What India Did After 26/11 and How it Served the Country

With a ceasefire agreed upon after US mediation, the recent engagement of India and Pakistan in their most significant military confrontation in decades – including India's 'Operation Sindoor' and the resulting cascade of cross-border strikes – invites reflection on a pivotal moment in their troubled history. 

Following the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, India, despite fierce domestic pressure, opted for strategic restraint rather than immediate military retaliation against Pakistan. It yielded relative peace from terror in the years that followed.

In his 2016 book, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy, Shivshankar Menon, former national security adviser who served as India's foreign secretary during that turbulent period, detailed the complex reasoning behind this decision. His reflections provide valuable insight into how nations might weigh their response to state-implicated terrorism – a strategic calculus that stands in marked contrast to the one guiding events now.

Menon acknowledged that his initial instinct, shared by others in the Indian government, was to pursue "immediate visible retaliation." He advocated for decisive action against Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) facilities in Muridke, their camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, or even covert operations against Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which he deemed "clearly complicit." 

He believed such a response would address public sentiment, eliminate the perceived "shame of incompetence" from India's initial handling of the attacks, deter future aggression, and enhance India's international credibility. Indeed, then external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee had publicly declared that all of India's options remained open.

After informal discussions and formal high-level government meetings – where political leaders reviewed military and other forceful options, and military chiefs presented their views to the prime minister – India chose a different course.

 "On sober reflection and in hindsight," Menon wrote in his 2016 account, "I now believe that the decision not to retaliate militarily and to concentrate on diplomatic, covert, and other means was the right one for that time and place."

The core reason, he explained, was the considered judgment that "more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it."

Several factors drove this strategic restraint. A primary concern was that an Indian military strike might paradoxically obscure Pakistan's culpability. Rather than keeping global attention focused on Pakistan's role in the attack, Menon argued, it would devolve into "just another India-Pakistan dispute." 

He drew a parallel to India's experience taking the 1947 Kashmir issue to the UN, where aggressor and victim were treated as equals. An Indian attack, he reasoned, would play into the hands of certain factions within the Pakistan Army. It would enable them to frame the situation as a dangerous confrontation between nuclear states, prompting international calls for restraint and leading to an unhelpful "splitting of blame." 

He noted the Pakistan Army's "first reaction during the attack itself was to approach the United States and the United Kingdom asking that India be restrained from launching a war between two nuclear weapon states (NWS)."

An Indian attack would likely have strengthened the Pakistan Army's domestic position at a delicate time. Menon noted that the army faced "increasing domestic disrepute" and wasn't fully aligned with president Asif Zardari's new civilian government, which had shown interest in improving ties with India. When the attack began, Zardari's foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, was actually visiting Delhi. Officials worried that an Indian offensive would unite Pakistanis behind their military while undermining the civilian leadership. 

This concern proved prescient – Sherry Rehman, Pakistan's information minister, lost her job under army pressure after publicly acknowledging Kasab was Pakistani. Menon pointed out that the Pakistan Army had moved troops to the border even before the 26/11 attacks, then claimed India was mobilising – evidence that a war scare served its institutional interests.

India also questioned the military effectiveness of limited strikes. Menon described the targeted terror camps as mere "tin sheds and huts" that could be easily rebuilt. He drew a parallel to the short-lived impact of the 1998 US missile strikes on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. A critical concern was the high risk of civilian casualties, as LeT sites like Muridke were deliberately positioned near hospitals and schools. 

Even if India carefully avoided civilian targets, Menon noted that the ISI could fabricate evidence of casualties. The fundamental issue, he emphasised, was Pakistan's pervasive "official and social support" for these terror groups – a deep-rooted problem that a limited strike could not address.

Money matters and diplomacy

Economic considerations also influenced the decision. A military attack carried the risk of escalating into a broader conflict, which would have severely damaged India's economic progress—especially concerning given the 2008 global financial crisis that "seemed likely to lead to another Great Depression." Additionally, the possibility that an attack might compel Pakistan to prosecute the 26/11 perpetrators was dismissed, as those chances were considered "near zero" regardless.

According to Menon, India's restraint achieved several key strategic objectives. It enabled New Delhi to diplomatically isolate Pakistan on the global stage, maintaining international focus on Pakistan's role in the Mumbai attacks. This sustained pressure contributed to the UN's decision to impose sanctions on LeT leaders involved in the plot.

The policy of restraint also created space for India to pursue the perpetrators through both legal channels and covert operations. This led to successful arrests when suspects ventured outside Pakistan – notably Sheikh Abdul Khwaja in Sri Lanka and Zaibuddin Ansari (Abu Jundal) in Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, this measured approach strengthened international counter-terrorism partnerships. Menon noted "unprecedented cooperation" from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, while even China became more willing to share information about Pakistan-based terror groups.

Domestic measures

Domestically, India attempted to strengthen its counter-terrorism infrastructure by passing the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and establishing the National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Menon observed that the attacks had a unifying effect on the country. The government's measured response prevented the issue from becoming politically divisive during the general election months later, which the incumbent UPA government went on to win.

Menon concluded his 2016 analysis with a stark warning. He stated unequivocally that if Pakistan mounted another major attack, "it would be virtually impossible for any government of India to make the same choice again." He attributed this likely shift to "Pakistan's prevarications in bringing the perpetrators [of 26/11] to justice and its continued use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy after 26/11." 

In fact, he considered "some public retribution and a military response inevitable" in such a scenario, noting that the unique conditions of November 2008 "no longer exist and are unlikely to be replicated."

Regarding the use of force, Menon examined Israel's "mowing the grass" strategy – a form of attrition with temporary deterrent effects that acknowledges non-state actors' unchanging motivations. He contrasted this with India's situation, where the presence of internal insurgents and cross-border terrorists supported by nuclear-armed Pakistan makes overt military action against sponsors more dangerous, as disputes could become internationalised. 

He concluded, "overt military force is only one weapon, and not the most decisive or even necessarily the most effective weapon, against cross-border terrorism."

Reflecting on broader India-Pakistan relations, Menon characterised them as "one of the few major failures of Indian foreign policy," defined by "entrenched hostility." While he acknowledged moments of potential breakthrough during 2004–07, these opportunities were ultimately derailed by Pakistan's internal politics. 

He also critiqued the superficial nature of Indian policy debates regarding Pakistan, particularly the reductive "to talk or not to talk" binary, emphasising that dialogue remains essential specifically because of challenges like cross-border terrorism.

This perspective from a key figure in the decision-making provides a crucial framework for understanding India's markedly different strategic choices now. The rationale for restraint in 2008 was multifaceted and, as Menon concluded, ultimately serving India's interests at that time. 

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