Seven Unanswered Questions After Wang Yi’s India Visit

New Delhi: The high-profile visit of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Delhi in August 2025 has generated headlines and official optimism, but it also leaves deep, unresolved questions about the Modi government’s approach to India’s most complex bilateral relationship. While both sides celebrate revived diplomatic channels and new forums for engagement, the underlying issues that determine India’s security and geopolitical standing remain largely unaddressed. Here are the seven pressing questions that have been left unanswered in the wake of Wang Yi’s visit.

1) Has the situation on the LAC in eastern Ladakh returned to the status quo ante of April 2020?

The Modi government is rapidly normalising ties, including resumption of direct flights, border trade and pilgrimages, without substantive progress on the core boundary issue or restoration of the status quo ante at key friction points in Ladakh.

This reverses India’s longstanding policy, as articulated by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar: “Our relationship is not normal, it cannot be normal as the border situation is not normal”. Certain areas in buffer zones remain out of reach of Indian military patrols, confirming that substantive restoration of the territorial status quo remains elusive.

If normalisation of bilateral ties is possible without resolving the Ladakh border crisis, how will India regain leverage for future disengagement?

2) Has India reiterated its position on Taiwan without China changing its policy on stapled visas?

As per the official Chinese statements, Jaishankar told his Chinese counterpart that “Taiwan is a part of China” and NSA Ajit Doval told Wang that “India has always adhered to the one-China policy”. MEA issued a non-denial about Jaishankar’s statement while there was no clarification about Doval’s words.

‘One-China’ is a phrase India has refrained from using in joint statements since 2008, after Beijing began issuing stapled visas to some Indian citizens from J&K and Arunachal Pradesh. There is no evidence of a change in China’s visa policy, raising doubts about why the Modi government made this diplomatic concession, especially without any public explanation or reciprocal movement from Beijing.

3) Why has there been a policy shift on the ‘early harvest’ proposal from China?

The Modi government has now agreed to consider the ‘early harvest’ boundary settlement proposal, which it had previously been rejected in 2019 as being contrary to the 2005 Political Parameters Agreement. The proposal means resolving the boundary dispute in a piecemeal manner, with Sikkim border being the ‘early harvest’ allowing China to cut a border deal with Bhutan, instead of considering the whole boundary as a single package. This marks a significant shift in India’s negotiating stance, yet it has occurred without any public debate or parliamentary scrutiny.

The questions remains as to what changed between 2019 and now to justify this unexplained concession from the Modi government.

4) Why will Beijing share only emergency hydrological data from its rivers?

India remains concerned over China’s mega-dam construction on the Brahmaputra, which impacts water flow and downstream security. Yet, China has committed only to sharing hydrological information during “emergency situations based on humanitarian considerations,” rather than providing real-time, ongoing data.

This limitation leaves India vulnerable to unilateral upstream decisions with strategic consequences. The statements show no Chinese commitment to address this issue, as the Modi government is left “underlining concerns” while China simply “notes” them, indicating lack of leverage in negotiations.

5) Is China willing to stop its active military support to Pakistan?

Another persistent worry for India has been the Chinese military support to Pakistan during the most recent clash. This was highlighted by the deputy chief of the Indian army in a public forum, and Chinese weaponry has been blamed for some of the significant losses suffered by the Indian armed forces during Operation Sindoor. There is no evidence that the Modi government pressed China for guarantees in this area. It ought to be a key condition for genuine friendship and improved ties between India and China. Without assurance that Beijing will restrain its support to India’s principal security threat, the risk of strategic encirclement and a two-front collusive threat remains open. Beijing has refused to even condemn Pakistan’s support for terrorism, when Wang Yi’s last stop in this visit is in Islamabad.

6) Has China officially committed to resolving contentious trade and supply chain issues?

While the Modi government’s official narrative touts resumed trade and increased cooperation, questions persist about the supply of strategic imports. China has not issued any public commitment to resume or guarantee access to DAP fertilisers, rare earths or boring machines, items critical for India’s industry and agriculture. China’s foreign ministry spokesperson denied any knowledge of an assurance on rare earth issue. This injects doubts about the commitments made by Beijing. The official narrative and the desperation of the Modi government also convey India’s vulnerability to sudden Chinese export controls that can be used by Beijing in the future.

7) How is China going to address the massive trade imbalance with India in its favour?

For India, the expanding trade deficit with China is a central concern. It has been aggravated by Trump’s tariffs which will hurt India’s exports to its biggest destination. Although both sides agreed to promote greater trade flows during Wang Yi’s Delhi visit, there are no announced steps to specifically reduce India’s deficit or address market access imbalances. Instead, increased trade may further exacerbate the disparity, weakening India’s economic position.

To summarise, these unanswered questions collectively speak to a wider concern. The Modi government’s approach to China has undergone abrupt reversals and opaque compromises, amounting to strategic retreat rather than robust engagement. The absence of clear answers highlights growing asymmetry in the relationship, with India ceding ground on territory, diplomacy and economic leverage, while failing to secure reciprocal commitments from China. Unless the Modi government provides clarity and tangible outcomes, the move towards normalisation of ties with China will only further expose weaknesses, lock in vulnerability and reduce India’s standing both at home and on the world stage.

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