Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.
Similarly, 40 days later, the results of recent by-polls echoed this trend, showing an average decrease of 16 percentage points in the vote share of the NDA across 11 out of 13 assembly constituencies from the 2024 Lok Sabha election.
Such a shift in vote and seat share underscores a significant transformation in voter preferences this election cycle. With an eye on insights from the Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) post-poll surveys of 2019 and 2024, this article aims to dissect voter choices and sentiments, shedding light on the undercurrents that have subtly but significantly reshaped the political landscape.
Falling Satisfaction
When pondering the winds of change in voter sentiment, the foremost question is the level of satisfaction with the ruling regime. In 2019, when voters were asked if they were content with the BJP-led NDA government’s performance over the past five years, a robust 65% of respondents gave a nod of approval, while 30% registered their discontent. Fast forward to 2024, and the tide had shifted: satisfaction dipped to 59%, while dissatisfaction swelled to 36%. This marks a notable 6-percentage point drop in satisfaction from 2019 to 2024 and a corresponding rise in dissatisfaction (Graph 1).
Graph 1: Shift in satisfaction with the BJP-led NDA
Note: The % do not add up to 100% as the rest of the respondents did not give a response.
To understand how satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the BJP-led NDA influenced voters’ choices regarding the parties, candidates, and PM candidates they consider while they vote, we need to look at their voting behavior. From 2019 to 2024, both satisfied and dissatisfied voters with the BJP-led NDA government gave more consideration to the party (whether the BJP or any other) and the candidates (regardless of party affiliation), when they went out to vote. However, the most significant change was in how voters considered the PM candidate (Graph 2).
Most notably, while “PM candidate” was not offered as an option in the survey, some respondents mentioned it on their own. Voters dissatisfied with the BJP government who considered the PM candidate, irrespective of the party, while they voted, were 7% in 2019 and 6% in 2024 (the variation was minimal, which is why it isn’t represented in the graph), whereas voters satisfied with the BJP government who considered the PM candidate, irrespective of the party, were 23% in 2019 and 12% in 2024 (Graph 2).
This indicates that while the proportion of dissatisfied voters who considered any party or candidate showed minor fluctuations, there was a notable shift among satisfied voters, with a significant 11% drop in those considering the PM candidate from 2019 to 2024 (Graph 2).
This suggests that voters who are satisfied with the BJP-led NDA are not satisfied with the PM candidate. This suggests a need to investigate whether the dip is specifically linked to the BJP’s PM candidate.
Graph 2: Shift in how voters satisfied with the BJP considered the party, candidate, and PM candidate from 2019 to 2024
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because the remaining respondents either did not respond or considered others.
Waning appeal?
Upon examination, those voters who were dissatisfied with the BJP government and still preferred Modi as the next PM of India were 11% in 2019 and 15% in 2024. In contrast, those who were satisfied with the BJP government and preferred Modi were 65% in 2019 and 58% in 2024. Interestingly, among dissatisfied voters, there was a 4 percentage-point increase in the preference for Narendra Modi as the next PM from 2019 to 2024. This suggests a form of selective partisanship, where even though these voters are dissatisfied with the BJP’s performance, they continue to support Modi as the Prime Minister. This could be due to ideological alignment or the absence of a viable alternative, compelling them to choose Modi despite their overall discontent with the party (Graph 3).
The most significant change is seen among voters who were satisfied with the BJP, showing a decline in preference for Modi as the PM from 2019 to 2024 by 7 percentage points. This highlights a shift where voters reaffirm their loyalty to the party by expressing satisfaction with the BJP, yet do not prefer Modi as the PM in 2024 as much as they did in 2019 (Graph 3). This raises critical questions about the BJP’s strategy of positioning Modi as the grand and singular face of the party. It appears that while voters continue to support the party (Graph 2), their enthusiasm for Modi as the PM candidate is on the wane.
Graph 3: Shift in preference for Modi as the next PM among satisfied and dissatisfied voters from 2019 to 2024.
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% because the remaining respondents either did not respond or considered others.
Translation and aversion
The shift in voter satisfaction with the BJP-led NDA government and the decline in preference for Modi as Prime Minister among satisfied voters sheds light on the actions of the government that resonated—or failed to resonate—with the electorate, and how these issues/actions were translated into votes in the 2024 Lok Sabha election. When asked about the work done by the central government that the respondent appreciates the most in the last five years, the construction of the Ram Temple and promoting Hindutva stood out, with 26% of respondents expressing their support but only 5% of all the respondents voted for the BJP based on the same issue (Graph 4). Conversely, certain issues attracted votes even though they were not widely liked. For instance, while only 2% of voters favoured Modi’s leadership as a standout achievement, this very issue motivated 19% of voters to cast their ballots in favour of the BJP (Graph 4). This pattern again suggests a significant lack of viable alternatives to the voters, among other factors.
This indicates that, on the one hand, issues like unemployment and price rise significantly influenced voting choices, with voter dislike for these issues translating into votes against the BJP (Graph 5). On the other hand, issues such as the Ram Temple and Hindutva saw a divergence, where admiration did not necessarily translate into electoral support. This highlights the electorate’s discerning approach in making voting choices, where decisions are driven by a complex interplay of loyalty to the party, both partisanship and disillusionment with the leader, and an overarching desire for change.
Graph 4: Conversion of the BJP’s Most Liked Actions into Electoral Support in 2024
Note: Only significant categories are considered.
Graph 5: Impact of the BJP’s Most Disliked Actions on Electoral Support in 2024
Note: Only significant categories are considered.
Christophe Jaffrelot is research director at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Professor of Politics and Sociology at King’s College London and Non Resident Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His publications include Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2021, and Gujarat under Modi: Laboratory of Today’s India, Hurst, 2024, both of which are published in India by Westland.
Abhishek Sharma is a researcher at Lokniti-CSDS and a candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi.
Vandita Gupta is a researcher at Lokniti-CSDS.
