Do the Draft Social Security Rules Legalise Precarity for Gig Workers?

New Delhi: In the urban centres of modern India, a new workforce has emerged, tethered to digital interfaces. The Draft Code on Social Security (Central) Rules, 2025, attempts to map this vast sector of gig and platform workers. However, a close reading of Chapter VIII suggests that the rules may regulate the nature of this work without fundamentally altering the insecurity that defines it.

The rules replace the traditional concept of the "Employer" with the "Aggregator" and shift the focus from rights to "eligibility conditions". Critics argue this ensures that the precariousness of the gig economy remains its defining feature.

Defining the 'aggregator'

A significant shift in naming appears in Rules 49 and 50. In the history of labour law, identifying the "Employer" was a prerequisite for accountability. By enshrining the term "Aggregator" in Rule 50(1)(a), the government effectively classifies these multi-billion-dollar corporations as neutral connectors rather than employers.

This is not a mere technicality; it implies a structural shift. It ensures that the "Social Security" offered is decoupled from the direct relationship of production. The rider is no longer a worker with a claim against a company; they are an "eligible unorganised worker" registering with a "Designated Portal".

The 16-year threshold

In a departure from traditional labour protections, Rule 49(1)(a) opens the gig economy to anyone who has "completed sixteen years of age".

While this may be framed as a formal entry into the digital economy for youth, it raises concerns about the nature of this employment. By allowing 16-year-olds – a demographic ideally in education or vocational training – to enter the algorithmic loop of delivery work, the government provides a "Digital ID Card" (Rule 49(f)). Critics argue this secures a supply of young labour for platforms while ensuring these teenagers enter the workforce in a state of statutory instability.

The triple-counting clause

A distinct calculation method is found in the Explanation to Rule 62(iii). It states that if a worker is engaged with three aggregators on a single day, "this shall count as three days" toward their eligibility.

While this appears to accelerate the worker's path to security, a closer read suggests it may incentivise hyper-activity. To maximise their record, a rider is encouraged to work across multiple food delivery and quick-commerce platforms simultaneously. The law essentially equates the exhaustion of the worker across multiple apps with legal "longevity" in the system.

The 90-day eligibility trap

Rule 49(2)(e) introduces a critical threshold: to be eligible for any benefit, a worker must have been engaged with an aggregator for not less than 90 days in the last financial year (or 120 days across multiple aggregators).

In an economy where platforms use technical blocks, often referred to as "shadow-banning," or temporary deactivation to manage labour supply, the burden is placed on the worker to prove "continuity". If an algorithm blocks a rider for a few weeks, they may fall short of the 90-day mark. The Rule effectively transforms social security into a retention bonus, incentivising the worker to accept every gig to maintain the digital record required by the government.

The burden of data entry

Rule 49(i) mandates that the worker must update their mobile number, address, and skills "from time to time". The rule adds a caveat: "in the absence of such updation, any unorganised worker may not be eligible to avail benefits".

Here, the administrative burden is shifted onto the worker. A delivery rider must now act as a data-entry clerk. Failure to report a change in phone number or rental address to the "Portal" could result in the nullification of their eligibility. The law treats a clerical lapse as grounds for the forfeiture of benefits.

The 60-year cut-off

Rule 50(4) contains a specific limitation: a gig worker "shall cease to be eligible for the benefits... when he attains the age of sixty years".

In most social security systems, the age of 60 is when support mechanisms like pensions and healthcare become most critical. By terminating eligibility at 60, the 2025 Rules suggest that the gig worker is viewed primarily as a unit of production. Once the worker is arguably too old to meet the delivery times demanded by the algorithm, the State withdraws its protection.

The audit shield

While the worker’s eligibility is monitored strictly, the contribution of the Aggregator to the Social Security Fund is governed by Rule 50(3)(b). The assessment of what a company owes is determined after the "finalisation of the audited statement... as per the Companies Act".

This effectively leaves the auditing power with the Aggregator’s own accountants. Furthermore, Rule 52 gives the "Assessing Officer" the power to "sanction the writing off" of dues deemed "irrecoverable". This provision raises fears of a lack of corporate accountability, potentially leaving the Social Security Fund (1-2% of turnover) under-resourced while corporate liabilities are written off.

Therefore, the 2025 Rules mark a transition where the State positions itself as a record-keeper of an inherently unequal relationship. By making security ephemeral, digital, age-bound, and contingent on continuous engagement, the Law ensures that the gig worker remains tracked yet vulnerable. For millions navigating the gig economy, Rules 49 and 50 offer a digital architecture that may prioritise flexibility over fundamental security.

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