Operation Sindoor Has the Key to Why India and US Ties Are in Doldrums

The special session of the parliament on Operation Sindoor exposed the limitation of India’s foreign policy, driven as it is by the objective of projecting Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a strong leader, instead of furthering India’s national interests. This objective suffered a setback after Operation Sindoor.

Before I go into the three key operational failings of Operation Sindoor, it should be understood that between nuclear armed India and Pakistan, the air war will determine the outcome of the campaign. While the firing of long-range missiles and drones by both sides will cause destruction of military and civilian infrastructure, apart from collateral damage, it will not determine the outcome of the war. Instead, it could raise the possibility of nuclear signalling by Pakistan since it has an elongated geography with numerous high value targets close to the border. The side which achieves limited, or total air superiority, will quickly help its army move fast to occupy enemy territory. For this reason, the air battle of May 6-7 night was important.

The first and biggest failing of Operation Sindoor was the timidity of military leaders, allowing the political leadership to determine operational matters. For example, India’s naval attaché in Indonesia, Captain Shiv Kumar disclosed that IAF was told to fire its missiles into Pakistan without first silencing Pakistan’s air defences. At a time when the Pakistan Air Force had adequate warning of the impending attack, this was a shocking lapse. Then, India formally asking for an end to hostilities within half an hour of its operations not only showed a lack of political will to fight, but also that the political leadership was in operational control with the IAF leaders watching helplessly. These, and other issues which insiders know but are afraid to talk about, led to IAF fighter losses, whose numbers no one is willing to disclose.

The second operational shortcoming was that the Indian military was unaware that it would not be fighting the Pakistan military but a one-front-reinforced war. This meant the Pakistan military was fully supported by the PLA's non-kinetic capabilities and the combat support needed for a war surge. This was a big support for the Pakistan military considering neither the US nor Russia helped the Indian military with round-the-clock surveillance capabilities by their constellation of satellites namely, GPS (Global Positioning System) and GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System). After Sindoor, news came that to boost its real-time surveillance for military actions, the Indian military was in talks for commercial satellite imagery from a US-based company called Maxar Technologies, amongst others.

The third failing was of the IAF being unmindful of PAF’s new war concept called Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). MDO are done by a digital ecosystem where space, air and ground assets and fighters are integrated by data link allowing free information flow amongst them. This ecosystem is ideal for firing Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. So, instead of PAF’s J-10C doing a one-on-one engagement with IAF’s Rafale, it used the MDO in what is called a ‘system of systems’ approach. The J-10C got the information feed from airborne assets and on getting the target coordinates through it, the fighter fired its PL-15 BVR missile while keeping its own radar off so as not to disclose its location. The PL-15 with a range of over 200km initially flew on a pre-programmed trajectory using its inertial navigation system with the mid-correction provided by an airborne asset. In the terminal phase, the PL-15’s own AESA radar got activated and guided the missile to the target. Once the missile’s AESA radar locked on the target, its seeker, highly resistant to the target's electronic countermeasures, ensured that it hit it with precision. The PL-15 is an advanced BVR.

Four issues regarding ‘system of systems’ warfighting are noteworthy. One, it requires great effort to put the hardware and software of the digital ecosystem in place. Two, it takes years of realistic combat training, patience and hard work for pilots to become proficient in using a digital ecosystem. Three, the PAF needed to have an advanced level of electronic warfare capabilities to ensure that the software data links connecting the ecosystem were not disrupted or damaged by the adversary. And four, unlike one-on-one engagement which is a tactical approach, the MDO operates at the higher operational level involving multiple domains of land, air, space and electromagnetic spectrum with linked assets and capabilities from them. The MDO is necessary for BVRs engagement in modern aerial warfare.

The outcome of the air war was sensed by the US when shortly after asking Pakistan to end hostilities through the DGMO channel, Indian NSA Ajit Doval spoke with his US counterpart Marco Rubio. The latter on social media said the US was monitoring the India-Pakistan situation and President Trump was keen for an early ceasefire. Besides Doval other policy makers were also in touch with the Trump administration which in turn was interacting with Pakistanis for an early ceasefire. This was the basis of Trump’s repeated claims made later that he brought about the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, thereby preventing a nuclear war. 

Pakistan was quick to publicly thank Trump for the ceasefire through its foreign minister Ishaq Dar, something that India did not do. India stuck to the narrative that it was Pakistan which sought ceasefire with India on May 10 after its military’s kinetic beating by the Indian military. Both Trump and Modi stuck to their positions for different reasons. Trump had entered his presidency as a peace time president who promised to end the Ukraine war in 24 hours. However, having failed to end wars in Ukraine and West Asia, Trump needed a breakthrough by claiming to end a possible nuclear war between India and Pakistan to show to his voter base that he was serious about ending ‘forever wars’. India denied him that opportunity since India’s foreign policy is premised on Modi being a strong leader. To be sure, this incident did not go down well with an egoistic Trump.

Also read: Operation Sindoor: How India's Gamble Backfired and Made It More Vulnerable

Add to this was Trump’s open call to India to withdraw from BRICS which he said was an anti-US group out to weaken the US dollar. Moreover, with Russia ignoring Trump’s ultimatums to end the Ukraine war, he instructed India to stop buying Russian oil. This of course was not possible for India since (a) it would show Modi as a weak leader, (b) adversely impact India’s economy, and (c) it would end the already strained ties with Russia, which besides so many other things, is India’s guarantor of peace with China.

In short, India’s projected foreign policy of multi-alignment (being in the QUAD and the BRICS at the same time) or being sought by all nations in the world, lies shattered. The reality of the present multipolar world with three great powers (the US, China and Russia) is that the Modi government’s foreign policy is aligned with the US’ Indo Pacific policy meant to contain China’s rise. All US presidents since Obama’s pivot to Asia had sought to contain China’s rise with India becoming its military bulwark in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The US’ role for India as a net security provider (including for combat) in the IOR suited the Modi government since it saw in this an opportunity of projecting its own strategic reach befitting a major power. So, the Modi government did two things. One, on the military front, it signed US military’s four foundational agreements to become a part of the US Indo-Pacific command defence network. Two, on the policy front, external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar abandoned SAARC and focused on BIMSTEC which he said aligned well with Modi government’s Act East policy which in turn was compatible with US’ Indo Pacific policy with QUAD as its key component.

Moreover, as the founding member of Russia-India-China which was formed on the suggestion of Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov in the Nineties and later became the basis of BRICS, India realised that with the rise of China, it had become a powerful grouping doing better than the G-7. Thus, until the arrival of the Trump administration, India could have its cake and eat it too since it was both in QUAD and BRICS. Given this, India’s G-20 presidency in 2023 gave it the opportunity to showcase the four pillars of its foreign policy. These were:

(a) India’s pivot to the US’ foreign policy while being the foundational member of BRICS;

(b) Close ties with G-7 given India’s strategic proximity to the US;

(c) Projecting itself as the bridge between Global South and Global North; and

(d) Piggybacking on the US foreign policy, it projected regional competition with China. 

President Trump crushed India’s foreign policy assumptions. 

Trump was not interested in security competition with China in the IOR, hence the strategic role of India diminished, if not ended. Trump’s foreign policy focus was on MAGA (Make America Great Again) through trade wars, to end forever wars, to maintain security competition with China in the eastern Pacific by hoping to keep it tied in the first island chain. While this was bad news for India, it quickly decided to hoist its strategic ties with the US on MAGA. This resulted in the February 13 joint statement between India and the US which promised Mission 500: to enhance the present US $ 200 billion bilateral annual trade to US $ 500 billion by 2030. India committed to buy Green Tech, Big Tech, energy, and defence equipment amongst other things from the US. Both sides were happy until Operation Sindoor happened.

While Trump was unhappy with Modi for denying him the credit for ending the war, he was astonished by his own intelligence briefing that five jets (belonging to the IAF) were lost in the opening round of the four days war. Trump publicly mentioned this number hoping that India would give its version of IAF fighter losses, which did not happen. This convinced Trump and much of the world that the Pakistan military was a peer competitor of the Indian military since India did not want an escalation after firing its opening kinetic salvo and was unwilling to talk on fighter losses in the air battle. This was the reason for Trump’s strategic tilt from India to Pakistan. Since the US own foreign policy is predicated on military power, Pakistan’s show of its military power was quickly noticed by Trump resulting in two areas of strategic convergence between the two nations: The US wants Pakistan to stabilise Afghanistan, and it wants Pakistan’s help to get a foothold in the region to keep a watch on the Eurasian landmass.

As a consequence of Operation Sindoor, India and Pakistan were hyphenated as peer military competitors. And by denying Trump the credit of successfully ending a potential nuclear war, India’s strategic ties with the US are in doldrums. Meanwhile, India cannot normalise ties with Beijing as its China policy of regional competition with it would unravel. Since normalisation of ties would imply mutual cooperation, China’s deep pockets, superior infrastructure building capability, advancement in standards setting in Green and Big Tech, its exceptional ecosystem for global manufacturing and so on would end India’s hope of projecting itself as China’s regional competitor. Given its colonial mindset, dent to India’s image of being the big brother in South Asia is unacceptable to New Delhi. Between a partnership with China and being a US vassal, India would prefer the latter, as it would come with the illusion of major power, even if by association. Thus, unless India changes its mindset, its rise will not happen.

Pravin Sawhney’s most recent book is The Last War: How AI Will Shape India’s Final Showdown with China.

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