Today, December 9, 2025, the Lok Sabha holds a crucial discussion on “electoral reforms”. Central to this debate is the proposal for One Nation, One Election (ONOE). While the government frames this as a matter of administrative efficiency – citing financial savings, the prevention of “policy paralysis”, and reduced voter “fatigue” – the counter-argument suggests these are alibis rather than justifications.

Analysed through a federalist lens, the proposal appears as a project of political engineering designed to strip away the mask of “good governance” and convert the diverse, federal Union of India into a unitary monolith. The concern is that this politics aims to flatten the multi-layered Indian voter into a singular consumer of a nationalised leader’s image.

What is the genealogy of this proposal?

The High-Level Committee (HLC) Report (2024), chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, was the final act in a process that began shortly after 2014. The chronology indicates a systematic manufacturing of consensus.

The process commenced in 2015 with the 79th report of a parliamentary standing committee on “Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assembly” floating the idea of curtailing state assembly tenures – previously considered unthinkable – and introducing the concept of the “fixed term”, borrowing from the unitary model of the United Kingdom.

Even at that time, the report was interpreted as clearly signalling  to the bureaucracy a new agenda.

This was followed by a NITI Aayog Working Paper in 2017, which provided economic rationale for simultaneous elections. By decrying the “populism” of frequent elections, it reframed democratic accountability as economic inefficiency, shifting the argument from “rights” to “resources” to appeal to the middle class and the corporate sector.

Subsequently, the Law Commission’s Draft Report of 2018 attempted to weave a legal safety net to reconcile the reduction of State autonomy without formally amending the Basic Structure. Finally, the HLC Report of 2024 recommended the insertion of Article 82A, moving from theory to statutory enforcement.

How does the ‘appointed date’ impact federalism?

The HLC Report proposes the concept of the “appointed date” via a proposed Article 82. The proposal states that the President notifies a date, and on that date, all state legislative assemblies – regardless of when they were elected – will eventually synchronise with the Lok Sabha elections.

The political implications are significant. A voter in Tamil Nadu might elect a government in 2026 with a mandate for five years. Under this regime, the Union gains the power to truncate that mandate to three years, or two, to align it with the “national cycle” of elections.

This raises the question of the moral ground on which the Union claims the right to alter the social contract between a voter and their state representative.

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Since Article 1 of the constitution declares India a “Union of states”, forcing state cycles to align with the Union treats the former as administrative vassals rather than constitutional entities with sovereign spheres of legislation (List II). The NITI Aayog report (2017) cites an IDFC Institute study showing a 77% probability of a voter choosing the same party for the state and Union, if elections are held simultaneously.

Structurally, this ensures a national narrative – such as national security or foreign policy – drowns out regional narratives like water, irrigation, caste justice and language. The double engine effectively becomes the only engine.

What is the ‘Unexpired Term’ controversy?

The HLC report introduces the concept of the “Unexpired Term”. If a government falls mid-term (e.g., after two years), the fresh election will not be for a full five-year term, but only for the remaining three years. This is the politics of disincentive. It acts as a structural constraint on the legislature, signalling to MPs and MLAs that even if they win a fresh election, they will secure power only for a fragment of time. Theoretically, this incentivises the tolerance of incompetence.

Furthermore, this creates a potential caretaker syndrome. If a government falls after four years, the Election Commission would conduct a massive election for a government that would last only one year. The feasibility of planning policy with a one-year horizon is questionable, leaving the state in administrative limbo and converting Parliament from a body that holds the Executive accountable into a body held hostage by the Executive’s tenure.

Does model code cause ‘policy paralysis’?

A recurring justification is that the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) leads to “policy paralysis”. However, a granular examination reveals that the MCC only stops the ruling party from announcing new schemes or using state machinery to bribe voters; it does not stop ongoing projects, disaster relief work or salary payments. The complaint regarding paralysis can effectively be read as a complaint about the loss of the power of patronage.

Furthermore, reports argue that frequent elections lead to “populist measures”. In this context, “populism” is often code for subsidies and rations for the poor. The implicit intent is to secure a five-year immunity from the demands of the poor, allowing the implementation of unpopular reforms – such as the farm laws – without the fear of immediate electoral backlash in states like Bihar or West Bengal.

The logic follows: frequent elections keep the politicians constantly accountable; ONOE lets them off the hook.

Are the secondary justifications valid?

The validity of the government’s secondary arguments for simultaneous elections must be examined against specific data. Regarding international precedents, the reports cite Sweden, South Africa, Belgium and Germany. These comparisons are contestable as Sweden and the United Kingdom are unitary states without sovereign “states” like Tamil Nadu.

Similarly, Germany uses proportional representation. However, forcing its stability mechanisms (specifically the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’) onto India’s first-past-the-post electoral system represents a forceful stabilisation of a dynamic democracy. Regarding scale, Belgium has a population of 1.1 crore, whereas the diversity of Uttar Pradesh alone exceeds that of the European Union.

On security, claiming that elections divert forces from “internal security” duties implies an inversion of duty. If the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is needed to ensure a marginalised person votes without coercion, that is their internal security duty. Furthermore, holding all elections simultaneously would require an exponential spike in forces deployment, necessitating a total militarisation of the country, bordering on martial law.

Regarding voter fatigue, HLC data shows voter turnout is rising; for the poor, the election is a festival of assertion. It appears the only fatigue being addressed is that of the corporate class and the bureaucracy.

Financially, the claim that ONOE boosts GDP by 1.5% relies on economic determinism. Comparing pre-1967 growth (when elections were simultaneous) with post-1967 volatility ignores that the former was a command economy, while post-1991 growth occurred during an era of frequent elections. The Emergency (1975-77) offered stability and economic discipline, yet the trade-off was liberty.

Also read: Opposition Leaders Question Law Commission Chief on Utility of One Nation, One Election

Finally, simultaneous elections would skyrocket the cost of campaigning for that specific window, creating an oligopoly of funding. Only the richest national party, supported by corporate oligarchs, would be able to deploy resources across 543 Lok Sabha and 4,120 assembly seats at once.

How does ONOE affect third tier of governance?

The HLC report recommends Article 324A to force municipalities and panchayats to align their elections with the Lok Sabha, within 100 days. This could spell the death knell of the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution – both reforms enacted in 1992 to strengthen local self governance in rural and urban areas.

By tethering the vote for a village pradhan to that of members of parliament, including a prime minister, the proposal ensures the nationalisation of the neighbourhood. Instead of voting on local issues like the village water supplies or primary schooling, the election will be fought on national issues – Article 370 or the Ram mandir.

Is there a constitutional mandate for ratification?

The HLC report (Chapter IX, Para 33) claims that the amendment to Articles 83 and 172 (to curtail state assembly terms) “will not need ratification by the states”.

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Article 368(2) mandates that amendments affecting the “legislative powers of the states” require ratification by 50% of state assemblies. By cutting short a state assembly’s life, the amendment fundamentally alters its legislative power. Bypassing ratification effectively treats states as subjects rather than partners.

Where do political parties stand?

Submissions to the HLC by political outfits reveal a clear fault line. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supports the move, viewing federalism as a potential weakness and ONOE as a corollary to “One Nation, One Tax” and “One Nation, One Culture”.

Conversely, the federalist resistance – comprising the Congress party, the Trinamool Congress, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the left parties, Aam Aadmi Party and All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Musilmeen (AIMIM) – identifies ONOE as an existential threat, with the left warning of a push towards a “one-party state”.

A third category includes National Democratic Alliance partners like the Janata Dal (United) and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Despite being founded on principles of regional self-respect and decentralisation, these parties support ONOE. By supporting this, leaders like Nitish Kumar and Chandrababu Naidu are effectively agreeing to a system where the national narrative swallows the regional narrative, trading long-term sovereign existence for short-term political accommodation.

In the final analysis, the resistance to ONOE is not about time, but about power. The proposal seems to be an attempt to bypass the states, insulate the Executive, and centralise the narrative. If passed, the republic risks transforming into a manageable corporation where voters are shareholders allowed to attend the Annual General Meeting once every five years, but barred from speaking in the interim.

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