Too Many BRICS, Not Enough Cement 

The newly expanded BRICS+ is all set to meet in Brazil over the weekend, making its 17th annual conference. Conceived as a direct response to the dominance and inequalities of the Western-dominated Bretton Woods system, particularly centred around the US dollar and rules of international trade that favour the US and its Western allies – since its formation in 2009, BRICS has called for global reforms to economic and political governance, demanding that multilateral institutions better reflect the realities of emerging economies of the Global South that give larger/proportional representation to the global majority.

It has also sought to go beyond economic cooperation, positioning itself as a platform for promoting multilateralism and South-South cooperation to include joint action on climate change and sustainable development, and other issues that reflect the development priorities of the Global South.

Yet, 17 years into this formation, the tangible impact of BRICS in advancing its agenda remains a subject of debate.

As the alliance grows and adapts to rapidly shifting geopolitical changes ushered in by the second Trump presidency, the questions remain: what impact has BRICS had so far and how effective has it been in advancing the interests of the Global South? As South-South cooperation becomes more relevant and necessary than ever before, can BRICS+ emerge as the alliance that occupies this space and what challenges must it overcome in order to do so. 

Despite the continuing expansion of BRICS, as recently as January 2025 with the inclusion of Indonesia, a central critique of the grouping has been its inability to present itself as a unified and cohesive bloc. While member countries share certain development and economic interests, internal divergences continue to strain collective and strategic action. Geo-political tensions among member countries, India-China, Iran-Saudi Arabia, as well as the members’ differing approaches and priorities, continue to fragment decision-making with countries like India and Saudi Arabia maintaining close economic and security ties with the US, while China and Russia take a more confrontational stance towards Western hegemony.

Internal frictions have also resulted in the rise of bilateral relations among member nations that undermine collective regional cooperation. While the internal contradictions put BRICS on a slippery ground, with India moving on to new alliances and groupings, earlier ones like SAARC look at an uncertain future, prompting countries like China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan coming together to form their own alliances.

Also read: India, Trump's Tariffs and the Future of BRICS

Aside from calling for reforms within the World Bank and IMF, central to the BRICS agenda has been the ambition to create alternative financial tools tailored to the needs of the Global South, which have repeatedly been articulated through the calls for de-dollarisation, the development of alternative currencies and establishment of trade-swap mechanisms. In addition, the New Development Bank (NDB), or the ‘BRICS Bank’ was also established as a counter to international financial institutions such as the IMF that represent the interest of the West. 

Contrary to its objective, established in 2014, NDB replicates the development model promoted by the World Bank-IMF duo – of financing large infrastructure and energy projects, centralised and top-down planning at the cost of decentralised and community led solutions to local problems, and financing climate detrimental projects, while talking green. Slow to operate, and dwarfed by the massive expansion of Chinese led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), NDB’s total investments are $31.9 billion in 120 projects, with China ($8.1 billion) being the largest borrower, followed by India ($7.5 billion). 35% of these funds went to transport infrastructure, while 11% was invested in clean energy. For a comparison, AIIB, established in 2016, lends $58.8 billion in 303 projects. More than the volume, the kind of projects invested in or the process of investment decisions were never different from the Bretton Woods institutions. 

Climate, Global South and other ignored concerns

At a time when the world is reeling under the impacts of climate crisis – including extreme weather patterns costing countries billions of dollars, war, sovereign debt crisis, rising unemployment, failure of public health systems as established during the pandemic, the farce of climate finance as championed by the global north, the past 16 BRICS Summits failed to substantially push the concerns of Global South to the centre, except for a weak demand for reforms at multilateral development banks and UN in the initial years and probably discussions on de-dollarisation (2023) which did not go anywhere so far.

Brazilian Navy Marines practice landing on Gloria beach as they prepare to provide security during the 17th annual BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Friday, July 4, 2025. Photo: AP/PTI.

Neither has the BRICS alliance been able to create other debt relief mechanisms either for its member states or for the broader Global South. Sovereign debt burdens have risen sharply in several BRICS countries, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and amid tightening global financial conditions. Countries like Brazil, South Africa, and India have experienced escalating fiscal deficits, prompting a turn toward austerity cuts in public spending which undermine BRICS’s own stated social and developmental objectives. Inequality is rapidly increasing across BRICS countries, with countries like Brazil and South Africa experiencing some of the highest income inequality levels in the world. In India, the top 1% holds 40% of wealth, the top 10% holds 65%, while the bottom 50% holds just 6.4%. 

There is no doubt that BRICS faces significant internal and external challenges, but the current geopolitical climate calls for a needed enhanced cooperation among Global South countries that de-link from US-led institutions and develop new frameworks for finance, governance and development. As Latin American economist Andrés Arauz recently noted in a lecture, “The technical capacity already exists to delink from such regimes. What is lacking is political will”. It is precisely in this context that BRICS+ has the potential to serve as an alternative forum, one that can coordinate shared interests, amplify collective bargaining power, and support the creation of parallel institutions better aligned with the needs of Global South countries. 

With India slated to take over the presidency once again in 2026, the question is would India use the opportunity to address key issues plaguing the Global South as illustrated above, or would it again, as seen during the G20 presidency, use the opportunity for another political spectacle, photo-ops and glitter. If India intends to use the opportunity for a constructive and positive Summit, it should engage with all stakeholders, including members of the civil society from the Global South to develop an agenda which is relevant to the times.

Asmi Sharma and Joe Athialy are with the Center for Financial Accountability

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