Omair Ahmad 
Ever since the modern state rose in the 17th century to become the principal actor in the international system, power has been measured by control over borders, economies and populations. In his thought-provoking new book, Climate Security, Ashok Swain argues that all three are now under threat.
“Globally, more than one-third of the total length of national borders is determined by rivers,” he writes, noting how climate change is shifting these boundaries by altering the hydrological cycle. This is even more extreme in regions where glaciers are receding and Arctic ice cover is vanishing.
Ashok Swain,
Climate Security,
Sage publications (December 2024)
Climate-induced disasters are fundamentally reshaping economies, particularly in developing island nations, while also triggering mass migrations – both temporary and permanent – on a scale that is creating a crisis both within and between countries.
Swain’s book is concise, coming in at just over 150 pages, with another 40 devoted to references. It is sharply written and deeply researched, with a wealth of data and examples to back up his arguments. The main argument is that because climate change threatens the core functions of the state, it must be treated as a national security issue to receive the urgent attention it deserves.
As head of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Swain brings more than three decades of expertise in conflict and environment studies, and is perfectly placed to join the dots. His international background – having grown up and studied in India, taught in Europe, and served as a visiting professor in the US and Malaysia – allows him to connect global perspectives with granular insights. For example, writing on the impact of climate-induced disasters, Swain notes:
Globally, between 1970 and 2019, there have been 11,778 natural hazards leading to 2 million deaths and USD 4.3 trillion in economic losses. Over 90% of all the reported deaths have been in countries with developing economies located in the Global South. On the other hand, countries in the Global North have experienced 60% of the reported economic losses from natural hazards. However, the economic losses in the Global North have been less than 0.1% of the countries’ gross domestic products (GDP), respectively. In contrast, in the least developed economies, 7% of all disasters lead to economic losses greater than 5% of their GDP.
This perfectly sums up the disproportionate suffering of poorer nations. Wealthy counties – the primary emitters of greenhouse gasses – can absorb the financial impact, while poorer countries are overwhelmed. When Hurricane Maria hit the island nation of Dominica in 2017, it “caused damages of USD 1.31 billion, equivalent to around 200% of the country’s GDP. The hurricane destroyed almost all trees and vegetation and eliminated the agricultural sector.” This was just two years after another hurricane had caused damage equivalent to 100% of Dominica’s GDP.
Dialogue Earth spoke to Ashok Swain about some of the questions raised by his book.
You mention in your book classifying climate as a national security issue may lead to a power grab by the military, so why are you advocating it?
Ashok Swain: Partially out of frustration. I initially opposed the idea, but as I demonstrate in the book, even polities like Sweden whose population says climate is important, don’t vote along those lines. Politicians who want to address the issue are often sidelined, because it is not “prime terrain”. You do not become a bigwig by tackling climate and environment, but you do if you focus on national security. Secondly, climate activists and movements still primarily focus on big corporations and problematic individuals, but it is the state that is the most powerful actor, and which needs to be the focus. Lastly, and most importantly, as I write, there has been limited action on climate issues. In fact, we have emitted more greenhouse gasses since the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change was recognised. This needs to be a priority.
Could classifying climate as a national security issue, leading to increased militarisation, backfire?
When climate change is framed as a security threat, governments – especially authoritarian ones – might use it as a justification to suppress dissent, restrict environmental activism, and curtail civil liberties. For example, they may crack down on environmental NGOs, activists, and Indigenous communities under the pretext of maintaining national stability. This approach can also lead to militarised responses to climate migration, where instead of providing humanitarian aid, states fortify borders and criminalise displaced populations. Such policies undermine human rights and could increase internal instability rather than addressing the root causes of climate insecurity.
However, despite these risks, projecting climate change as a national security issue is essential for getting political leaders to take strategic decisions on climate mitigation and adaptation. By elevating climate change to the level of national security, governments are more likely to prioritise it in their policy agendas, allocate resources effectively, and integrate climate considerations into strategic planning. This could help in developing long-term policies that not only address climate risks but also ensure sustainable development and stability. The challenge, therefore, is to balance securitisation in a way that strengthens climate action without undermining human rights and environmental advocacy.
One of the countries that has, arguably, made environment a high-value political issue is China, but you are speaking of democratic countries. Could you expand?
Firstly, China is an outlier among countries classified as authoritarian. Most have not made good environmental decisions, whereas China has done remarkable work in air pollution, pushing electric vehicles, and even its afforestation programmes. That said, it has not been so good beyond its borders. For example it has not built dams on the Salween within its borders, but downstream in other countries, it has. But, in a way, China shows that if environment is made a “security of the regime” issue, things can be done. In contrast, US President Joe Biden wanted to be the “Climate President” but had to scale back his ambitions and make major compromises.
Is there scope for North-South cooperation, given the different ways the countries are impacted?
Environment really became an issue after the end of the Cold War, with the Global North largely thinking of it as a problem in the Global South, and the role of developed countries was only to support poorer countries to do better. Climate change is a different dilemma. Some things will be better in the Global North. It is the end of January and there is no snow here in Uppsala. Having the very cold areas becoming temperate seems nicer, but with that come other problems such as floods, diseases, the difficulty of importing food, and even the ability of the military to operate. The Global North cannot get away by saying it is a Global South problem only. Similarly, the Global South has to stop waiting for reparations. There were none for colonialism, and there is unlikely to be any for emissions. They have to act in their own self-interest, for their own security, to take climate seriously. I believe we can have a balance, but we need to approach it cautiously. Pushing climate security to the UN Security Council, where Russia and China are on one side, and the US, UK and France are on the other, will not help. We need to build consensus, and the only way to do that is to take the problem seriously.
Do you think there is a viable path forward for developing countries to bypass Global North-led climate negotiations and build their own cooperative frameworks for climate resilience?
Developing countries face a difficult situation: while they are the most affected by climate change, they have limited influence in global climate negotiations. The book explains how the Global North has historically contributed the most to climate change but has been slow to provide the promised financial and technological support to the Global South. However, waiting for help from the Global North is not a viable strategy. Instead, countries in the Global South must take the lead in regional and South-South cooperation for climate resilience. This could include forming regional climate alliances, sharing technology and knowledge, and developing joint adaptation projects.
Some countries have already started doing this by prioritising their own climate adaptation measures, independent of North-led initiatives. However, these efforts are often constrained by limited funding and political instability. Political will and leadership are crucial in making climate adaptation a priority, even when financial resources are scarce. While bypassing Global North-led negotiations entirely may be difficult, strengthening regional cooperation and focusing on self-reliant adaptation measures can be a practical way forward for the Global South.
How do you see the role of transboundary water conflicts evolving as climate change intensifies?
Transboundary water conflicts are expected to become more frequent and severe as climate change alters water availability and distribution. Many existing water-sharing agreements are already under pressure due to environmental changes, and new agreements are increasingly difficult to negotiate. Climate change is intensifying water scarcity, especially in arid and semi-arid regions, leading to heightened tensions between countries that share rivers and aquifers. The unpredictability of water flow, especially in major river basins like the Nile, Ganges, and those originating from the Himalayas, is creating disputes between upstream and downstream nations.
Although no full-scale wars have been fought exclusively over water, conflicts over quantity, quality and control of shared resources have contributed to broader geopolitical tensions. Climate change acts as a “threat multiplier,” increasing vulnerabilities in already water-stressed regions and making cooperation even more necessary but harder to achieve.
Finally, how do you think Donald Trump’s return to the White House will impact global climate security, particularly for the Global South?
Donald Trump’s return to the White House, along with the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the suspension of all foreign aid, has already weakened global climate security, particularly for the Global South. The loss of US climate finance has severely impacted developing nations, halting crucial adaptation projects and leaving vulnerable regions – such as the Sahel and South Asia – exposed to worsening droughts, floods and food shortages. Without this funding, climate-induced conflicts over water and land are expected to rise, driving more displacement and instability. Climate security should be framed as a national security issue to drive strategic action, but Trump’s policies have deprioritised both domestic and global climate commitments. With the US stepping back, countries in the Global South are now seeking alternative alliances for climate finance and cooperation. However, these efforts remain insufficient to fill the massive funding gap left by the US withdrawal. Meanwhile, the suspension of humanitarian aid has worsened migration crises, with climate refugees facing stricter border policies. Trump’s policies have not only derailed global emissions reduction efforts but have also weakened America’s diplomatic standing, allowing its competing powers to expand their influence in climate governance. Without urgent corrective measures, the future of global climate security looks increasingly unstable.
Omair Ahmad was the South Asia managing editor at Dialogue Earth. This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth.