A New How-To for Delimitation That Balances Fairness and Works Politically

Article 81 of the Constitution of India states that seats should be distributed among states and constituencies based on population, so that the ratio between population and representation is, as far as practicable, similar across states. This condition broadly held in 1951 and 1971, when population differences between states were relatively small. That is no longer the case. Given the large divergence in population growth across states, delimitation has effectively been frozen since 1971. This situation is unlikely to remain sustainable beyond the 2026 census, after which delimitation is due under a constitutional amendment.

First, we should note what the implications are if a linear projection of current population is used for each state to increase the Lok Sabha size from the current 543 to 816, as proposed by the Union government last week.

Figure 1, spells out the Lok Sabha seat allocation under alternative house sizes, based on population proportionality, as per projected population for 2025. It shows the egregious increases in seats for the Hindi belt states as against all other Indian states, which have systematically contained their population by investing in health care, education and nutrition, which brought down their population growth rates. It has already sparked disquiet among southern states and their chief ministers.

Note: Others refer to all Union Territories except Delhi, northeastern states except Assam, and hilly states. Each state’s proportional share of Lok Sabha seats is calculated by multiplying its percentage share of the total national population by the total House size, such that a state comprising X% of India’s population is allocated X% of the seats.

Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah noted on April 5 in a Facebook post, “Let us be clear: the issue has never been about whether the number of Lok Sabha seats of southern states increases. The concern is about how they increase – and who benefits disproportionately.”

He also said that under the proposed expansion, while every state may see an increase in seats, the rate and scale of the increase clearly favour Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-dominated states. “Uttar Pradesh is expected to go from 80 to 120 seats (+40), Maharashtra from 48 to 72 (+24), Bihar from 40 to 60 (+20), Madhya Pradesh from 29 to 43-44 (+14-15), Rajasthan from 25 to 37–38 (+12-13) and Gujarat from 26 to 39 (+13).”

“In contrast,” he wrote in his post, “the southern states see much smaller gains. Karnataka rises from 28 to 42 (+14), Tamil Nadu from 39 to 58–59 (+20), Andhra Pradesh from 25 to 37–38 (+12-13), Telangana from 17 to 25–26 (+8-9), and Kerala from 20 to 30 (+10).”

“The numbers are telling. Five southern states together gain barely 63-66 additional seats, while just seven BJP-dominated states gain about 128-131 seats – nearly double,” he wrote.

“Even after expanding Lok Sabha to 816 seats, the collective share of southern states remains around 24% – unchanged and already modest. States that performed better in population control and governance are being penalised, and Karnataka – a key driver of national growth – risks being deliberately sidelined. If our share does not improve while the numerical dominance of larger states grows, what exactly is Karnataka gaining from this exercise?” the post said.

“The result is a widening imbalance. Today, Uttar Pradesh has 52 more seats than Karnataka. This gap will increase to 78. Maharashtra’s lead over Karnataka will expand from 20 to 30 seats. This is not just expansion – it is concentration of power,” he wrote.

“Nor is this cooperative federalism,” he wrote, calling it “another blatant assault on federalism, designed to concentrate power and silence states like Karnataka. Having failed to win the trust of southern people, the [Prime Minister Narendra] Modi government is now attempting to weaken their voice through manipulatively restructuring representation.”

“This structural change is being pushed without consultations or public debate. At a time of economic and global challenges, the Union government is more focused on political arithmetic over national priorities. The people of Karnataka - and all who believe in federalism - deserve fairness, respect, and transparency. We will firmly oppose any attempt to weaken our voice.”

Therefore, we proceed with an alternative set of proposals, that should suit the whole country, and is fair to both south and north.

A Delimitation Commission has to be constituted, as in the case of past delimitations until 1971. The following five principles (a to d) are proposed for the commission to consider:

a. Demographic performance – but without abandoning the population-of-state criteria as the basis for seat allocation.

The population-alone criteria has resulted in delimitation being postponed by five decades, as opposed to the constitutional requirement that it is done every decade after the population census is completed. Postponement occurred because many states noted that they were being punished politically for performing better on human development – they had invested in health and education, thus reducing their population growth rates and hence total population. They argued that the population criteria risked reducing their seat allocation relative to other states that had performed worse than them on the same indicator.

There is constitutional precedent for the use of principles other than population-only. For example, the Finance Commission, a constitutional body, uses the following principles to allocate financial resources across states. First, “income distance” (equity), which has a 50% weight, that is, states with lower income receive higher transfers. Second, the Finance Commision also explicitly considers demographic performance. This criteria rewards states that have successfully reduced fertility rates.

b. Federal balance – this is a principle for the Delimitation Commission to follow in order to avoid deepening the distrust within India’s widening governance gaps, human development outcomes and fiscal allocations.

c. Solving for population-to-representation ratios – which have significantly diverged from those prevailing in 1971 – the commission must update representation to match current populations, but focus on state assemblies rather than parliament.

Thus, the Delimitation Commission could raise the total number of Lok Sabha seats plus introduce equality of states in Rajya Sabha, as done in the United States Senate, regardless of population sizes of states (i.e., adding ten seats per state, raising Rajya Sabha seats from 245 to 290.) However, it is likely that the ruling party will oppose this, as it would interfere with its goal of dominance over Lok Sabha and reducing the power of Rajya Sabha.

So, what is possible is raising the number of seats in vidhan sabhas to equalise representatives per 1000 population for each state – while leaving the Lok Sabha intact, as at present. In a large federal country, that should correct for poorer representation within more populous states, especially at the state level, which is what matters most for individual citizens. However, the ruling party will oppose this as well, since their sights are on the Lok Sabha.

d. Union Territories, hill states and northeast states – consistent with existing exceptions to the population-alone principle noted earlier, and with the Delimitation Acts until 2002, UTs, hill states and northeastern states are accorded greater representation than a population basis would justify.

How should the demographic performance of states be rewarded?

First, the demographic performance principle is applied only for additional seats, above and beyond the 543 currently of the Lok Sabha, not to the 543 seats. So the population principle still remains overwhelmingly dominant in determining the total number of seats. Second, there are two dimensions (with appropriate weightages) to the demographic performance principle: one is the early achievement of TFR of 2.1 or less before 2005. The other is the rate of decline in TFR between 2005 and 2021, that is between the third and fifth NFHS rounds, respectively.

Third, all small federal entities in population terms, that is, Union Territories, northeastern states and hill states – Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, as also Jammu and Kashmir – are not subject to this principle, given that their population is usually below 5 million.

Table 1 presents seats by state after applying the demographic performance principle. What is notable is that the south is protected, not privileged. The southern states gain fewer seats than high-growth northern states while avoiding relative marginalisation – they are no longer peanlised for demographic success. This defuses the “north versus south” constitutional crisis many fear would arise post-2026.

We focus here on the major states of India with large populations. The range for the last year when delimitation happened (1971) are compared with current situation (2024) average population per seat; then for 2025, using projected population. The range for average population per seat is:

1971: 5,80,857–1,125,784

Ratio: 0.54-1.05 of the smallest population/seat in a state versus the largest.

2024: 1,796,000–3,275,880

Ratio: 0.68-1.24

2025: 1,442,520–2,964,295

Ratio: 0.63-1.30

(1 = perfectly equal or everyone represented equally. Below 1 = some seats represent fewer people. Above 1 = few seats represent more people, therefore, less equality across states.)

It is obvious that the average population per seat rose sharply between 1971 and 2024, since the country’s population itself rose more than 2.5 times: 541.1 million in 1971 rose to 1377 million in 2024, projected to rise further to 1388 million in 2025.

Objections to demographic performance

One objection could be that Article 81 says Lok Sabha seats are allocated to states “as nearly as may be in proportion to population”. It could be argued that demographic performance violates voter equality. However, the constitution does not require strict mathematical proportionality; it explicitly allows approximation.

In fact, India already violates strict equality in several ways: the huge size disparities in constituencies, the reserved seats and overrepresentation in Union Territories. Besides, courts (including the Supreme Court of India) have consistently treated delimitation and seat allocation as political questions, not enforceable equality claims.

A second objection could be a fear of judicial invalidation. Thus, the risk, such critics would argue, is that courts may strike down a digressive formula as unconstitutional. However, this critique ignores that Articles 81 and 82 give parliament wide discretion in seat allocation. Thus, a clear, uniform, rational formula would pass the “reasonable classification” test. After all, the Supreme Court has never imposed a numerical equality threshold.

A third critique may be that there is likely to be a political backlash from large states. Thus, high-population states will resist dilution of influence. However, resistance of large states would be not constitutional – it would be political.

Santosh Mehrotra taught economics in JNU.

The statistical assistance of Alaya Purewal is very gratefully acknowledged. I have benefitted greatly from comments and discussions by Radha Kumar, Ganesh Devy, Alaya Purewal, and the members of the Constitutional Conduct Group. The usual disclaimers apply.

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