That India lacks vision to make the most of the once-in-a-century global geopolitical opportunity to improve lives of its 80 crore (800 million) poor people was apparent by its reactive foreign policy observed on a single day: January 27. This day, a full week after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump, on India’s request, spoke with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was a clear indication that for Trump, India was important but not a high priority in his second term which promises to be as disruptive as his first one.
In his first term, by banning Chinese Huawei from the US market in 2017, and by naming China and Russia as US’s pacing competitor and a revisionist power respectively in his 2018 national security strategy, Trump declared trade war on China and the need to strengthen US’s military power in the Asia Pacific – he re-named the US Pacific Command the Indo Pacific Command in May 2018 to give centrality to India.
In his present term, he intends to actualise his election campaign slogan of Make America Great Again (MAGA) by isolationism and ending forever wars. Isolationism does not mean the US will withdraw from the world, but that it will concentrate on freeing western hemisphere (Canada, Greenland, and Latin America) of Chinese and Russian influence, and by building national power (the sum of innovation, manufacturing, deterrence and war fighting capabilities) which has declined relatively against China. And, ending the wars in Ukraine and West Asia would allow the US to focus on its top priority, MAGA.
The issue where Trump has yet not shown his hand is the security competition in the Indo-Pacific against China, where India has a major role in the Indian Ocean region. For India, this is hugely troubling as the Modi government has aligned its national strategy with the US. Believing that the US will remain the single greatest power in the foreseeable future, India formulated its two-pronged approach to handle China’s rise: One, by not normalising ties with China, India wants to tell its domestic audience that it is capable of regional geopolitical competition with China since both nations are rising in stature. And two, it hopes to get technological support from the US and its allies for building its national power.
This dependence on the US had created unease, if not outright panic, in the Modi government. What if Trump, unlike the Biden administration, decides to go slow on the security competition by not provoking China on Taiwan and South China Sea, two issues which could escalate beyond the grey zone operations?
Since Trump prefers dealmaking and tariff threats to security competition which could lead to wars, there is good reason for the Modi government to review its foreign policy afresh with China. This, it hesitates to do. After all, it will be tough justifying normalisation of ties with China when it continues to occupy Indian territory in east Ladakh.
The external affairs minister S. Jaishankar visited the US twice within a month. He went in December to meet with the Trump transition team for perhaps an invite for the prime minister to attend Trump inauguration, failing which for himself to attend the inauguration as the special envoy of the prime minister. The Modi government’s message which Jaishankar delivered to the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, following the Trump inauguration betrayed extreme anxiety. At a time when the world, especially US’s allies were sizing up Trump’s agenda, Jaishankar told Rubio that India wanted to take the bilateral relationship to greater heights with bolder and bigger steps. Such a cart blanche amounted to offering strategic loyalty to the US.
An image posted on X by US secretary of state Marco Rubio. Photo: X/@secrubio
On the other hand, India decided to move towards normalisation of relations with China. So, with India agreeing to Chinese demand of direct flights between the two countries after a gap of five years, Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, breaking diplomatic protocol, met the visiting Indian foreign secretary, Vikram Misri on January 27.
However, the problem is that India, accustomed to colonial statecraft, has failed to understand Chinese statecraft based on its civilisational wisdom. Unlike the US and western nations’ – and consequently Indian – statecraft which is zero-sum implying either you are a friend or an enemy, Chinese statecraft assesses a nation as a friend or a potential friend. It does not believe in having an enemy.
And, if China’s red line is crossed, it first tries to even things by grey zone operation, as it did in Galwan. When India refused to undo its new maps which showed Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh union territory, to make sure that a new normal was not created, China did incursions and moved the PLA close to its 1959 claim line at most places on the LAC in east Ladakh. Moreover, since India claimed Aksai Chin, it claimed the whole of Ladakh.
Strategic dependence
To comprehend the hollowness of Modi government’s strategic autonomy, there is a need to understand the evolving world order. In the present multipolar world, each nation, big and small, has liberty to consider itself a pole so long as the big picture is clear. The big picture is that instead of one great power (the US in the unipolar world), today there are three great powers – the US, China and Russia. Between them, there are two totally opposite global governance systems which are being nudged towards stability by the great powers with the help of AI (Artificial Intelligence is a technology of technologies, meaning it is applicable to all emerging technologies) and emerging technologies. So, whichever great power’s (or powers in the case of China and Russia since their global visions are aligned) AI and emerging technologies standards are accepted by majority of nations, that global governance model would prevail to deliver prosperity, or in the US’s language, would win the global geopolitical race to become the sole great power.
Now, which nation qualifies to be called a great power?
One which has the capability to influence events anywhere in the world. Since such nations cannot be intimidated by any another nation, they alone can exercise strategic autonomy in their foreign policy. India, lacking requisite hard power (technological, economic and military powers) necessary to qualify as a great power is dependent on them for crafting its foreign policy. For instance, at the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024, prime minister Modi emphasised the need for trade in local currency amongst member nations. However, once Trump threatened 100% tariff on BRICS members not trading in US dollar, India, a founding member of BRICS, did a somersault committing itself to trade only in dollar.
The good news for India is that the global geopolitics have shifted from trans-Atlantic to Indo Pacific primarily owing to the spectacular rise of China as well as a few developing nations including India. So, instead of being a regional power removed from the core of global geopolitics, India (given its geography, huge market and potential), for the first time since Independence, is being sought by all three great powers to fulfil their vision. Choosing the right global governance model which helps India’s poor is what New Delhi’s vision should be.
One governance model led by the US believes in balance of power politics, sees security as zero-sum game, where the US has formulated and is the custodian of the rules-based order (outside the UN) with rules not defined. The US considers the world has entered a second Cold War (between the US and China) which it can win by its two big strengths: its military power and supremacy of its currency, which perpetuates the dollar payment system worldwide. While what winning means is not known, the focus is that China should not be allowed to leapfrog the US into the fourth industrial revolution which is about AI and emerging technologies with implications for national security. The US’s allies of the first Cold War called the Global North comprising 20% of world population follow this model.
The other model, supported by China and Russia, is about delivering connectivity, development and prosperity. Working under the UN with the concept of indivisible security and respect for all nations, it has no hierarchical structure since neither great power has sought a leadership role. Comprising 80% of the world population called the Global South, most of these nations are onboard China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Those still outside it are keen to benefit from UN’ 17 sustainable development goals which are supported by China’s Global Development Initiative.
Moreover, to use the US’s terminology, while China has already won the fourth industrial revolution race, the US, global north nations and India have not accepted the monumental change. For example, the shift from unipolar to multipolar world happened in 2010 when the US’ Obama administration announced the ‘pivot to Asia’ and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to meet the Chinese military and economic challenge, but it was seven years later in 2017 that the Trump administration acknowledged the arrival of multipolar world. Similarly, China has outdone the US in numerous emerging technologies and plans to take them to many global south nations through the second phase of the BRI. While the first phase was physical connectivity, the second phase is about cyberspace hardware and software connectivity. It will be a few years before this truth dawns on the industrialised world.
Consider the reality: China, with 31.6% of global share, is the leader in low-cost high-quality manufacturing. The US is a distant second at 16%, and India’s share is merely 2.9%. China leads the world in high-speed rails, international infrastructure building, shipbuilding, 5.5G or 5G advanced, fourth generation nuclear reactors, fusion power generation, renewable energy, long distance power transmission and sustainable building. It is a leader in space, cyber, electronic warfare, quantum technologies, biotechnology and has demonstrated leadership in AI by its recent DeepSeek R1 open-source low-cost foundational model which resulted in the US stock market losing US $ 1 trillion in one day. The fate of Trump’s ambitious US $ 500 billion Stargate project is in jeopardy. Above all, China is ahead of the US in AI applications which are at the heart of the fourth industrial revolution.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi meeting with the Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bishkek in 2019. Photo: PIB
Moreover, based on Xi Jinping’s ‘new productive forces’ which is the continuation of the 2015-2025 ‘Made in China’ programme, China has committed US $ 137 billion over five years to focus on key areas of AI-driven robotics, bio-manufacturing, advanced materials and low altitude economy. The latter involves all airborne economic activity one kilometre above earth using drones and flying cars. China aims to build US $ 230 billion low altitude economy by 2030.
The key difference between the two governance models is that the one led by the US favours de-globalisation and de-coupling from China’s supply chains while the Chinese and Russian model supports globalisation. This will lead to splinternet (breaking of the internet) into two, led by the US and Chinese emerging technologies, making digital trade between the two models difficult since there would be compatibility problems with technologies based on different standards. Most of all, while China, a leader in blockchain technologies had in 2010 started the use of its Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in a few key cities and plans to take it to the BRI nations, president Trump has banned use of CBDC and instead prefers trade in cryptocurrency barred in China.
A visionless policy
Amongst all this, India wants to be close to the US and the Global North. It believes that with a multi-aligned foreign policy (vishwa bandhu), it can be in QUAD and BRICS at the same time. Moreover, as a global south nation, it wants to be the bridge between the Global South and the Global North. With BRICS having overtaken the G-7 in GDP and with the future of G-20 uncertain in the world split between the two global governance models, India, given its total dependence on foreign hardware and with growing digitisation in trade and commerce, will realise in a few years that it has irretrievably lost the opportunity to make use of its geopolitical advantage in its foreign policy. It will not be long before India’s BRICS membership will be called out by member states desirous of displacing (not replacing) the US dollar by multi-currency trade.
The fragility of Modi government’s visionless foreign policy can be seen by recent Trump’s tariff threat to India and China. India has started working furtively on a plan to do more imports from the US (in commodities India may not need like Whiskey) and to cut tariff on exports to the US. Chinese analysts, on the other hand, have said that US’ tariff threat would impact it more than China since the latter has adequate economic resilience to weather US’ threats of trade and tariff wars. Thus, at a time when the US allies are standing up to Trump’s tariff threats and imperialist designs to grab Greenland, Modi is determined to cozy up to Trump. Since attending the planned QUAD summit in India is not a priority for Trump, Modi has decided to visit the US in February with Trump telling him that India should buy more US security equipment, never mind if it is needed or is operationally sensible. The US wants to progressively wean India away from its dependence on Russian military equipment which is one of the key objectives of the US-India Defense Cooperation Act that was moved in the Congress in July 2024 by the then senator Marco Rubio.
Given the above, it will be fair to say that Trump’s disruptive foreign policy will keep the Global North, the western hemisphere, NATO and the European Union destabilised. This will allow space to China and Russia to stabilise their connectivity vision in the Global South, especially in Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and ASEAN where China intends to take the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) to a higher level with industrial internet. This will also help steady the new global institutions like BRICS, SCO, New Development Bank and so on. Once the Global South gets stabilised by the end of Trump’s term in office, these nations will push for reforms of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions to meet the new global reality.
India as a global south nation and a foundational member of BRICS stands at the forked end of the road. It could use this geopolitical opportunity to integrate wholeheartedly with the Global South institutions. This option will allow peace and stability on the two military lines (with China and Pakistan) critical for development and deterrence. The challenge here is to accept that the time to compete with China is over. Instead, India needs to compete with itself by cooperation with China and Russia.
Or it could continue riding the bumpy US bandwagon in the hope that the world recognises India as a major power, and its visionless foreign policy as strategic autonomy. Unfortunately, having emerged from the dark centuries of colonialism, most Global South nations no longer wear blinkers.
