mr Rajnath Singh, have repeated the prime minister’s line.
KT: “We will go to their homes and kill them.”
GS: Precisely.
KT: At this point, Gerry Shih, let’s come to the Biden administration’s response to the alleged assassination attempt against Pannun you write and I’m quoting you, “They settled on a plan they hoped would ward off future plots without causing deeper ruptures with India, so the United States would refrain from punitive responses but push India into holding those responsible accountable there was as a result no expulsion of RAW officers no economic sanctions and arms deals that had been negotiated when Mr Modi visited the White House in June were permitted to proceed.” Would you call that a lenient or at least an accommodating response from Washington?
GS: I think it’s perhaps a realpolitik response from Washington. This is a government that is clearly very invested in cultivating ties with India, which it sees as an important partner to face the pacing challenge for US foreign policy which is countering China’s rise. Under that rubric, the Biden administration has taken many, many steps to contain the fallout, to insulate this quite extraordinary breach of American sovereignty, from the broader relationship. I think that’s how American officials are viewing it. We understand that at one point there have been a series of meetings at the White House in which they weighed the seriousness and the gravity of what had transpired, with other considerations of how this would affect the US relationship with India, and as a result, we have seen the Biden administration take steps that show its restraint towards India.
KT: So they’re protecting the relationship against unnecessary adverse impacts.
GS: precisely, they have not prosecuted ‘CC1,’ Mr Yadav or other R&AW officers.
KT: CC1 being, in fact, Vikram Yadav, as your paper has revealed.
GS: That is what we understand. They have not prosecuted any officials working for the R&AW or any Indian government officials. That stands in contrast to what the American government, I think, has done in the case of Russian intelligence services, in the case of Iranian agents. This discrepancy in how the American government has treated India compared to how it’s treated other countries has produced some disagreements certainly.
KT: Within the administration?
GS: Within the US government and its various departments, we understand that there were officials in the US Justice department responsible for bringing and prosecuting cases and the FBI who felt that they had enough evidence to bring charges in a court of law. Obviously, that has not happened so far.
KT: Can you identify a single or a couple of individuals of the administration who are pushing for what I earlier called leniency or accommodating attitude?
GS: It’s safe to say that as with any major foreign policy issue there are going to be disagreements among the different branches of the US government.
KT: Would Biden himself be on the side of accommodation? I presume Biden has to be.
GS: I think it is clear based on the decisions that were ultimately taken and what we’ve seen – the steps that President Biden has ultimately taken, including welcoming Prime Minister Modi in Washington with great fanfare, coming and attending the G20 – they value preserving a friendly relationship and a constructive relationship with India over pretty much anything else.
KT: The interesting thing is he welcomed Modi to the White House even though presumably, at the time, they were aware of what was happening on the Pannun front.
GS: I don’t think they were aware actually. I should correct myself. American officials were not fully aware of the alleged fact that this had national security implications and that there was a foreign atate actor behind this assassination attempt until after June 30th, when they detained Mr Gupta in Prague, obtained his phone and recovered some of his encrypted communications.
KT: Then let me ask you is one explanation for the fact that President Biden did not accept Mr Modi’s invitation to be chief guest on Republic Day which is considered a huge honour, because Mr Biden wanted to put a bit of distance between him and Mr Modi after the story had broken?
GS: American officials have said that Mr Biden simply was overworked.
KT: But that’s the official line; what’s the truth?
GS: I am wary of attributing this case to his decision.
KT: What you do point out is the following: the Indian government appointed a panel to investigate the allegations but you add a US delegation that travelled to New Delhi several weeks ago for an update on the probe returned with little evidence of meaningful progress. Were the Americans disappointed or even dissatisfied?
GS: I think there’s certainly a level of frustration that more progress hasn’t been made from the Indian side.
KT: Only frustration? Not dissatisfaction? With the sort of progress that’s being made investigating in India?
GS: I think dissatisfaction would also be a fair way to characterise, from what we’ve heard from people who sort of are involved and aware of some of these developments.
KT: But in contrast to what we’re just discussing, there’s something else in your article that suggests a different attitude from Washington. You say White House officials warned the Modi government this month that the post was close to publishing an investigation that would reveal new details about the case. Then you add it did so without notifying the Post if the Biden administration warned the Modi government that your paper was about to do a major story that would reveal new details. What does that suggest about the nature of the relationship between Washington and Delhi?
GS: I think what the administration officials did was certainly highly unusual. I think that you know we gave the US administration ample time and heads up to respond to detailed questions that we put forward to them, just as we put forward detailed questions to the Indian government about the assertions in our article. When we did that with the US side, we certainly did not expect that their knowledge of what was to come would then be given to the Indian government and I think that shows once again some of this geopolitical balancing act.
KT: But it’s more than that it’s more than just an attempt to contain the damage to the relationship. It sounds prima facie like an attempt to almost protect the Indian government from the adverse fallout of the Washington Post story to warn them so that they can forearm themselves and know what to do when the story emerges in the paper. It’s a bizarre thing to do, isn’t it?
GS: You could arrive at that conclusion. I don’t think that this was necessarily an investigation that either the Indian side or the American side wanted revealed.
KT: Were you or was your paper upset when you found out that they notified the Indian side without informing you that they proposed to do so?
GS: I probably can’t speak on behalf of the Post.
KT: What about one of the authors of the article?
GS: I think that it was an unusual step….
KT: Improper?
GS: I was personally disappointed, and I think many of my colleagues in the journalism community would probably agree, but what exactly motivated…
KT: So journalists would be surprised and disappointed?
GS: Surprised, certainly. This is not something we’ve seen before.
KT: Given everything that you’ve revealed to me – and no doubt the American administration knows a lot more than your paper was able to find out – how do you believe the Biden administration today views the Modi government?
GS: I personally think that, for all of the reasons that we’ve discussed in terms of how the US government has handled the repercussions from this foiled plot, it suggests to me that the Biden administration continues to view cultivating the relationship with India as its top priority. I know that that’s something that many in critical or liberal circles in India may not like to hear, but I think that that is what it has revealed itself to be. You know what the truth is. At the same time I would like to add that I think this relationship becomes increasingly front-and-center in US foreign policy. I think these debates within the various branches of US government, whether it’s the various agencies or on Capitol Hill, will increase.
These will be on how exactly the US government should treat India. I think those debates are only getting louder.
KT: I’ll tell you why I ask. Because you began your answer by saying that the US government seems to continue to want to cultivate the relationship with India as a top priority. On the other hand, you also accepted that a couple of weeks ago when a US delegation came to India wanting to find out how the probe was proceeding they returned frustrated. You also agreed that they returned dissatisfied. We know that Biden, for whatever reason he’s officially given, didn’t accept what is considered a huge honour to be chief guest on Republic Day and we know since then Jake Sullivan has twice confirmed and twice failed to come to India on both occasions, I believe, citing that he has a lot of work to do.
Is there an impact happening as a result of the fact that the Americans feel that the probe in India is not moving satisfactorily?
GS: I think there’s certainly dissatisfaction about the probe, but like I said, I think you know governments of this size often can walk and chew at the same time. It’s one of those things where at the departmental level even you may have a great deal of frustration…
KT: Even if Biden not coming for Republic Day was not necessarily connected to the part of the story, is Jake Sullivan cancelling twice connected to it?
GS: We’ve heard various explanations, of course, about what Mr Sullivan was preoccupied with. At this point I’m also wary of attributing his absence to a snub to India or the Modi government.
KT: You’re willing to attribute it to us or?
GS: I’m wary of it.
KT: You’re wary of it?
GS: I’m reluctant to.
KT: Okay, finally, yesterday, the 30th, Randhir Jaiswal, the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, said your report makes unwarranted and unsubstantiated imputations. He also called it speculative and irresponsible. How does one of the authors of that story and as well as the chief of the Bureau of the paper in Delhi respond to this?
GS: Well first, I would say that I think our reporting has been solid and and second of all, we were keen to have input from the Indian government. We provided them detailed line-by-line questions…
KT: And they didn’t take it up?
GS: …containing our assertions that would appear in the article for many days in advance and we didn’t hear back so we proceeded to publish.
KT: So you’re saying that this claim that it is an unwarranted and unsubstantiated imputation is one you disagree with?
GS: Well certainly. The MEA has…it’s in their right to reach whatever conclusions they’ve reached about our article, but certainly if they had told us that the article reached incorrect imputations, we would, ahead of our publication, have included their perspective.
KT: What about the fact that they claim it’s irresponsible?
GS: It’s our responsibility as the media to critically and earnestly investigate these matters, and I think that this is an issue that is a looming sort of an irritant. Albeit one that can be overcome in bilateral relations. I think that it deserved journalistic scrutiny and hopefully we provided that.
KT: In other words, this article deserves to be written, and it’s not irresponsible to do so.
GS: Correct.
KT: Gerry Shih, thank you very much for making time for me. Take care, stay safe.
GS: Thanks very much, Karan. It’s a pleasure to be here.
