New Delhi: The return of Katchatheevu Island into the political arena, raised by the party in power itself, is unlikely to enhance India’s credibility with Sri Lanka or its neighbouring countries, even as the Indian external affairs minister parried questions about the reopening of a 1974 agreement with Sri Lanka.
This time, it was Prime Minister Narendra Modi who amplified a response to a right to information (RTI) query submitted by the BJP’s Tamil Nadu president.
Twice in two days, Modi backed reports in the Times of India that referred to the RTI response to attack the party ruling in the key southern state, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), and its alliance partner, the Congress, for their “double standards”.
The PM’s line of attack was that the DMK and Congress had both knowingly collaborated to hand over Katchatheevu Island to Sri Lanka through the 1974 bilateral agreement.
External affairs minister S. Jaishankar also held a press conference at the BJP’s headquarters on Monday (April 1), where he claimed that government documents show that DMK leader and chief minister M. Karunanidhi had been aware that the island would not fall under Indian territory under the bilateral agreement.
Jaishankar was repeatedly asked whether New Delhi was looking at re-opening the treaty and talking with Sri Lanka, but he dodged these questions by saying that it was not the main issue and the matter was sub-judice.
But, as the issue has been inserted into the campaign by the BJP, there is concern that it will gather its own momentum and put a spanner in India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations.
According to Nirupama Menon Rao, former foreign secretary who was India’s ambassador to Colombo from 2004 to 2006, the “recent resurgence of the Katchatheevu Island issue in the internal political domain in India, on the eve of the general election, is likely to be interpreted in Sri Lanka as yet another replay of an old but important controversy in Tamil Nadu politics”.
Similarly, another former Indian high commissioner to Sri Lanka (2009-13), Ashok Kantha, said that Colombo also “understands” that this is purely an electoral issue.
He told The Wire that relations with Sri Lanka will not be harmed “as long as there is no follow up with concrete measures or [an] attempt at retrieval”.
Rao also noted that while the issue gives a handle to the BJP to attack the opposition on the issue of having “divided” India, “the ‘retrieval’ of the island from Sri Lanka may be a bridge too far”.
“The question also arises, what is India ready to provide Sri Lanka as recompense if such an issue were to be placed, realistically speaking, on the agenda of bilateral relations?” she asked.
The former foreign secretary also questioned whether India would be willing to be seen as re-opening a signed international treaty. “Also, would India be willing to be seen as re-opening international treaties and agreements to which it is signatory and thus setting an unusual precedent in global politics?”
India’s relations with neighbouring states in the immediate Indian Ocean neighbourhood has gone through upheaval over the years.
Currently, ties with the Maldives are under a shadow after President Mohamed Muizzu came to power on a campaign platform to remove Indian troops operating helicopters from the island nation.
Relations with Sri Lanka have been on a relatively even keel, with India offering assistance of up to $2 billion during its economic collapse.
Concurrently, Sri Lanka has also maintained close ties with China as Beijing is significant in negotiating favourable terms to alleviate its significant debt burden.
As a 2018 article in India Quarterly, the journal published by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)’s think tank, the Indian Council for World Affairs, noted, for Sri Lanka, Katchatheevu Island was strategic as it figured as a base for its military practice.
While Colombo had concerns about Indian ‘expansion’ that impacted its military posture, India did not have a similar view.
According to a former Indian ambassador, Katchatheevu would only hold strategic importance for India if it were considered as a potential launch site for conflict against Sri Lanka.
However, as this scenario was deemed implausible, Katchatheevu, a small uninhabited island with a derelict Christian church, was not regarded as possessing inherent value.
The maritime boundary agreed upon in the 1974 agreement was not based on the equidistant principle, but was modified so that the boundary line runs one nautical mile west of the island.
“If the equidistant formula was applied, then 70% to 80% of the island would be in Sri Lankan territory, so it was modified as per international norms,” said another former Indian diplomat who did not want to be quoted.
He also reiterated that the island had no strategic value for India. “If it was a bit [further] north towards Trincomalee, I could possibly see the argument. The only strategic value was that there is good quality shrimp around the island. But, going fishing is happening, even that issue will go away”.
According to the authors of the 2018 India Quarterly article, despite losing Katchatheevu, India gained in two ways from the 1974 agreement.
“Of the total Palk Bay area of 2,100 square nautical miles, India’s share vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan share in terms of ratio was 1.02:1. In other words, India got 0.02 units more than the equal share,” it said.
The second advantage was two special clauses that allowed Indian fishermen to use Katchatheevu for pilgrimage and drying nets and that granted the free movement of vessels in the Palk Bay.
The 2018 paper contended that the 1976 agreement, which extended the boundary line in the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Mannar, was weighed on by the negotiations related to Katchatheevu.
In the second agreement, Sri Lanka claimed fishing rights in the Wadge Bank, which India disputed. As a compromise, India only permitted Sri Lankan fishermen to fish for three years following the establishment of an Extended Economic Zone (EEZ). After three years, New Delhi agreed to provide 2,000 tonnes of fish annually to Sri Lanka.
However, the exchange of letters between the two sides allowed India to ensure there was a clear understanding that fishermen from either side will not fish in the other country’s territorial waters or EEZs.
The authors asserted that without “such explicit mention, India would have lost fishing rights at Wadge Bank to Sri Lankan fishermen”.
On June 1, 1974, India and Sri Lanka issued a joint statement on the demarcation of the boundary in the Palk Bay “in conformity with historical evidence, legal international principles and precedents”.
The Indian foreign minister at the time, Swaran Singh, made two statements in both houses of parliament on July 1 and July 23, amidst a walkout by opposition MPs, including of the DMK.
During the proceedings, opposition MPs also pointed out to the Supreme Court judgement saying that any transfer of territory has to be approved by parliament.
The foreign minister’s statement, however, did not address that point of contention, but he noted: “The question of Katchathivu … had necessarily to be dealt with as part of the broader question of the boundary in the Palk Bay so as to eliminate the possibility of any further disputes on similar matters in these historic waters”.
On August 1, during another debate on the issue, Singh also pointed out that the case for India’s sovereignty over the island was not very clear as per paper records.
Singh, as per the MEA’s records, told Lok Sabha MPs that Sri Lanka had an advantage as the Government of India in 1924 had recommended after examination of evidence to London that sovereignty of Katchatheevu should be with Ceylon (the name Sri Lanka was known by at the time).
To repeated claims that the Raja of Ramnad had the island as part of zamindari rights, Singh had retorted, “Does he want me to give all the facts that are against us?”.
“If you want a straight answer, then I would say that in the ‘sanad’ which was with the Raja of Ramnad, Kachchativu was not mentioned. There were other 2,000 villages which were mentioned. It was a significant omission,” Indian external affairs minister said in the Lok Sabha in August 1974.
After the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen returned to their boats and the strengthened navy was patrolling the territorial waters more strictly. This led to clashes with Indian fishermen, with shootings by the Sri Lankan navy further driving up emotions.
Six months after the Modi government had taken over, the MEA received an RTI submission in November 2015 that listed out 13 queries, which included demands of documents to show whether Tamil Nadu chief minister Karunanidhi had accepted Indira Gandhi’s decision to give Katchatheevu to India and correspondence between the Union and state governments.
Despite the extensive questions, the MEA refused on the grounds that the disclosure of requested documents “could prejudicially affect India’s relations with a foreign state” and therefore would fall under the purview of section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act.
It had also noted that it was “sub-judice” due to two writ petitions submitted to the Supreme Court.
Even when the matter was raised in parliament by Tamil Nadu lawmakers, the NDA government’s foreign minister, from the beginning, had refused to comment further on Katchatheevu by saying that the matter was pending in the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the government was more forthright.
“The island was given to Sri Lanka on the basis of a bilateral agreement in 1974. To retrieve it now, we have to go to war,” attorney general Mukul Rohatgi said in August 2014 during the hearing in the apex court on writ petitions filed by the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the DMK.
In January 2015, the MEA received another RTI query asking about the “real owner” of Katchatheevu Island and whether there were “any written documents of the ownership”.
After referring to the 1974 and 1976 agreements, the MEA informed that it “did not involve either acquiring or ceding of territory belonging to India since the area in question had never been demarcated”.
Nine years later, this RTI reply created a buzz when an opposition MP highlighted that the Modi government itself had admitted there was no territorial concession to Sri Lanka, contradicting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement.
A former Indian ambassador noted that during the Modi administration, India had ratified the land boundary agreement with Bangladesh, exchanging enclaves. This move underscored the necessity of a pragmatic approach for border resolution, considering the broader perspective and ground realities.
In this exchange, India gained 7,110.02 acres but transferred 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh.
Regarding adverse possessions, India gained 2,777.038 acres while ceding 2,267.682 acres to Bangladesh. Overall, India ended up with about 9,887 acres less than Bangladesh.
Similarly, India was quick to accept the ruling of the UN tribunal that handed over nearly 80% of 25,000 square kilometres of disputed area in the Bay of Bengal. This is since cited in international law as a positive step towards using the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to resolve disputed waters.
“If the government could give over land to resolve borders with Bangladesh, which required a larger exchange of territory, then it is surprising to see this matter of Katchatheevu being politicised by the same government now,” the former ambassador said.
