A new book released this week on the 1971 Bangladesh War has conclusively shattered many cherished myths that are over 50 years old, including Field Marshal Manekshaw’s claim that he was the person who dissuaded Indira Gandhi in April from sending an unprepared Indian army into East Pakistan as well as the claim that India won the war but lost the peace at the Simla Conference of 1972.
In a 30-interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a former Ambassador to China and the European Union, and the author of India and the Bangladesh Liberation War: The Definitive Story says:
“The records conclusively disprove the story popularised by Field Marshal Manekshaw that he had dissuaded Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in April from sending an unprepared Indian army into East Pakistan.”
Dasgupta points out that although under pressure from some members of her Cabinet to intervene in April 1971, Indira Gandhi had made up her mind to wait for several months. Her Principal Advisor, P.N. Haksar said:
“We cannot, at the present stage, contemplate armed intervention at all…it would evoke hostile reactions from all over the world and all the sympathy and support which the Bangladesh (cause) has been able to evoke in the world will be drowned in (an) Indo-Pak conflict.”
It was against this background that Indira Gandhi asked for Manekshaw’s opinion. This is what Dasgupta writes:
“The Prime Minister asked for the Army Chief Gen. Sam Manekshaw’s opinion, knowing fully well that he would need time to prepare for a major unplanned contingency. Failing to see through the Prime Minister’s political ploy, Manekshaw, a gifted raconteur, circulated a colourful tale about how he had restrained Mrs. Gandhi from ordering the Indian army to march into East Pakistan in April.”
A second myth shattered in Dasgupta’s book is about who was “the principal architect” of the invasion plan of 1971. Most people have assumed it was Manekshaw. Dasgupta’s book shows that it was, in fact, the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, Maj. Gen. JFR Jacob, as he then was.
The original plan was based on the belief that the war would be ended before an unconditional Pakistani surrender could happen by a UN enforced ceasefire and, therefore, “the aim … was to occupy the major part of Bangladeshi territory and to place the Pakistani forces in an untenable position that would soon compel them to withdraw from the rest of the territory.” It was Jacob who insisted that Dhaka “was the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan and its capture should be the key objective of army operations.”
Also read: From Karachi To Bay of Bengal, How the Indian Navy Played a Stellar Role in the 1971 War
The third myth busted by Dasgupta’s book is the belief India won the war but lost the peace. This is based on the argument that India failed to leverage the defeat of Pakistan in East Pakistan to convert the ceasefire line (as it then was) into an official border and thus finally resolve the Kashmir issue.
Dasgupta’s book says this was never India’s intention. Indira Gandhi’s intention was to convert the old ceasefire line into a new bilaterally agreed Line of Control, taking into account ground realities, and also reach an agreement that differences with Pakistan would hereafter be resolved bilaterally. She secured both at Shimla.
More importantly, Dasgupta’s book identifies three reasons why Indira Gandhi did not want to convert the ceasefire line into an official border and thus resolve the Kashmir issue. First, it would mean “relinquishing or surrendering India’s claims to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (and that) would trigger strong public protests in India fanned by opposition parties”. This would have provoked an enormous outrage in India and created a domestic problem.
Secondly, Indira Gandhi could not have used the fact India had over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war as leverage because that is specifically prohibited by the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Had she done so she would have invited the wrath of the international community?
Third – and this is something not known previously – India was under critical pressure from the Soviet Union not to seek unwarranted gains at Shimla. Moscow had stood by India before and during the Bangladesh War but in early 1972 a request for Soviet arms was met with silence.
Dasgupta writes: “it withheld a positive response to India’s new request for arms till after the Simla Summit”. This was a calibrated way of ensuring India did not use the Simla Summit to make gains on the Kashmir front. Also, India had assured the Soviet Union in late 1971 that it did not seek territorial gains on the west. Incidentally, shortly after the Simla Summit was concluded India’s request for new arms was acceded to by Moscow.
Watch the full interview here.
