New Delhi: India is staring at its gravest external crisis in years, and yet the government’s choices remain shrouded in spin, not scrutiny. At the centre of this opacity are a handful of decisions and choices that have left the economy, energy security and democracy exposed, which demand clear, public answers from Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his cabinet. 

Unfortunately, these questions remain unanswered but are pertinent to the lives and livelihoods of Indians, as they grapple with severe consequences of a crisis imposed upon them by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran.

Why was Prime Minister Modi in Israel on the eve of the Iran war?

Prime Minister Modi landed in Israel for a high-profile visit just as the region was on a knife-edge, with US–Israeli tensions with Tehran openly escalating. Within hours of his meetings and the much-trumpeted “upgraded” strategic partnership, the US–Israel joint operation against Iran was launched. The Modi government must explain what its own assessment was before this visit: did Indian intelligence not flag that escalation to open war was a real possibility? If it did, why did the prime minister choose a political photo-op over emergency energy and security planning in Delhi; if it didn’t, what does that say about the quality of India’s strategic assessment under Modi and National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval?

Did India really have no warning that war was coming?

US–Iran and Israel–Iran hostilities had been intensifying for months, with open threats, cyberattacks and regional proxies already in play. Yet the Modi government appears to have treated the war as a bolt from the blue, scrambling only after the first missiles were fired. Was there no internal scenario-planning on a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a decapitation strike on Iran’s leadership, or coordinated Western sanctions? Parliament and the public deserve to know whether the failure was of intelligence collection, political attention, or both.

Why did India not build buffers like China – and why are exports still flowing?

Over the past year, China steadily built up crude stocks, buying aggressively when prices softened and using spare commercial storage as a strategic cushion. Analysts estimate Beijing planned purchases of up to 140 million barrels between mid‑2025 and early 2026 to buffer against precisely this kind of geopolitical shock.

India, by contrast, enters this crisis with limited strategic petroleum reserves – spending only a fraction of funds allocated in the past few years –  and high import dependence, knowing that nearly 60% of LPG and most Gulf crude flows are vulnerable to Hormuz.

Also read: LPG Shortage Concerns: Man Dies While Waiting for Cylinder; Government Extends Rural Booking Cycle

Why was there no comparable build‑up, no transparent strategy to insulate Indian consumers from an entirely foreseeable Gulf disruption?

Thailand went into the conflict with around 60 days of fuel and promptly suspended petroleum exports to secure domestic supply. Beijing has ordered big refiners to halt diesel and petrol exports; Thailand has formally banned fuel exports. India, by contrast, has explicitly ruled out curbing refined fuel exports, which are led by Reliance industries. Why is India still shipping diesel and petrol abroad when households, farmers and transporters are staring at higher prices and the risk of local shortages?

What was the plan once Hormuz became unusable?

In statements that bureaucrats read out, the Modi government now reassures the public that “cargoes are on the way”, that refineries are running at “more than 100% capacity”, and that LPG and CNG for households and transport are being prioritised by cutting back on fertiliser and industry. These are wartime improvisations, not evidence of serious pre‑war planning.

When 90% of imported LPG normally transits Hormuz and Qatar is India’s largest LNG supplier, a contingency plan should have existed in writing and in public well before this week. Where is that plan; who signed off on it; and why is the country hearing of reallocations only after supplies have already tightened?

Why did Modi buckle on importing Russian and Iranian oil?

In February, US President Donald Trump announced that India had agreed to wind down Russian crude imports as part of a trade deal, replacing them with US and Venezuelan barrels. Reports and market data already warned that moving away from discounted Russian oil could add billions of dollars to India’s annual import bill.

Before that, the Modi government had stopped Iranian crude purchases under earlier US pressure, even though Iran was one of India’s most reliable, proximate and cheapest suppliers. Did the government accept these US demands without securing watertight long‑term alternatives on pricing, shipping and insurance — and without factoring in the obvious risk that the very powers dictating our supply mix might then launch a war in the same region?

Why the silence on the targeted killing of a friendly head of state?

When Iran’s top leadership was killed in the opening phase of this war, opposition voices in India condemned the act as a violation of a friendly state’s sovereignty and international law. The Modi government’s own line has been a vague appeal for “maximum restraint” and “dialogue and diplomacy”, without a clear position on the legality of assassinating the leadership of a state with which India has civilisational ties and long‑standing cooperation.

Prime Minister Modi has not personally condoled, let alone condemn, the killing of a friendly head of state, nor has the government mentioned the torpedoing of an Iranian vessel in the Indian ocean by a US nuclear submarine. Is New Delhi now unwilling to defend the basic UN Charter norm of non‑aggression when the perpetrator is the US or Israel? Or has Indian foreign policy under the Modi government quietly shifted from strategic autonomy to strategic obedience?

Is there any plan for the rupee slide, high inflation and job losses?

The rupee has already hit record lows, with analysts warning it could breach 95 per dollar if the conflict and high oil prices persist. Foreign portfolio investors have pulled out billions of dollars from Indian equities this month, while the Nifty 50 has fallen around 7% since the first strikes on Iran. Economists warn that a prolonged war could worsen inflation by up to 0.4 percentage points and widen the fiscal deficit as fuel subsidies and import bills rise. Higher energy costs will squeeze MSMEs, transport, construction and hospitality, threatening layoffs just as the economy was struggling to generate enough formal jobs even in calmer times. What is the Modi government’s concrete plan – not slogans and acronyms – to protect employment, shield the poorest from fuel‑driven inflation and prevent a cascading financial stress on banks and state budgets?

Where is democratic accountability in the middle of a crisis?

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has delivered statements and briefed parliament in general terms about the situation in West Asia. But there has been no debate in parliament on the Modi government’s prior decisions, no detailed white paper on energy security, and no sustained press conferences where ministers take unscripted questions on the economy, jobs and fuel.

Instead, the prime minister has continued his election rallies while being conspicuously absent from a full, open discussion in the House on a crisis that touches every Indian’s wallet and workplace. Why is the world’s largest democracy being treated to one‑way monologues from stage and television instead of honest answers in parliament and before the press?

Finally, Indians are entitled to know how these calls are being made and on what basis. Is there an inter‑ministerial war‑room on energy and evacuation, chaired daily by the prime minister, or are decisions fragmented across ministries with bureaucrats responding piecemeal to foreign pressure and market panic?

Until these questions are answered, the picture that emerges is not of a functioning political leadership in control, but of a government that walked blindfolded into a predictable storm — and now refuses to explain why. India does not just need calm; it needs answers, accountability and a course correction worthy of a country of its size, importance and historical record since its independence. 

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