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Two Decades Later, IAF's Plan to Upgrade Multi-Role Fighters to 'Super Sukhoi' Status Remains Stillborn

What began as an ambitious plan to modernise the IAF’s backbone has devolved into a bureaucratic endurance test– where committees multiply faster than completed upgrades.
Rahul Bedi
Oct 28 2025
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What began as an ambitious plan to modernise the IAF’s backbone has devolved into a bureaucratic endurance test– where committees multiply faster than completed upgrades.
An Indian Air Force. Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft. Photo: Mike Freer/Wikimedia Commons, GFDL 1.2 or GFDL 1.2
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Chandigarh: The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) enduring saga of upgrading its Su-30MKI multi-role fighters to “Super Sukhoi” status remains an instance of ambition outpacing execution, even as its combat squadron strength continues to erode, down from a sanctioned 42 squadrons to barely 29, following the retirement of two legacy MiG-21 units at Chandigarh last month.

Initiated nearly two decades ago in 2006, the plan to retrofit around four squadrons – roughly 80-84 of the IAF’s 260-odd Su-30MKIs, mostly licence-built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Nashik – into near 4.5-generation fighters, remains stillborn.

Citing unnamed IAF officials, the Indian Express had reported over the weekend that the MoD was still “examining” the long-pending Su-30MKI upgrade proposal, before forwarding it to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for final approval. Once cleared, the upgraded fighters would take another seven years to achieve Final Operational Clearance (FoC) before entering combat service in the 2030s, the newspaper declared, citing official sources.

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An ageing and dwindling fighter fleet

Until then, the IAF would continue to field an ageing and dwindling fighter fleet, propped up by legacy SEPECAT Jaguars, middle-aged and upgraded Mirage-2000Hs and MiG-29Ms, Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), still struggling to prove themselves, overstretched Su-30MKIs, and too few Rafales.

These totalled up to some 510-odd fighters divided across 28-29 squadrons-13/14 less than the sanctioned 42; these included 12/13 squadrons of Su-30MKIs, three each of Mirage-2000Hs and MiG-29Ms, six of SEPECAT Jaguars, two of Rafales and two of Tejas LCA, one of which had merely obtained Initial Operational Clearance (IOC), rendering it just partially ready for full combat deployment.

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This latter operational shortcoming was prompted jointly by the IAF and the MoD, both of whom were in haste to induct Tejas into squadron service in 2016, some 35 years after the LCA programme was initiated in 1981, and 15 years after the platform conducted its maiden test flight in January 2001in Bangalore.

Collectively, these IAF fighters barely outnumbered Pakistan’s 24-25 fighter squadrons comprising some 350-400 platforms, including some 140-150 4/4.5 generation Chinese-origin JF-17 ‘Thunder’ (Block I/II/III) and some 70-odd F-16A/B ‘Fighting Falcon’ fighters from the US.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), on the other hand, deployed some 2,300 fighters, which include J-20 and J-35 5th-generation stealth fighters. China is also presently flight testing its locally developed 6th-generation fighter prototypes to augment its stealth, networking, and unmanned teaming capabilities. These advanced fighters are likely to imminently enter series production.

“The delay in India’s Super Sukhoi programme perfectly captures the inertia of the IAF and MoD bureaucracies,” said a veteran three-star fighter pilot. Declining to be named for fear of repercussions, he quipped that in corridors of Vayu Bhawan on Rafi Marg in New Delhi and the nearby MoD, time moved faster than a file on an officer’s and babu’s desk. The Su-30s may fly at supersonic speed, he added caustically, but the MoD’s decisions were engineered for glacial drift.

The Su-30MKI upgrade plan has laboriously inched through years of feasibility studies, inter-departmental notes, and bureaucratic red tape before finally securing the MoD’s Acceptance of Necessity in November 2023 – merely the first, tentative step in India’s tortuous material procurement and major platform and equipment retrofit labyrinth, which invariably takes aeons to conclude.

Since then, however, stasis has set in, despite the public urgency displayed by the IAF and MoD over declining fighter numbers – proof that India’s military modernisation too often collapses under its own paperwork. After all, a programme intended to sharpen the IAF’s spearhead had, instead become a study in how bureaucratic torpor can dull national capability faster than any adversary’s missile.

Discussions for the ‘Super Sukhoi’ programme began 19 years ago in 2006, with fighter manufacturers JSC Sukhoi – now part of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) – to equip the Su-30MKIs with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and improved cockpit systems, alongside other advanced capabilities.

Protracted negotiations concerning cost, technology transfer, and indigenous content dragged on for a decade until 2016. In the intervening years, the upgrade proposal was overshadowed – and effectively side-lined – for an extended period by the joint India-Russia Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme, centred on what eventually emerged as the Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter for the Russian Air Force.

No fifth-generation fallback option in a turbulent neighbourhood

In pursuit of the FGFA, the IAF and MoD sank $295 million into the project, hoping it would make the Su-30MKI upgrade redundant and deliver a 5th-generation fighter. But disputes over costs, technology sharing, and minimal Indian design input crippled the venture, and around 2018, India withdrew from the project, citing the FGFA’s poor stealth design, sensor shortcomings and overall inadequate operational performance.

This left the IAF with ageing Su-30MKIs and no fifth-generation fallback option in a turbulent neighbourhood, forcing Delhi to kick-start the long-delayed ‘Super Sukhoi’ plan. However, concomitantly, Russia’s reluctance to share sensitive technology and the MoD's “Make in India” or Atamanirbhar or self-sufficiency mantra for acquiring military equipment and advancing defence programmes, redirected the Su-30MKI upgrade to an indigenous retrofit path.

In this endeavour, HAL, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and state-owned Bharat Electronics were to lead efforts in equipping the Su-30MKIs with modern EW suites, indigenous mission computers, and advanced avionics. The fighters were also to be armed with the home-grown Astra and BrahMos(A)-NG missiles, significantly enhancing their lethality, survivability, and network-centric abilities.

However, soon after, fearing escalating costs, the MoD formed yet more committees that studied the very same issues for years, without resolution. Consequently, the project remained largely dormant for nearly three years until October 2019, when former Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria revisited it during the annual Air Chief’s press conference.

“We will upgrade the Su-30MKIs with (modern) radar and weapon capabilities and also tackle their obsolescence management and EW capabilities,” ACM Bhaduria had declared, but declined to elaborate. At the time UK’s Janes Defence Weekly had reported that initially 42 Su-30MKIs would be upgraded to ‘Super Sukhoi’ status, before extending the retrofit to include additional numbers.

The Weekly also reported that the upgrade would see the Su-30MKIs fitted with DRDO’s Uttam AESA radar to replace the ageing NIIP N011M Bars (Panther) sets, alongside uprated avionics, EW suites, and limited stealth features. The fighters were also to carry the BrahMos-A air-launched cruise missile –capable of pinpoint precision strikes at speeds of Mach 2.8 and ranges of over 292km–and DRDO’s Astra BVR, with a reach of up to 110 km.

Thereafter, silence again shrouded the programme until November 2023, when the MoD finally granted it its AoN – only for it to stall again, ensnared in the usual web of bureaucratic indecision, cost disputes, and clashing design philosophies. This, in turn, had led to the prevailing status of the MoD ‘examining’ the proposal.

Meanwhile, industry sources said the IAF had planned on retrofitting 84 Su-30MKIs as a limited, proof-of-concept phase, which is expected to take five years for the platforms to secure initial operational clearance and another two afterwards for full operational clearance. Additional platforms were likely to be similarly upgraded.

HAL Nashik – the lead production and integration centre for all Su-30MKIs, would execute the retrofit and systems integration work with HAL Bengaluru, providing support for the fighters' avionics, mission computer, radar and EW suite development in coordination with DRDO’s Defence Avionics Research Development laboratories.

Warning from IAF veterans

In the meantime, a cross-section of IAF veterans warned that unless decisive action followed, the Force could enter the 2030s with barely 25 combat squadrons as six Jaguar squadrons – the “MiG-21s in waiting” – awaited imminent retirement, as India was the sole country that still operated this Anglo-French relic from the 1970s. Alongside, the retrofitted Mirage 2000H and MiG-29M fleets, too, were slated to be ‘number-plated’ or phased out over the next decade, further hollowing out combat squadron strength.

They also added that with each passing year that the Su-30MKI programme was kicked down the road, it only widened the IAF's operational capability in contrast to both China and Pakistan, who doggedly continued apace with their fighter modernisation and inductions. “Unless the Su-30MKI upgrade finally leaves the tarmac, the IAF risks watching its once-dominant fighters age into obsolescence – grounded not by technology, but by bureaucratic hesitation,” said a former fighter pilot.

In conclusion, what began as an ambitious plan to modernise the IAF’s backbone has devolved into a bureaucratic endurance test– where committees multiply faster than completed upgrades. HAL still waits for approval, the IAF pleads for progress, and the MoD continues to “examine” the proposal.

This article went live on October twenty-eighth, two thousand twenty five, at thirteen minutes past five in the evening.

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