The conduct of the minister of railways in the aftermath of one of the biggest railway disasters in the history of the Indian Railways, near Balasore on June 2, has been shocking in more ways than one. In particular, the unprecedented decision of the ministry, supposedly upon the recommendation of the Railway Board, to initiate a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), is highly irregular and is at variance with longstanding established procedures and practices in the case of accidents in the Railways.
This deviation appears to indicate a desperate attempt at damage limitation that has two facets: one, to limit the damage to the political authority embodied in Narendra Modi the prime minister because, after all, after the spate of Vande Bharat inaugurations he is now seen as the face of the Railways in popular perception; and, two, to ring fence the impact of this particular accident so that longstanding issues of a systemic nature in the Railways, which have a bearing on safety, are diverted from public attention that has been riveted on the Railways after the tragedy at Balasore that has cost nearly 300 lives.
It appears that railway minister Ashwini Vaishnaw has already determined not only how the accident happened but identified the persons suspected of having sabotaged the signalling system, which triggered the accident that involved three trains. The fact that the CBI commenced its probe even before the Commission of Railway Safety (CRS), the statutory authority empowered to probe all rail accidents resulting in loss of lives, had even finished its first round of hearings at Kharagpur, is shocking.
The CRS’s proceedings, which commenced on June 5, were conducted by A.M. Chowdhury, Commissioner of Railway Safety, South Eastern Circle. The CRS also visited the accident site on June 6. Summons were issued to at least 40 named Railway staff and even some contract workers who may have been working at the site prior to the accident; several more were called upon to depose before the inquiry, among them were members of the Railway Protection Force and members of the National Disaster Response Force in Odisha. In keeping with its track record of similar investigations in the past, the CRS also invited members of the public or “any other relevant witness” to be present at the inquiry. The CRS, it needs to be reiterated, works under the administrative control of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. This decision was made even before Independence, when it was known as the Railway Inspectorate, in order to ensure the autonomy of the investigating agency.
Undermining the railway safety commission
On June 4, less than 48 hours after the accident, Vaishnaw claimed that a “change made in the electronic interlocking and point machine” had caused the accident. He also misleadingly announced that the CRS “has investigated the matter”. Most significantly, he claimed, “We have identified the cause of the incident and people responsible for it. It happened due to a change in electronic interlocking.” To clarify, it is a matter of public record that the CRS’s notice for its inquiry proceedings was made only on June 4, announcing that the proceedings were scheduled for June 5 and 6 and would continue “till completion”. At the time of writing, the inquiry is by no means over. It is well known that the CRS generally commences its official inquiry only after a couple days, allowing for relief and recovery activities to proceed immediately after an accident. According to a CRS circular issued in December 2012, a “brief preliminary narrative report” and “provisional findings” are to be submitted by the investigating zonal safety commissioner to the Railways Board, the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety and the concerned zonal railway entity within 30 days of the accident. The circular also stipulates that the preliminary report be sent to the Press Information Bureau for wider dissemination. The detailed report is to be submitted within 180 days. The Railway Board is required to respond with its “action taken” report within 270 days.
Also read: Coromandel Express Back on Tracks, But Systemic Risks Remain
A senior retired Railway official told The Wire that media reports of the findings of a “preliminary” enquiry, conducted internally by the Railways, are a far cry from the statutory inquiry conducted by the CRS. He also pointed out that media reports about the railway ministry “directing” or “initiating” an inquiry by the CRS suggest “extreme ignorance” about the functioning of the CRS. “Nobody can direct or ask the CRS to conduct an inquiry, it is a key statutory function assigned to it by law,” he pointed out. The fact that it functions under the civil aviation ministry underlines its independence from the institution it is expected to investigate, he added. “The Railway Board recommending a CBI investigation is something that has never happened before,” he observed.
A former member of the Railway Board who served for four decades in the Railways told The Wire that unlike in the past, this inquiry was not preceded by extensive advertisements in the media, inviting the active participation of the public in its proceedings. Taking serious exception to the CBI probe, he pointed out that both the railway minister and Prime Minister Narendra Modi had promised “strict action” against the culprits who caused the action, after which Vaishnaw announced dramatically that the culprit had been identified. “If the culprit has already been identified, even before the cause of the accident has been established beyond doubt, why does the CBI have to probe any further?” He also pointed out that the CRS is staffed by personnel whose “competence” in all aspects of the Railways’ functioning is well established, which “the CBI is unlikely to have”.
An advantage of an inquiry by the CRS is that it provides a comprehensive assessment of the safety situation in all its dimensions. This implies that the Railways can draw lessons and implement corrective measures that prevent similar accidents from recurring. In contrast, the CBI’s probe would be limited to this one case, and confined to identifying the “culprits”, if any. There would be no systemic lessons to be learnt. Indeed, that may well be the motive for calling upon it to investigate this accident.
A desperate conspiracy theory
Vaishnaw has claimed that the Coromandel Express, which was on the “Up” line, entered the adjacent loop line on which a stationary goods train was standing, despite having a clear signal to proceed straight ahead on the main line. Further, he claimed that the point which had been set for allowing the train to proceed on the main line had been tampered with, implying that someone had switched the point in order to cause the accident. This line of argument, essentially a conspiracy theory, is what he used to justify his decision to order a CBI probe.
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, when did the goods train that was standing on the loop line at the time of the accident pass through the point? Was the point switched back for the Coromandel Express? If so, when? A railway employee who has worked with the organisation for more than three decades told The Wire that it is unlikely that the goods train would have entered the loop line much before the ill-fated train arrived. Given that the route is a heavily congested one, and given that slower trains are assigned lower priority so that the faster trains move on the main line, it is likely that the goods train would have entered the loop just before the Coromandel Express arrived. If so, was the point switched back after the goods train had moved fully on to the loop line? If indeed so, when was this done? And, even more importantly, was the point functioning properly at that time?
Ashwini Vaishnaw. Photo: Twitter/@BJP4India
The railway employee cited earlier said the interlocking system that governs the switching of points on the tracks have to satisfy three conditions before a train is allowed to pass through a signal. First, just before the train arrives at a station the gatekeeper at the level-crossing and the station master (or his deputy) exchange a signal that confirms that the gate has indeed been closed. Only after this confirmation is the point set to either the main line or the loop line, depending on the traffic requirements at that time. In addition, a third condition needs to be satisfied before the signal can turn green for the next train: the switching of the point to either the main or loop line is only possible if there is no obstruction on the track for which the green signal is given. “If the track is occupied, the signal cannot turn green because the point cannot be set for a train to move on an occupied track,” explained the employee.
Ashok Kumar (name changed because the union activist fears victimisation), a signalling inspector in the Railways, told The Wire that the “tampering” of the point that has been alleged by the minister is “extremely unlikely, simply because there would have been very little time for someone to plan and execute this”. Typically, a signal from the preceding station conveys to the Station Master that the train had passed through it. The Station Master at Bahanaga Bazar Station (near which the accident occurred) would then ensure that the point is set in the direction in which is meant to be. Kumar also pointed out that the interlocking switch, once set, cannot be altered for at least two minutes. We know that the Coromandel Express that day was traveling at 128 km/hr. We also know that the distance between the previous station, Panpana PH, and Bahanaga Bazar, is five km. A train travelling at that speed would have travelled that distance in about 141 seconds – actually less, because the accident site is just before Bahanaga Bazar Station. This implies that the person who deliberately reversed the point would have had less than 20 seconds to do it.
Moreover, Kumar explains that for this to happen, there would have to be collusion by the Station Master or his deputy. He asks: “But even more importantly, even if the point was reversed, how could the signal have turned green to allow the Coromandel Express to the loop line when there was an obstruction (the goods train) on the tracks?”
Sidelining safety
Recent revelations about a similar incident on February 8 indicate that a head-on collision between the Sampark Kranti Express and a goods train in the Mysuru section was prevented only because of the “alertness of the Loco pilot”. A communication from the South Western Railway Headquarters pointed out that the relevant point was “automatically set in the wrong direction”. It observed that the event “indicates that there are serious flaws in the system, where the route of despatch gets altered after a train starts on signals with correct appearance of route in the SMs (Station Master’s) panel.” It observed that the incident is in contravention of “the essence and basic principles of Inter-locking”. The incident highlights the fact that electronic signalling equipment has malfunctioned in the recent past.
In the community of railwaypersons, it is well known that those on the operational and commercial side of operations call the shots, while those on the engineering side, whose task it is to keep the system fit and ship-shape, only get what is given. In heavily congested railway corridors like the one on which the Coromandel Express was travelling – characterised by not just high passenger traffic but also of goods, particularly coal and iron ore – those on the engineering side have to bargain hard to get adequate time to conduct the regular repair or maintenance work. In railway parlance, the “block” time they get is often a fraction of what is required. Kumar points out that typically if the time needed is 90 minutes, railway staff get just about 20 minutes to complete the work. “The bosses are extremely averse to delay traffic, even if it actually compromises safety,” he said. “The subordination of those who work to ensure safe operations, to those whose task is to maximise revenues, is a serious anomaly, and this has only worsened in recent years.”
On June 6, the Railway Board, convened by its chairperson and CEO Anil Kumar Lahoti via video conference, urged senior officers urged to spend “quality time” with field staff over the next two weeks to ensure that “systems” are followed correctly. The Board also decided, like so many times in the past, that scheduled “block” times are provided for, “without any uncertainty.” The meeting also promised field staff at the lower levels that they need not be afraid of delaying trains if there were safety concerns. In fact, the Board said it would reward them for doing so.
A railway employee familiar with the accident location told The Wire that there appears to have been some point-related wiring work done near the accident site just before the collision on June 2. Normally, after completion of the work, this would require testing involving at least two persons at the point, an electronic signal maintainer (ESM) and an assistant, working in tandem with the station master to check physically and visually whether the point is in fact working properly after the repair work had been completed. In reality, however, the scarcity of working staff and the time constraints result in serious compromises with safety norms, he explained.
According to the Railway Board, there were 8,747 accidents arising from “equipment failure” in 2021-22, of which 2,592 were due to “failure of signalling apparatus”, accounting for almost one-third of all cases of equipment failure. Although these accidents did not results in fatalities, the fact is that they point to problems that need urgent attention. To add to the picture of neglect, there are now 14,850 vacancies in the Signalling Department of the Indian Railways.
A recent article by Sarabjit Arjan Singh, a senior retired railway official and a member of the Central Administrative Tribunal, illustrates these constraints. The severe shortage of personnel and adequate time to conduct maintenance work results in the station master and the staff entering into an “informal understanding” because the Railways’ “central control is extremely reluctant to agree to blocks (of time)”. He suggests that supervisory staff who oversee track, rolling stock and signalling equipment must determine when it is safe for a train to pass through, instead of leaving it to those who manage the commercial side of operations, whose primary motive is to move more traffic faster on the track.
Gross underinvestment
The Modi government’s penchant for glitz, reflected in Modi’s eagerness to inaugurate every Vande Bharat train route, as well as his promise of Bullet Trains, has come at a heavy cost. Modi’s fondness for appropriately-Bharatiya sounding fancy new names resulted in the Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK), a fund exclusively meant for improving the railways’ safety systems.
The railways had recommended an allocation of Rs 1.19 lakh crore over a five-year period, starting in 2017-18. With the Railway Budget banished on utterly specious grounds that year, the allocation was trimmed to Rs 1 lakh crore. In reality, over the five-year period, the shortfall of financial allocation for the RRSK was about 25%. In the seven years of its life, it has received Rs 96,000 core. The programme has now been extended for another five years, but with additional allocations of just Rs 45,000 crore. Thus, over a ten-year period, allocations would amount to Rs 1.41 lakh crore, not just barely enough to cover the increase in costs estimated in 2017-18 but also not reflecting the backlog of track renewal, signalling and other works that require serious attention, and funds.
Significantly, the total allocations for signalling and telecom works under the RRSK have received just a little under Rs 10,500 crore in seven years. How adequate is this? According to an internal Task Force Report on Safety (not available in the public domain) submitted by a team of senior railway officials in early 2017, in the wake of a spate of accidents and derailments, the backlog of existing signalling systems at that time amounted to Rs 7,800 crore, “leave(ing) aside investments in Advanced Signalling Systems”. Similarly, the current backlog of track renewals, a euphemism for tracks that require replacement because they have outlived their life, amounts to almost 10,000 km, about 8% of the Indian rail network. Although allocations for track renewal have improved in the last few years, the neglect in the Piyush Goyal and Suresh Prabhu years leaves a lot of catching up to do. Meanwhile, the backlog is building up. This has also to do with the heavy flogging of assets caused by the heavily-overladen wagons on Indian Railways, which reduces the life of the rolling stock as well as the tracks they ride on.
The tragedy at Balasore is a wake-up call for the Modi government to change course from the excessive focus on the glitz and instead focus on ordinary necessities that remain unseen, but are a matter of life and death.
V. Sridhar is a journalist based in Bengaluru.
