The Liberal International Order: From Wilsonian Internationalist Racism to Trump’s Anti-Globalist Racism

There is a widespread feeling and even considered view that US President Donald Trump is an aberration, an outlier, possibly crazy. He is seen by many as outside the American tradition, an exception within an exceptional national.

But appearances are deceptive. The roots of Trumpism lie in the very American system and international order – rooted in the presidency of the liberal Woodrow Wilson in World War I – he claims to abhor. That’s why under Trump, America is only recalibrating its attitude to that order, not rejecting it, and preparing to coercively confront the tides of change wherever they arise.

There’s a particularly moving scene in the movie Gandhi (1982). In it, an American journalist who witnesses British colonial violence against peaceful protestors, breathlessly phoned in to his news desk that, “Whatever moral ascendancy the West once held was lost here today. India is free, for she has taken all that steel and cruelty can give and she has neither cringed nor retreated.”

That West has changed in many ways – its stewardship passed from Britain to the United States. It evolved from direct colonialism to imperialism by another name (a liberal international order). But it remains violent and hierarchical.

However, the liberal international order (LIO) and Western moral authority are (once again) withering away before the world’s eyes. Nowhere more is this evident than in backing Israel’s illegal war of genocidal terror in Gaza. But it is hardly the first time that the most modern weapons known to humankind have been turned onto peoples of the Global South. History is littered with millions of black and brown bodies.

Despite that, the LIO is often heralded as a rules-based system promoting democracy, free markets, and global cooperation. But in practice it is, and always was, a widely contested construct – at home and internationally – rooted in the interplay of ideology, power, hierarchy and exclusion. Wilsonianism and Trumpism are but two complementary faces of American power that still leads the international system.

Roots of Trumpism at the creation

Its origins lie in the early 20th century, particularly in the vision of US President Woodrow Wilson, whose internationalism was deeply imbued with class and racial hierarchies. Wilson was considered a progressive intellectual. He went on to become President of Princeton University, elected Governor of New Jersey, before entering the White House in 1913 and serving two consecutive terms. A progressive liberal, Wilson carried out a sustained policy of racial re-segregation of the federal government.

His administration demoted or fired thousands of Black federal workers. It racially segregated offices, restrooms, entrances to buildings, setting back Black rights and reversing gains after the American civil war (1861-65).

Wilson’s tenure could hardly have been otherwise given the founding principles of the United States, and the reconstruction of de facto and de jure racial hierarchies after the civil war. By 1896, the US Supreme Court had sealed the deal with its ‘separate but equal’ ruling in Plessey vs Ferguson that cemented the constitutionality of racial segregation that lasted for over six decades.

Today, this hierarchical order is sustained, albeit in a transformed guise, through the anti-globalist rhetoric and policies of Trumpism. The liberal international order, built on Wilsonian racist internationalism, has been reconfigured by Trumpist anti-globalism which reinforces American hegemony through white-superiority driven nationalism and selective global engagement.

The conclusion from this is bleak: the United States has turned its back on racial and gender equality, civil and workers’ rights as it dismantles federal programmes. And it is evident that the US and its Western allies are not ready to accept that the world is moving towards multipolarity, and are willing to fight to maintain their dominance in world politics.

Hence, western militarisation is intensifying in an era the US has declared as one marked by the “return of geopolitical competition”. Prior to that era, the West had the field pretty much to themselves. That’s called order.

This is not history repeating itself first as tragedy and later as farce; it remains tragic, dangerous and deadly. It may be withering but the liberal international order and its American guarantor are far from dead.

Wilsonian internationalism and its racial underpinnings

Woodrow Wilson’s vision for a new world order, articulated during and after World War I, laid the ideological and institutional foundations for the liberal international order. His ‘Fourteen Points’ and advocacy for the League of Nations promised self-determination, collective security, and global governance. However, Wilson’s internationalism was not a universalist project but one steeped in classist (anti-communist), racial and civilizational hierarchies.

Wilson’s belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority and domestic policies – such as the resegregation of federal offices – reflected a worldview that prioritized white, Western dominance.

Wilson’s internationalism was inherently exclusionary. His concept of self-determination was selectively applied, largely reserved for European nations while denying colonised peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean the same rights.

The League of Nations, while ostensibly a global institution, was dominated by Western powers, with non-white nations marginalised or excluded. Japan’s attempts to insert a racial equality clause into the League’s charter was rejected, Pan-Africanists and other anti-colonialists, ignored. Wilson’s vision aligned with the broader imperialist framework of the time, where the United States, as an emerging power, sought to reshape the world in its image – white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, capitalist.

This racialised internationalism was not an aberration but a foundational feature of the liberal international order, embedding hierarchies of race and power into its institutions and norms. It continues to this day.

The liberal international order, as it evolved through the 20th century, reflected and institutionalised these hierarchies. The creation of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system (the IMF and World Bank), and NATO reflected American leadership but also perpetuated a system where Western dominance was normalised.

These institutions, while promoting liberal values like free trade and ‘democracy’, served American strategic and economic interests, marginalising non-Western voices and reinforcing global inequalities. The Wilsonian legacy, therefore, was not merely the spread of liberal ideals but the construction of a global order that upheld American hegemony under the guise of universalism.

Trumpism and the anti-globalist turn

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked a seeming rupture in the liberal international order. Trump’s “America First” doctrine, with its rejection of multilateralism, disdain for international institutions, and emphasis on national sovereignty, appeared to challenge the very foundations of the order Wilson helped establish. His withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and his criticism of NATO and the World Trade Organisation signalled a retreat from global leadership.

Yet, a closer examination reveals that Trumpist anti-globalism does not dismantle the liberal international order but reconfigures it to serve American interests in a new geopolitical and geoeconomic context.

Trump’s anti-globalism is less a rejection of American hegemony than a reassertion of it through nationalist means. His policies have imposed tariffs on China, the EU, UK, Israel, among others, and weaponised all aspects of US power. They reflect a desire to maintain American economic dominance in an era of multiple rising and competing powers, not just China.

By framing globalisation as detrimental to American workers, Trump cynically exploits domestic workers’ discontent while preserving the core of U.S. elite power: its ability to shape and profit from global economic and security arrangements. His administration’s focus on “fair trade” and “energy dominance” ensures that the United States remains a central player in global markets, even as it eschews multilateral frameworks.

Moreover, Trump’s foreign policy retains key elements of the liberal international order, particularly its militarised and hierarchical nature. His administrations increased defence spending, strengthened alliances with authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia, and maintained U.S. military presence in strategic regions.

The “Indo-Pacific strategy” aimed at countering China’s rise is a continuation of (Obama-era) efforts to contain rival powers, a hallmark of the liberal international order since its inception. Thus, Trumpism’s anti-globalist rhetoric masks a deeper continuity: the preservation of American primacy through selective weaponised engagement with the world.

The paradox of continuity and change

The transition from Wilsonian internationalism to Trumpist anti-globalism reveals a paradoxical dynamic, maybe even a secret, at the heart of the liberal international order: its adaptability to different ideological guises while maintaining American dominance. Wilson’s vision, rooted in racial hierarchies, established a system where liberal ideals were selectively applied to serve U.S. interests. Trump’s anti-globalism, while rhetorically opposed to Wilson’s multilateralism, reinforces this system by prioritising American sovereignty and economic power.

Recall that it was Wilson who first used “America First” as his clarion call in World War I. Both Wilson’s and Trump’s approaches, though seemingly divergent, share a common thread: the use of ideology to legitimise American hegemony. America First, Forever.

This continuity is evident in the role of elites in shaping both eras. Wilson’s internationalism was driven by a cosmopolitan elite—academics, policymakers, and business leaders—who saw American leadership as essential to global stability. Trump’s anti-globalism, while populist in tone, was similarly supported by a coalition of corporate elites, military-industrial interests, and nationalist ideologues who benefited from tax cuts and deregulation.

My own research on American power emphasises the role of elite networks in sustaining hegemony, and Trump’s era is no exception. The liberal international order, whether under Wilson’s idealist garb or Trump’s shrill nationalism, remains a project of elite power, adapting to domestic and global shifts while preserving U.S. dominance.

Conclusion: A resilient but contested order

The liberal international order, built on Wilson’s (and the West’s) racially-charged internationalism, has proven remarkably resilient, adapting to the challenges of Trumpist anti-globalism. While Wilson’s vision embedded racial and civilisational hierarchies into the global system, Trump’s policies have reoriented it toward overt nationalism without dismantling its core structures. Both approaches, in their own way, uphold American hegemony, revealing the order’s flexibility in accommodating ideological shifts while maintaining power hierarchies.

Yet, this resilience comes at a cost. The liberal international order faces growing challenges from rising powers, domestic discontent, and demands for greater inclusivity. The racial underpinnings of Wilson’s vision continue to haunt the order, as marginalised nations and peoples question its legitimacy. Similarly, Trump’s anti-globalism, while appealing to some domestic audiences, risks alienating allies and undermining the multilateral frameworks that have sustained American power.

Understanding the liberal international order requires recognising its contradictions: a system that promotes universal values while perpetuating exclusion and domination.

Its future depends not on ideological purity but on its ability to navigate the tensions between global ambition, nationalist retrenchment, domestic resistance, and increasing multipolarity in world politics and economy—challenges that Wilson’s heirs and Trump’s successors must confront.

And they believe in and are preparing for massive and sustained coercive confrontation, everywhere.

Inderjeet Parmar is a professor of international politics and associate dean of research in the School of Policy and Global Affairs at City St George’s, University of London, a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, and a columnist at The Wire. He is an International Fellow at the ROADS Initiative think tank, Islamabad, and author of several books including Foundations of the American Century. He is currently writing a book on the history, politics, and powers of the US foreign policy establishment.

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