In its latest move to tackle the unrest in Ladakh, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has constituted a “High-Powered Committee” to discuss measures to protect the “unique culture and language” of the Union Territory of Ladakh). The Committee is composed of three groupings: (a) Seven members from the current political establishment consisting of five bureaucrats from the Union government and two elected Ladakhis from the local government; (b) five citizen members from the Leh district and (c) four citizen members from the Kargil district.
It was an action more expected than sudden for Ladakhis, but not without a surprise. The Committee has excluded any representation of Ladakh’s Sunni Muslims and, lest we forget, Christians – both communities who have punched well above their weight in Ladakh’s economic and intellectual life. The Christian community, conventionally, has been muted in protesting publicly, but are not unconcerned in private. In contrast, the Sunni Muslims are seized of the significance of this exclusion and are vocal in their protests to this latest move, though they are yet to formally articulate their objections.
In the event, the Sunnis of Ladakh would do well to understand that this part of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) Ladakh policy is less about wanting to “cancel” the Sunni Muslims and more about deepening the BJP’s foothold in the trans-Himalayan borderland. Territorially, it reflects the ideology of an Akhand Bharat; culturally, it helps embed Hindutva thought; and politically, it is consistent with the BJP’s electoral tactics, the accent being on the “P” for party in its acronym. To recognise this is to highlight a political reality: that this policy is not only a danger for the Sunni or Christian communities, but to all Ladakh no matter the region or religion. Indeed, rumours suggest that most members of Ladakh’s local BJP are fast realising that “BJP-Ladakh” is not the same as “BJP-central”, who remotely control from the capital even the tiny demography and strategically perilous territory of Ladakh.
The time has come, therefore, for Ladakhis to define themselves as Ladakhis, not as Buddhist, Shi’i, Sunni or Christian. As Ladakhis, not as “shamma” (geographically western) or “stodpa” (geographically eastern). As Ladakhis, not as “Ladakh Buddhist Association”, “Anjuman-i-Moin ul- Islam”, “Anjuman Imamiyya”, “Ladakh Gompa Association” and other such. The time has come to halt further fragmenting ourselves before we permanently hurt ourselves after the disingenuous promise of autonomy for Ladakh on August 5, 2019.
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Ladakhis will need to counter the BJP’s procrastination.
First, the Sunni Muslim, who feel the most threatened, must acknowledge that the latest BJP political perfidy is not merely about a “Sunni seat” on the so-called “High Powered Committee”. What they need to do is convey their own concerns about land rights, livelihood opportunities, local economic autonomy and representation for themselves to their Ladakhi compatriots on the Committee. Simultaneously, the Sunni Muslims must highlight and insist on the need for transparency, merit-based argumentation and open public debate in all negotiations that are held in the Committee about the future of Ladakh’s tiny but precious demography. The above is not to concede non-participation by Sunni Muslims in the negotiations about their homeland, but in the temporary but larger interest of the need for speed in the preservation of Ladakh’s uniqueness. It can be done without acquiescing, precisely speaking, to being cancelled in their own homeland.
Second, all Ladakhis must once again pledge to preserve the unity phase in Ladakh’s politics that was initiated in 2021 by the Apex Body of Leh and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA). Not strengthening that unified approach can prove tantamount to confirming deep and long-term intrusion into Ladakh’s cultural and political identities, tacitly endorsing continued economic and livelihood disadvantages for Ladakhis and to further fragmenting the society.
Third, Ladakhis must think about the history, albeit short, of their negotiations with New Delhi and its non-results. The following is a brief recapitulation of that history.
- On realising that it had been “granted” an impotent Union Territory, the citizens of Ladakh took the trouble to study constitutionally federal formations across the Himalaya, trekking as far away as the northeast of the country to understand the pros and cons of such negotiated structures. They did so independently.
- Thereafter, the various citizen’s groups proposed to the Union government that Ladakh be considered for Schedule 6 safeguards. The demand was ignored.
- After some time, the Union government constituted a Committee led by minister of state for home affairs G. Kishan Reddy. The Committee made recommendations which Ladakhis, overall, approved of. The recommendations were ignored.
- The Apex Body and the KDA referred their case to the Tribal Affairs Department and the latter made recommendations favouring protections for Ladakh’s unique cultural identity. This third-party recommendation was also ignored.
- Frustrated by the stonewalling, Ladakhis upped the ante and have recently demanded full statehood for Ladakh and the right to make their own local laws, citing Sikkim as a case in point, apropos of demographic salience. It has been ignored.
The above is a lot activity in a short time, with historical evidence of Ladakhis bending over backwards to be reasonable about their concerns and patient in their 3.4-year wait for the Centre to allay their fears, soothe their frustrations and reignite the hope that was so palpable in the immediate aftermath of being granted its long-sought status as a Union Territory. As Mustafa Haji, one of Ladakh’s young, bright, very competent and articulate lawyers said during a recent interview, “[Delhi] should not test our patience.”
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Ladakhis must think politically in the larger scheme of things. To wit: prior to August 5, 2019 the region had a voice that was proportionately much better heard in New Delhi than those of either of the two other regions of the former State of J&K, the function of a negotiated political structure. Ladakh then was represented by four Members in the Legislative Assembly, two Members of the Legislative Council, one Member of Parliament and, over the years, by several Ladakhis in the State’s cabinet.
Today, this representational map has diminished to being represented by just one MP in Delhi, with potentially disproportionate influence in the link between the citizenry and power. It does not bode well for Ladakh’s tiny demography of 300,000 souls, nor for India’s exceptionally vulnerable boundary with China, the 21st century’s emerged and acknowledged second party in the New Cold War and Asia’s indisputably greatest power.
Siddiq Wahid is a historian and former vice-chancellor. He is a native of Leh but now resides in Srinagar.
