Pakistan’s Slick US Strategy: It’s Deja Vu All Over Again
Chandigarh: For decades, Pakistan has been a savvy punter in the regional strategic, diplomatic and political stakes, efficiently managing a revolving door of US officials passing through this perpetually volatile, nuclear-armed and generally hazardous region, where logic is invariably discounted and negotiation resembles live theatre.
Consequently, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s fawning response last weekend to President Donald Trump’s baffling cocktail of contradictory statements about ‘brokering’ peace between India and Pakistan after Operation Sindoor and resolving the Kashmir dispute, was more than mere diplomatic courtesy.
It was, in essence, a well-rehearsed reprise of Islamabad’s decades-old playbook of wooing the Americans with a calibrated mix of charm, hospitality and strategic ambiguity, while striking just the right chords of anxiety – bolstered by the ever-present spectre of nuclear apocalypse – to keep Washington engaged and continuing to back and bankroll Islamabad.
In his post on X last Saturday, Sharif thanked Trump for his “leadership and proactive role for peace in the region” and lauded Washington’s facilitation of the cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan.
He also expressed gratitude to Vice President J.D. Vance and secretary of state Marco Rubio for their “valuable contributions towards peace in South Asia”, calling it a “new beginning” for resolving contentious issues that have long prevented the region’s “journey toward peace, prosperity and stability”.
It was a textbook psychological operation: an adept mix of flattery and opportunism. Sharif praised Trump in a way that appealed directly to his ego, an approach known to be effective with the president, while simultaneously seizing the moment to push Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, seeking once again to internationalise the dispute under the guise of welcoming American mediation.
This seemingly disarming strategy, designed to charm, confuse and keep US officials perpetually off-balance about Islamabad’s true intentions, dates back nearly seven decades to the early Cold War era when Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation in the mid-1950s.
Though both treaties were US-led anti-Communist alliances, aimed primarily at containing the Soviet Union, Pakistan deftly repurposed them to secure aid, arms and unflinching US political and diplomatic backing against India through the 1965 and 1971 wars.
Thereafter, circumstances and geography further conspired to render Pakistan the US's ‘frontline’ state during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan until 1989, and once again during the post-9/11 US-led war in Afghanistan that ended in 2020.
The latter two seismic chapters became the backdrop for Pakistan’s masterclass in strategic juggling, nimbly turning regional chaos into a finely tuned game of leverage, survival and profitability for Islamabad.
So, when Trump floated the idea of US mediation on Kashmir, albeit muddled and amateurishly enunciated, Pakistan’s muscle memory kicked in immediately and responded, as it had many times earlier, to squeeze every ounce of advantage from a situation that India virulently opposed.
For Islamabad, every muddled American statement on Kashmir is simply yet another opening to reframe the hugely complex 78-year-old dispute, press its case and bask in the theatre of international mediation – even if it’s mostly smoke and mirrors.
Pakistan, a regional fire-starter who also offers the firehose
At every major inflection point in South Asia’s turbulent history, Pakistan’s military-controlled polity has shown an uncanny ability to sell itself as both problem and solution: the regional fire-starter who also offers the firehose, always for a price.
Operation Sindoor was one such instance, for while India showcased its superior military firepower and cutting-edge precision weaponry, Pakistan adroitly reverted to its well-worn playbook: of playing the victim and, more critically, signaling its nuclear weapons card.
The mere hint of a meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority – which oversees its strategic arsenal – was enough to send shivers down diplomatic spines in Washington. Almost immediately, the US, which hours earlier had declared the India-Pakistan conflict as ‘none of its business’, leapt into action. Vance and Rubio, until then passive bystanders, were suddenly recast as crisis mediators, who placed calls, cooled tempers and finagled a ceasefire.
Islamabad knew such a script well, having rehearsed and refined it for decades, especially after becoming a declared nuclear weapons state in 1998. Alongside, it had also developed a visceral sensitivity to precisely how much instability and nuclear brinkmanship the US and its Western allies could tolerate before blinking, to prevent collapse, escalation or a strategic overreaction.
Whether, previously, it’s been about acquiring F-16 fighters, averting global financial sanctions over terror links, or skirting accountability for nuclear proliferation scandals, Pakistan has played the long game masterfully. It has expertly positioned itself as one too dangerous to fail, and one too useful to punish.
And the fallout?
How Islamabad has used cocktail of flattery, disinformation to woo US establishment
If previous instances are any guide, the melee invariably results in a quiet reshuffling of the diplomatic poker table before the next manufactured crisis. And, more often than not, it’s Pakistan that walks away with more chips – having played a weaker hand but with greater skill and cunning.
In short, the Americans may host the table, but Islamabad has been dealing the cards for years.
Meanwhile, in India, a crucial aspect of the US-Pakistan dynamic is often overlooked – either deliberately, or through ignorance and neglect: Pakistan’s seductive courtship of American officials through lavish hospitality, unfettered access to senior leadership, persuasive narratives and what could only be described as military tourism.
“Pakistan’s track record shows that it is relatively easy for its army to beguile American officials to its strategic, military and above all, pecuniary advantage,” said C. Christine Fair, author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, and co-editor of Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges, in conversation a few months earlier with The Wire.
Despite Pakistan’s long-standing support for the Afghan Taliban – who were responsible for the deaths of thousands of US troops – and despite its unabashed development of tactical nuclear weapons, Washington had given Islamabad over $50 billion since 9/11, Fair pointed out.
The US even provided Pakistan with weapons systems better suited to fighting its strategic ally India, than combating the insurgents and terrorists Islamabad claimed to oppose.
“Pakistan’s military establishment has mastered the art of wooing large swathes of the US policy ecosystem – senators, congressional delegations, think-tank analysts, even journalists – by offering rare access to its top brass and institutions. Over time, Pakistan has studied what Americans like and learned exactly how to cater to those preferences” said Fair, who is currently a professor of security studies at Georgetown University and who spent over 15 years in Pakistan studying security dynamics and learning Urdu and Punjabi.
The Pakistanis, asserted Fair, were quick to spot “potential” in junior US officials and think-tank analysts – and invest in them early for future “mining”. For these carefully chosen guests, Pakistan’s military has been known to abandon protocol, arranging high-level meetings not only with the chief of army staff but also with the director general of the formidable Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID, all while unleashing its trademark mix of charm and deceit on often naive and gullible Americans.
“Consequently, US subway strap-hangers from humble backgrounds were bowled over by the Pakistan army’s feudal grandeur and showmanship,” Fair said. “They went away not just impressed and obligated, but sympathetic to Islamabad’s cause – and determined to plead its case for material and monetary assistance.”
For instance, Fair recounted how then-President Pervez Musharraf had once autographed a photograph of her beloved pit bull during a brief one-on-one meeting when she was a junior analyst at the RAND Corporation in California. Soon afterward, he even had the Pakistan army band play her favourite tune at a private event organised for a visiting US security team.
“Pakistani military and security officials are engaging, seemingly jocular and always charming,” Fair noted. “But beneath that charm lies a deliberate campaign of miseducation – on nuclear matters, their F-16 program, support for the Taliban and more.”
This lethal cocktail of flattery and disinformation, she argued, had allowed Pakistan to slowly insinuate itself into the upper echelons of American power, from the Pentagon and State Department to elite think tanks.
Fair added that many retired Pakistani military officers, particularly those from the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal, have secured post-retirement positions in US-based institutions, further cementing influence.
According to Fair, many Americans find the “feigned candour” of Pakistani military officers refreshing.
The only real resistance to this PR offensive, she noted, came from a small group of US officials who had served in Afghanistan post-2001 and had first-hand experience with Pakistan’s duplicitous behavior. But they were too few, and too dispersed, to effectively challenge the slick Pakistani narrative.
Over the years, successive US embassy staffers in Islamabad – including military attaches, congressional delegations, policy analysts and journalists – were repeatedly charmed after interactions with smooth-talking senior officers of the Pakistan army.
Their visits to Rawalpindi’s General Headquarters, the SPD, ISID headquarters and the historic Bala Hissar Fort, home to the Frontier Force Regiment, were highlights of their trips. These visits were marked by grand hospitality, curated briefings and fetching souvenirs, all wrapped in an aura of strategic gravitas.
Military tourism was also an integral part of this image-management campaign. Helicopter rides were laid on by the army and ISI to the restive Federally Administered Tribal Areas, to showcase the “frontline” narrative. Trips to the Force Command Northern Area, a division-sized formation headquartered in Gilgit, were used to subtly reinforce Pakistan’s strategic victimhood and to provide a carefully constructed view of the Kashmir conflict.
India, on the other hand…
In contrast, Fair described her experiences in India with its security officialdom as strikingly different.
Despite spending considerable time researching security issues in the country – and most recently honing her linguistic skills in Chandigarh, where she translated short stories from Gurmukhi into English – she found India’s bureaucratic culture to be largely aloof and hierarchical.
India’s status-conscious officialdom, she said, was often “disdainful” of visiting junior analysts, congressional delegations and random US senators – many of whom were simultaneously welcomed with open arms in Pakistan.
“Unlike Pakistani officials, their Indian counterparts simply failed to grasp that even junior congressmen could play influential roles in shaping US security policy,” Fair noted. As a result, even when it was imperative to brief these visitors with the Indian perspective, it often didn’t occur to New Delhi to make the effort.
“And even when meetings are secured,” she added, “they often feel less like cordial exchanges and more like lectures.”
The overall experience with Indian officialdom, she noted, was frequently stiff and unwelcoming – especially in contrast to Pakistan’s disingenuous yet persuasive suavity.
This difference, she argued, left a lasting impression on American officials and analysts unfamiliar with South Asia, and often ended up working in Pakistan’s favour.
“US officials view this standoffishness in Delhi with both frustration and suspicion,” said Fair. “They wonder – if India is truly under threat from nuclear-armed adversaries like Pakistan and China, as it certainly is – why aren’t Indian officials doing more to convey the urgency of their situation, as the Pakistanis so deftly do?”
One other security analyst, who opted to remain anonymous, said Pakistan successfully ‘emotionally managed’ US officials, much like an ex-spouse simply unable to let go but knowing exactly which buttons to push to get his or her way.
India, on the other hand, he said, ‘enlightened’ Americans in lengthy briefings, peppered with ancient Sanskrit homilies to induce diplomatic hypnosis. Decisions or actions followed after six months, many joint statements and undisclosed calls later, with the concerned officials boasting of having ‘exposed’ Pakistani perfidy.
Under the present circumstances, perhaps, this needed changing.
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