Do the New Industrial Relations Rules Make Strikes Impossible?
New Delhi: The publication of the Draft Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2025, represents a significant restructuring of the relationship between the State, capital, and the workforce. While framed as a move towards procedural compliance and "industrial harmony", a closer reading suggests these rules may fundamentally alter the balance of power on the shop floor.
The rules introduce Fixed Term Employment (FTE), universalise strike restrictions, and alter the mechanism of collective bargaining. Critics argue that the cumulative effect is the "bureaucratisation" of labour rights, where legal protections are diluted by procedural hurdles.
The shift to fixed-term employment
At the heart of this restructuring is the normalisation of FTE, codified in Schedule B. For decades, the distinction between permanent and contract labour was central to industrial jurisprudence. The new rules effectively blur this line.
By placing FTE on par with permanent employment, the State creates a framework where tenure is determined solely by contract duration. In practice, this allows industries to maintain a workforce adjusted to market demand – hired when orders are high and let go without the legal obligations of "retrenchment" when they dry up. The worker ceases to be a long-term stakeholder and becomes a flexible component, raising fears that the prospect of non-renewal will act as a silent disciplinary tool.
The strike paradox
If FTE creates job insecurity, the provisions regarding strikes ensure that collective resistance is procedurally constricted. Rule 25, read with Section 62 of the Code, mandates a 14-day notice period for strikes in all industrial establishments. Previously, such restrictions were reserved for "public utility services". The new regime universalises this logic.
A deeper procedural complication lies in Rule 23. It stipulates that conciliation proceedings are deemed to have commenced the moment a strike notice is received by the Conciliation Officer. Under the Code, it is illegal to strike while conciliation is pending.
This creates a "legal loop": to strike legally, a union must give notice; but the act of giving notice triggers conciliation, rendering the strike illegal. Since the rules do not provide a hard timeline for concluding these proceedings, the State can theoretically keep a union in suspended animation indefinitely. By the time the legal path is cleared, the "immediacy" of the grievance – the primary leverage of a strike – may have dissipated.
The arithmetic of fragmentation
The rules also alter the structure of trade unions through Rule 9, which introduces the Negotiating Council.
Previously, unions fought for recognition as the sole bargaining agent. Under the new rule, if no single union commands 51% of the workforce, the employer must negotiate with a Council formed of representatives from various unions holding at least 20% membership.
Also read: Do the New Rules Weaken Trade Union Autonomy?
While ostensibly inclusive, this may lead to fragmentation. It incentivises management to engage with multiple smaller unions rather than one strong body. Instead of presenting a united front, unions may be forced into an arithmetic contest for seats on the council. Critics argue this turns collective bargaining into a competitive process between workers, rather than a negotiation between labour and capital.
Compounding as a transaction
Perhaps the most contentious provision regarding enforcement is Rule 38, which governs the "compounding of offences". This rule allows employers who violate specific provisions to settle the matter by paying a sum (typically 50-75% of the maximum fine).
This effectively decriminalises certain corporate violations. If a worker commits a "misconduct" – such as a go-slow or insubordination – they face potential dismissal. However, if an employer violates procedural laws, they face a fee-based settlement. This mechanism monetises impunity, treating legal violations as a financial transaction rather than a breach of rights.
The digital barrier
The rules are replete with references to "electronic modes" and "designated portals" for filing grievances or strike notices. While consistent with the "Digital India" push, this creates an access barrier. A significant portion of the workforce lacks the digital literacy or infrastructure to navigate web portals.
Furthermore, Rule 6 introduces the Grievance Redressal Committee for individual disputes. By creating an internal body, often with worker representatives chosen in the absence of a recognised union, the State attempts to individualise grievances. This bypasses the collective power of the trade union, turning political struggles over rights into managerial problems to be solved internally.
Finally, the 2025 Rules represent more than administrative adjustments; they signal an ideological shift. By dismantling tenure security, complicating the right to strike, fragmenting union power via the Negotiating Council, and allowing the compounding of offences, the government creates an environment prioritising "ease of doing business". The concern remains that this efficiency comes at the cost of the worker's voice, replacing the noise of collective bargaining with the silence of procedural compliance.
This article went live on January twenty-ninth, two thousand twenty six, at five minutes past twelve at noon.The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
