The Ken-Betwa river linking project (KBLP) is being inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on December 25. As a related development, a six-year construction contract for the project has been awarded to NCC with a winning bid of Rs 3,389 crore.
The grievous flaws of this old project, first proposed, then eventually rejected by the previous Congress government, have been consistently highlighted over the past two decades. Over the years, various individuals and institutions have appealed against this project in the Supreme Court and the National Green Tribunal (NGT), and despite numerous protests on the ground, little has been re-examined and even less has changed.
Given the project’s staggering cost of Rs 44,605 crore in 2021, one would expect rigorous standards of project appraisal. However, the project is a case study in flawed public policy, marked by its rejection of updated data, new research, expert reviews, and external assessments from a water management perspective, as well as its disregard for critical environmental inputs.
At this delicate moment, as the public announcements have been made by the state, it will naturally be nearly impossible for any public official (or even a learned judge) to raise even mild queries.
Also read: New Research Raises Fresh Doubts About India’s River Linking Plans
The loss to Bundelkhand is devastating as the region urgently needs near-term water remedies. However, it is essential to note that the project clearance has continued to bypass due process. As a final note, before facing the consequences, the following major red flags must be highlighted:
- Wildlife clearance: The detailed report of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) appointed by the Supreme Court, submitted in 2019, has not been considered by the Supreme Court, much less any other public agency. The CEC report states that implementing the KBLP would cause widespread ecological devastation and recommends that the government’s goals be achieved through cheaper alternatives, specifically by expanding the capacities of existing projects in the region.
The Supreme Court had argued in Godavarman (2000) that not even a blade of grass will be removed from a national park. Here, 28% of Panna National Park will be affected, either by submergence or fragmentation. The families of more than 6,000 labourers would be living inside the park for years. About 10.3 MCM (million cubic metres) of muck would be deposited in the riverbed affecting its hydrology.
All these are neither ‘improvements’ nor do they constitute ‘better management of wildlife,’ as the agencies claim, since ‘improvements and better management of wildlife,’ are all that the Wildlife Protection Act permits in notified national parks. Just imagine the precedent this sets across the country’s protected areas.
The economic Net Present Value (NPV) loss of the forest cover would amount to Rs 1,260 crore using average Godavarman rates (4x more if rates proposed by the Indian Institute of Forest Management in 2014 are used), which fully negates the NPV benefit, making the project unviable.
The Detailed Project Report (DPR) estimates that 32,900 trees will be lost, equivalent to seven trees per hectare, which is more characteristic of a desert landscape than the Panna region.
The CEC estimated that 43 lakh trees will be lost in 2021, and this number would be higher now. A committee reporting to the Supreme Court has estimated, “The true value of a tree, with 100 years of its lifespan remaining, would be Rs 72 lakh.” Even with a fraction of this estimate per tree, the loss of 43 lakh trees would be astronomical and wipe out the NPV benefit.
- Water ‘surplus’: It has not been verified by any independent agency. The water supply and demand data is also highly dated (2003-04) and in an era of rapid exploitation of groundwater and climate change. The total demand on Ken river water would have significantly increased in the interim, reducing any ‘surplus’ in Panna, even if the four dams planned upstream are never constructed (another tragedy for the Panna district, with the lowest irrigation coverage in Madhya Pradesh).
The use of dated water flow information from 2003-04 by the National Institute of Hydrology (NIH) was reported in The Wire in 2021. The article reported at least 6,810 MCM of water was required for both the states, with an additional estimate for e-flow.
The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) had earlier estimated 6,188 MCM annual yield for the Daudhan dam (based on a Central Water Commission report of 1995), which would not meet the states’ demand. Unsurprisingly, the NWDA accepted a higher number of 6,590 MCM for Daudhan’s yield with no basis provided. Even so, this eliminates e-flow.
In a report on the Ken River Basin released in 2012, two authors from IIT Roorkee and the NIH, after studying rainfall patterns for the century ending 2002, concluded, “Analysis indicated that there is an effect of climate change on drought characteristics. The decadal average annual and seasonal rainfall trend analysis shows a declining trend in rainfall, which is an indication for a likely increase in the occurrence of drought events in the coming future.”
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): The EIA failed to mention that the dam site is part of the Panna National Park’s core area.
Given the numerous shortcomings of this outdated EIA and cut-paste job (replete with references to foreign species), which ignores seasonal water availability, fails to address the impact of labourers on the park, and lacks details on village resettlement, conservation, and livelihoods, and considering the significant changes that have occurred since its initial submission, including the relocation of the powerhouse, the consideration of the previously overlooked Ken Gharial Sanctuary, the impact on vultures, and the construction of the Tendukheda Dam upstream, a project of this scale would normally require a fresh EIA.
- Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC): Conditions imposed by the EAC for the first stage of forest clearance were never satisfied. For example, the permission to cut trees was granted on the condition the government would provide an equivalent amount of non-forest land for afforestation. Having failed to find 6,017 ha of revenue land, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) is pressed to drop this condition.
The EAC had mandated that the water flow be updated to ensure aviral dhara (or e-flow) and non-monsoon flow. This was to be monitored over a three-year period. However, this key condition was not implemented. Notably, the Ken river already experiences negligible flow for most of the year, despite the erstwhile Planning Commission’s recommendation of maintaining a minimum 30% e-flow for all river valley projects, as outlined in the Chaturvedi report.
The associated Lower Orr project was nearing completion when it was found that it did not have all the clearances. The project has been penalised by the EAC and is subject to a fresh evaluation. Is this the template for Ken-Betwa (or not)?
- Deforestation: The project itself has changed, viz. a higher number of trees being cut, settlement of rights under the new Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 vs the less generous National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 (LARR Act, 2013 vs. NRRP, 2007), the costs of the landscape mitigation plan, a switch to costly lift irrigation, revenue foregone from power generation (used for lift irrigation), the cost of establishing a ropeway, the cost of additional pumping stations, tanks, and transmission lines for micro-irrigation, a 50% increase of the length of the left bank canal, and so much else.
All these changes would normally oblige the recalculation of the B:C ratio. A benefit–cost ratio (BCR) is an indicator, used in cost–benefit analysis, that attempts to summarise the overall value for money of a project or proposal.
- Geomorphological risk: Finally, if all this was not enough to give pause, it appears there is a geomorphological risk. The Pokhra basement fault, emanating from the Himalayas, passes precisely through Panna and the Ken River catchment. The authors of a recent paper conclude, “Fluvial modification in the Panna region demonstrates that Indian basement faults are also active far south of the Himalayan deformation front, and may be linked to intraplate seismicity and active tectonic modification of the landscape.” Since IIT Roorkee has also studied this subject (and kept MoEFCC in the loop), this would normally be worth examining.
Even now, we can learn from the Balram Talab Scheme which has funded over 7,000 ponds in Madhya Pradesh, as also from the thousands of tanks (‘sagars’) built by the Chandelas, to deliver local solutions for securing water supply across Bundelkhand at a cost less than Rs 2,000 crore and within two years. Is anyone listening?
So much of what is normal has been ignored and rejected, it seems the project has had to be cleared, or bulldozed, never mind the facts. A previous head of the NWDA presented a case study of this project to state that environmental clearances were hurdles in the pathway of development. So be it. Let the reader judge if thoroughly disregarding environmental impacts is the appropriate manner of investing scarce public resources and if Panna’s bleak future is the future they want for our drying country and warming planet.
