On the twelfth anniversary of the United Nations Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists this year, a counterintuitive truth has emerged: West Africa, despite economic struggles and political instability, has fostered a more resilient independent media landscape than the ostensibly more developed democracies of South Asia.
This surprising reality offers crucial lessons about the relationship between press freedom and democratic health. South Asia presents a troubling paradox. India, the self-proclaimed “world’s largest democracy,” has plummeted to the 159th place out of 180 nations in the 2024 press freedom rankings. However, across the Arabian Sea, countries like Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria have developed media systems with greater independence and pluralism despite facing comparable economic constraints and authoritarian pressures.
In Pakistan, 2024 witnessed 162 documented attacks on journalists, including murders, assaults, abductions, and arbitrary detentions by state forces. The country experienced at least 19 internet disruptions, including a year-long ban on X, with officials hypocritically using VPNs to access the platform themselves while restricting citizen access. Meanwhile, India has seen systematic harassment of journalists through coordinated troll armies directly linked to the ruling party.
What makes West Africa’s comparative resilience especially remarkable is that it emerged from similar historical constraints. Like South Asia, West Africa endured colonial control of media that prioritised settlers’ voices over locals. French colonisers “tended to suppress development of an indigenous press” while British rule allowed limited cultural expression. Both regions faced post-colonial authoritarian regimes that maintained tight media control. Yet, beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, West Africa embarked on a different trajectory. The region witnessed a “radio explosion” of independent broadcast outlets covering diverse formats from music to women’s issues. Civil society organisations played a crucial role, with groups like the Media Foundation for West Africa and the West Africa Journalist Association creating cross-border solidarity networks.
This divergence from South Asia becomes more striking when examining ownership structures. In India, four out of five major television networks are owned by individuals directly affiliated with the ruling party. BJP’s massive digital operation coordinates messaging through over 50,000 WhatsApp groups at the tehsil or ward-level, creating an unprecedented propaganda machine.
West Africa, while not immune to ownership concentration, has developed more diverse models. The region has seen a proliferation of community-based media and civil society networks designed specifically to reduce dependency on both government control and foreign interests. Regional press freedom organisations like the Africa Freedom of Expression Exchange have established networks across African countries to promote access to public information through collaborative advocacy.
Faced with censorship, West African journalists have developed creative resistance strategies. Organisations like the Union of Media Professionals of Benin, which defends journalists’ rights through advocacy and capacity building, have established regional networks enabling media professionals to bypass government restrictions. Contrast this with South Asia, where the media have increasingly abandoned their watchdog role.
In India, television news has become a platform for “exacerbated hyper-nationalism and hyper-religiosity” featuring “warmongering” that delivers electoral gains for the ruling party. When farmers protested government policies, mainstream media participated in vilifying them as “criminals and Khalistani separatists,” rejecting their traditional role of “reporting from below”.
These divergent paths reflect different relationships between media and civil society. West African media evolved in tandem with grassroots associations that Mohamed Camara describes as a “dialectical interdependence” strengthening both against state domination. South Asian media, particularly in India, has severed these connections, becoming what scholars describe as a “partner in crime” with authoritarian governance. The implications for democracy are profound. Media freedom is foundational not because journalists deserve special privileges, but because independent information enables citizens to make informed decisions and hold power accountable. When the media fails in this function, democratic erosion follows swiftly.
West Africa’s experience demonstrates that press freedom doesn’t require perfect conditions – the region still faces significant challenges including journalist killings and government harassment. Rather, resilience emerges from institutional diversity, civil society partnerships and regional cooperation that prevent any single actor from dominating the information ecosystem. For international supporters of press freedom, this comparison suggests redirecting efforts. Rather than focusing narrowly on constitutional protections or training individual journalists, more attention should go toward building media ecosystems with multiple centres of power and strong civil society connections.
West Africa’s surprising media resilience offers hope that even societies with limited resources can maintain spaces for independent journalism. The key lies not in pursuing a Western-imported model but in an Africa-centered normative ethical framework that balances global standards with local values. The contrasting trajectories of these regions remind us that press freedom is never guaranteed – it must be continuously fought for and protected through diverse, interconnected institutions. South Asia’s troubling decline and West Africa’s qualified success suggest that the future of global press freedom may depend less on resource-rich democracies than on the innovative approaches emerging from unexpected places.
Jonathan Akinniyi is a student of Political Science and History at Yale University.
