From Legal Regulation to Student Discipline: Has the BCI Crossed the Line?

The developments concerning the NALSAR students, the proposed participation of the Chief Justice of India in the convocation, and the subsequent intervention of the Bar Council of India (BCI) raise some serious questions of law, institutional autonomy and constitutional freedoms.

BCI chairman Manan Kumar Mishra had initially directed that, until further orders, no NALSAR law graduate of the 2026 batch should be enrolled as an advocate by any state bar council. The BCI had also asked the NALSAR Vice-Chancellor to furnish, within three days, an authenticated report identifying those who initiated, organised, coordinated or mobilised the campaign against the CJI's participation in the convocation. The BCI sought details of representations, petitions and signatories, as well as information about meetings, media communications and social-media groups.

The controversy has since developed further with the CJI stepping in to disapprove of the BCI’s intervention, the chairman withdrawing his action, while calls for him to resign intensified. Meanwhile, Mishra, a BJP leader and Rajya Sabha member, has since also apologised.

The immediate question, however, is: what is the precise statutory authority for such an intervention?

Section 7 of the Advocates Act, 1961, certainly gives the BCI important powers. It can lay down standards of professional conduct, promote legal education, prescribe standards of legal education, recognise universities whose law degrees qualify for enrolment and inspect universities for that purpose.

But does this statutory authority make the BCI a general supervisory authority over the political, ideological or expressive activities of students inside a law university?

That appears to be the first question requiring serious examination.

The distinction between regulating legal education and regulating student expression is important. The BCI can, undoubtedly, be concerned if a university fails to maintain standards prescribed under the legal-education framework. But can that power be extended to investigating students because they organised a campaign asking the university to reconsider inviting a particular constitutional functionary?

And if such an enquiry is permissible, under which provision of the Advocates Act or BCI Rules?

There is another important point. The NALSAR Act itself gives the vice-chancellor powers relating to the maintenance of proper discipline in the Uuniversity. NALSAR's own website states that its Proctorial Board is constituted by the V-C under Section 17(2) of the NALSAR Act to safeguard discipline and maintain standards of campus life.

Therefore, if there was some genuine allegation of misconduct, disruption, intimidation or violation of university rules, would it not ordinarily fall within the university's own disciplinary framework, subject to due process?

The more disturbing question concerns enrolment.

Section 24 of the Advocates Act sets out the statutory qualifications for admission to a state role. Section 24A specifies disqualifications for enrolment. These include specified convictions and, in certain circumstances, dismissal or removal from state employment on a charge involving moral turpitude.

The Act also contains specific provisions dealing with disposal of applications for admission, removal of names from the roll and disciplinary proceedings concerning advocates.

So, the central legal question is quite simple: Where is the statutory provision that makes participation in a peaceful student campaign against the invitation of the CJI a ground for refusing or postponing enrolment as an advocate?

The BCI's reported position was somewhat more nuanced. It said that it has not declared individual students disqualified merely because they participated in the campaign. Instead, it froze the enrolment of the entire 2026 batch pending an enquiry and says that allowing enrolment while the enquiry continues could frustrate the process.

But this raises an equally serious question of collective punishment or collective disability.

If the BCI is investigating particular individuals, on what legal basis can the enrolment of an entire graduating batch be kept in abeyance? What is the statutory source of that interim power? Is such a blanket measure authorised by the Advocates Act or the BCI Rules? And can the statutory power to regulate entry into the profession be exercised on grounds that are not expressly recognised as disqualifications?

There is also a constitutional dimension.

Students do not cease to possess their fundamental rights when they enter a law university. Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) protects peaceful assembly, subject of course to the constitutionally permitted restrictions.

A campaign asking a university to reconsider its decision to invite the CJI is, on its face, an expression of political or institutional opinion. That expression may become actionable if accompanied by violence, threats, intimidation or other unlawful conduct. But mere disagreement with a judge, or even strong criticism of a judge, cannot automatically become professional misconduct.

Indeed, there is a disturbing irony here.

A law university should be one of the places where students learn that judges, governments, universities, regulators and other centres of power can be questioned. If students learn instead that questioning a powerful constitutional authority may jeopardise their future enrolment as advocates, the chilling effect could be profound.

The BCI chairman is reported to have said that a law student who has no regard or respect for the highest judicial office cannot be expected to be a responsible advocate, teacher or judge, and that such conduct reflects adversely on suitability for entry into the legal profession.

This statement raises another fundamental issue:

Is "respect for the highest judicial office" a statutory qualification for becoming an advocate?

If so, where is it prescribed?

And if "respect" is interpreted to mean that a student must not publicly criticise or campaign against the CJI, what happens to the constitutional culture of dissent that legal education itself ought to cultivate?

There is a crucial distinction between respect for the institution of the judiciary and unquestioning deference to the person occupying the office. A constitutional democracy does not require citizens, including law students and lawyers, to agree with judges merely because they hold high constitutional office.

The BCI is, of course, entitled to protect professional standards and the dignity of the legal profession. But the question is whether those objectives can lawfully be converted into a requirement of political or institutional conformity.

The issue therefore seems to me larger than the immediate NALSAR controversy. It concerns the limits of regulatory power. It concerns university autonomy. It concerns freedom of expression and peaceful dissent. It concerns the distinction between criticism of a constitutional office-holder and misconduct in the legal profession.

And, most importantly, it concerns the possibility of a regulator using the power of professional enrolment as an instrument to discipline students for their political expression.

If the reports are accurate, this deserves very close scrutiny by constitutional lawyers and law teachers.

Questions are being raised if the BCI's act was “dictatorial” or “authoritarian”. Before judging it as we need, to answer these questions, the BCI action in keeping the enrolment in abeyance.

1. What provision of the Advocates Act authorises the BCI chairman to demand an enquiry into students' participation in this campaign?

2. Does Section 7(h) and (i), concerning legal education and recognition or inspection of universities, extend to investigating students' political or constitutional expression?

3. What provision authorises the BCI to direct state bar councils not to enrol an entire graduating batch?

4. Can a BCI chairman exercise such a power personally, or must it be exercised through the BCI acting in accordance with the Act and its Rules?

5. Does participation in a peaceful campaign against inviting the CJI constitute any statutory disqualification under Section 24A?

6. If there was alleged misconduct by particular students, why should the entire batch suffer an enrolment freeze?

7. Does the BCI have power to investigate individual students who are not yet advocates for alleged conduct which is unrelated to professional misconduct?

8. What is the relationship between the BCI's regulatory jurisdiction and the disciplinary powers vested in the NALSAR Vice-Chancellor and the University's own disciplinary machinery?

9. Would such action withstand scrutiny under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, particularly on grounds of arbitrariness, proportionality and the chilling effect on protected expression?

10. Can "respect for the highest judicial office" be converted into a condition for entry into the legal profession when the parliament has prescribed specific qualifications and disqualifications?

These are questions for our legally-trained friends to examine carefully, with the actual BCI communication and the relevant statutory provisions before us.

At stake may be something much larger than one convocation.

Can a regulator of the legal profession demand conformity from future lawyers, or is its legitimate role to ensure that those lawyers are qualified, professionally competent and subject to clearly established standards of law and ethics?

That is the question I think we should discuss.

V. Subrahmanyam is an advocate based in Guntur, Andhra Pradesh.

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