SC Reserves Verdict in Sabarimala Reference After 16 Days of Hearing

New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Thursday (May 14) reserved its verdict in the Sabarimala reference after 16 days of hearing before a nine-judge constitution bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant. The bench comprises Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan and Joymalya Bagchi.

The bench examined constitutional questions on the scope of religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26 of the constitution and the extent to which other fundamental rights apply to religious practices and denominational rights.

Fundamental right to religious freedom

A key issue before the court was the phrase "subject to other provisions of this Part" in Article 25(1), which guarantees freedom of religion. Article 26, which deals with denominational rights, does not contain this phrase. The discussion arose because Article 25(1) begins with the words "subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part".

Some lawyers argued that Article 26 does not exist independently from Article 25 because the source of all religious freedom in the constitution begins with Article 25(1), Live Law reports. Therefore, the limitations attached to Article 25 should also carry over into Article 26.

The hearing also focused on whether Article 26 operates independently or remains limited by other fundamental rights. The question before the court was whether equality guarantees and other fundamental rights under Part III would override religious freedom claims under Article 25.

Justice Nagarathna repeatedly questioned how Articles 14 to 24 could override Articles 25 and 26 when all of them were included in the same chapter on fundamental rights in the same part of the constitution. She also stated that Articles 25 to 28 specifically concern religion and should be examined together while interpreting the constitutional framework on religious freedom.

If you juxtapose Article 25 with Articles 14 to 24, the [latter] doesn't speak of religion. Discrimination on the basis of religion is proscribed, but the theme of those articles are not religion. Article 25 onwards up to Article 28 is religion, therefore, if you want to exercise your rights under Article 25(1), that is subject to Articles 26 to 28, which means Articles 26 to 28 will override Article 25(1), LiveLaw also reports.

Several senior lawyers argued that principles used in equality cases under Article 14 cannot be applied in the same manner to matters of religious belief and practice.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta for the Union government, Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium and Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan submitted that courts cannot assess faith using tests of arbitrariness or rationality that are applicable in ordinary constitutional review. These submissions arose in the context of the Sabarimala dispute, where exclusion of women had also been challenged as arbitrary discrimination under equality principles.

Also read: Sabarimala Hearing: CJI Surya Kant Says Original Plea Should've Been 'Thrown in the Dustbin'

Dwivedi submitted that the phrase "subject to other provisions" in Article 25(1) does not mean that all provisions of Part III apply to religious freedom claims. He argued that courts must examine which rights "necessarily have an impact" on Article 25(1). However, he submitted that no denomination could claim protection for practices prohibited under Articles 17 or 23 (untouchability or forced labour). He also argued that Articles 14 and 15 cannot apply in the same manner because religious denominations are not "State" under Article 12.

SC Observer reports an observation by Justice M.M. Sundresh that if both individual and collective rights ultimately trace themselves to Article 25(1), the individual right vis-à-vis the denominational right "cannot be treated at par".

Untouchability and denominational rights

The bench also discussed the applicability of Article 17, which abolishes untouchability. Justice Nagarathna stated that Article 17 was framed in the context of caste-based exclusion and not gender-based restrictions.

This discussion arose because Article 17 had been used in the 2018 Sabarimala judgement by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. In that judgement, he held that exclusion of menstruating women from the temple amounted to a form of "untouchability" because the practice treated menstruation as impure and that led to their exclusion from a public religious space.

The hearing also examined whether Article 25 creates a horizontal right enforceable against private religious bodies or remains enforceable only against the state. Shankarnarayan argued that if Article 25 is not a horizontal right, challenges against denominations may not lie directly under Article 32, which says citizens can directly approach the courts to enforce fundamental rights.

Subramanium argued that denominational rights under Article 26 are distinct from individual rights under Article 25(1). He submitted that once an individual becomes part of a denomination, disputes relating to religious practices and institutions fall within the framework of denominational rights. (In other words, a member of a denomination may not be able to challenge its tenets directly based on constitutional provisions.)

Subramanium responded that an individual may freely profess and propagate under Article 25(1), but membership in a denomination carries obligations flowing from collective belief. He also submitted that courts should never restrict themselves from judicial review in matters concerning Articles 25 and 26 since religious freedom concerns some of the most sacred aspects of human existence. During an earlier hearing on the issue as well, he reportedly said a denomination is where individuals come together collectively to express their worship and faith and must therefore be viewed expansively.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi distinguished between judicial review and judicial determination, observing that courts are capable of determining the existence of faith or denomination without entering into merits or value judgement on religion. Referring to Articles 29 and 30, Justice Bagchi observed that minority rights create a constitutional balance extending beyond ordinary vertical rights against the state.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi:
So there is a difference between judicial review and judicial determination. Whether you have a faith or not is a state of mind, and courts from time immemorial, and if you see the word “fact” in the Evidence Act, states of mind like honesty or dishonesty…

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) May 14, 2026

Balancing religious freedom and equality

Referring to social reform, Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan submitted that Article 25(2) embodied the Constituent Assembly's recognition that India could not survive without reform in a deeply diverse society. Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed, "The 14, 19 and 21 triangle" cannot straightforwardly apply to religious freedom provisions because these articles involve collective considerations." Dhavan agreed and argued that the framers consciously avoided treating rights as "silos".

Amicus curiae K. Parmeshwar urged the court not to exclude Articles 14, 19 and 21 from religious disputes. He submitted that future cases involving bodily integrity or exclusionary practices may require courts to examine competing fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis. He used examples like female genital mutilation and bodily integrity to argue that some religious practices may implicate constitutional rights beyond religion clauses.

"If mylords in a nine-judge combination is to say that Articles 14, 19 and 21 have no application at all, it freezes the law," LiveLaw reports.

Parameshwar also sharply criticised the Essential Religious Practices doctrine, arguing, "It privileges certain practices over others and is deeply elitist”. Referring to tribal faiths and the Bishnoi community, he argued that many traditions cannot satisfy rigid doctrinal tests despite deserving constitutional protection. Justice Nagarathna observed that the doctrine may function only as an aid or tool, not a conclusive constitutional test, SC Observer reports.

Abhishek Manu Singhvi also took a more nuanced line than some of the other respondents. He argued that Article 25 may be subject to similarly placed rights within Part III, but he resisted the idea that every important right automatically overrides religious freedom merely because it is fundamental.

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