Seven Takeaways From Bihar 2020 Provide Context for the Verdict in 2025
New Delhi: As the vote count for the 18th Bihar Vidhan Sabha begins tomorrow, a precise understanding of the 2020 election is critical. The mandate five years ago was not a simple victory or defeat; it was a sophisticated result defined by a high disproportionality index, where the popular will and the final seat tally seemed disconnected.
Here are seven key insights and takeaways from 2020:
1. Dozens of razor-thin races turned a popular vote tie into a 15-seat victory.
The 2020 Bihar election ended in one of the tightest results in recent history. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 125 seats, a razor-thin majority just three seats over the 243-member assembly’s halfway mark. The opposition Mahagathbandhan (MGB) finished a close second with 110 seats. This final tally, however, masked an even more dramatic reality: the popular vote was a statistical dead heat. The final figures showed the NDA with 37.26% and the MGB with 37.23%. This gap between a near-identical vote share and a 15-seat difference was captured by a high disproportionality index (DISP) of 22.22 – a metric that quantifies how much a seat tally deviates from the popular vote. The NDA’s victory was a story of superior efficiency in converting votes to seats.
Among the parties, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) emerged as the single largest with 75 seats and a 23.11% statewide vote share, followed by the BJP at 74 seats with 19.46%. The Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) secured 43 seats with 15.39% of the vote, while the Congress won 19 seats with a 9.48% vote share.
Also read: What Explains the Historic Voter Turnout in Bihar and What Does it Mean?
This outcome was decided by dozens of close contests. In total, 20 seats were settled by a margin of less than 1%, 40 by less than 2%, and 52 by fewer than 5,000 votes. Eleven constituencies were decided by under 1,000 votes. The single tightest race was in Hilsa, decided by a mere 12 votes. Other nail-biters included Barbigha (113 votes), Ramgarh (189), Matihani (333) and Bhorey (462). Yet, while the overall race was close, the nature of individual victories varied wildly.
An analysis of average victory margins shows that smaller, ideologically-driven parties won their seats with more authority; the AIMIM won its five seats with an average margin of 18.1%, and the CPI(ML)(L) won its seats with a 14.3% margin. In contrast, the major parties fought harder for every win: the BJP's average margin was 11.1%, the RJD's was 7.7%, and the JD(U)'s was just 7.0%.
2. Higher female turnout, a fragmented field and crucial protest votes decisively influenced the outcome.
Beyond the final tally, the election's mechanics revealed a state in flux. The overall voter turnout was a modest 57.29%. Within this number, however, lay a crucial gender dynamic: female participation, at 59.69%, was significantly higher than male participation, at 54.45%. This enthusiasm built through the campaign, as turnout rose from 55.7% in the first two phases to 59.9% in the third.
The political system itself was crowded and fragmented. A record 213 registered parties and 3,976 candidates contested. The average Effective Number of Parties (ENOP) across constituencies was 3.29, reflecting genuine multi-cornered fights beneath the bipolar surface. Fragmentation was highest in regions like Munger (3.87), indicating that third forces materially shaped results there. Amid this crowded field, over 7 lakh voters chose to reject all candidates by pressing the 'None of the Above' (NOTA) button, accounting for 1.68% of the statewide vote.
Also read: Why Does Bihar Not Vote in Large Numbers?
While a protest vote, its size was decisive in several races. Two key examples are Bhorey, where NOTA votes far exceeded the 462-vote winning margin, and Matihani, where the 333-vote victory margin was dwarfed by the number of NOTA votes.
3. The BJP's high strike rate gave the NDA an edge over an RJD-led alliance hobbled by the Congress
The 2020 result was a story of two deeply imbalanced coalitions. Within the victorious NDA, the BJP was the dominant force, winning 74 of its 110 contested seats for a formidable 67.3% strike rate. Its partner, the JD(U), underperformed dramatically, winning just 43 of its 115 seats – a strike rate of only 37.4%. This was mirrored in the MGB. While the RJD powered the opposition campaign by winning 75 of its 144 seats for a strong 52.1% strike rate, it was hobbled by the Congress, which won only 19 of its 70 contested seats, a dismal 27.1% strike rate.
The CSDS survey revealed that despite performance gaps, vote transfer was largely efficient. Among traditional voters, 97% of BJP and 93% of JD(U) voters stuck with the NDA, while 96% of RJD and 83% of Congress voters backed the MGB; the latter's leakage was a point of weakness. This dynamic was complicated by external forces. The Lok Janshakti Party played a decisive spoiler role, winning 5.66% of the vote but only one seat.
Simultaneously, the Left parties made a major comeback, winning 16 seats. Outside the two main blocs, vote-to-seat inefficiency was rampant: the Lok Janshakti Party and independents together amassed over 14% of the total vote but combined for just two seats.
4. High approval for the Union government overcame deep dissatisfaction with the state government
To understand why people voted this way, the CSDS survey provides a clear window into the public mind. When asked to name their single most important issue, voters prioritised economic concerns: 29% cited development, 20% unemployment, and 11% inflation. These priorities cleanly divided the electorate. Among those who named 'development' as their key issue, 58% voted for the NDA. For those who prioritised 'unemployment,' 54% backed the MGB.
This choice was heavily influenced by perceptions of the state and Union governments. There was significant anti-incumbency at the state level: only 42% of voters were satisfied with the Nitish Kumar-led government, while 55% were dissatisfied. In stark contrast, the Narendra Modi-led central government enjoyed a 69% satisfaction rating. This divergence was a consistent theme. On handling the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government's satisfaction rating (51%) was thirteen points higher than the state's (38%).
Similarly, on the migrant worker crisis, the Union’s 44% satisfaction rating outpaced the state's 34%. This "Modi factor" acted as a powerful firewall for the NDA.
5. A late swing of voters delivered the NDA a winning coalition of women and consolidated caste blocs.
These priorities were deeply rooted in the state's social fabric, and the election's final days were crucial in mobilising these blocs. A significant "late swing" was observed, with the NDA securing a commanding 11-point lead (41% to 30%) among voters who decided on polling day itself. This final push helped seal a victory built on specific demographic advantages. The gender gap was decisive: while men slightly favoured the MGB (38% to NDA’s 34%), women backed the NDA by a clear 7-point margin (41% to MGB’s 36%). The MGB, in turn, found its strength among the youth, winning the 18-29 age bracket with 41% of the vote to the NDA's 36%.
The CSDS survey provides a detailed breakdown: the MGB's support was anchored by overwhelming backing from Yadavs (80%) and Muslims (77%). The NDA constructed a broader winning coalition, securing dominant support from Upper Castes (63%) and Kurmi/Koeris (52%), while also winning a plurality of the crucial Extremely Backward Classes (49%) and holding a lead among Other Dalits (41%). A final nuance was the migrant vote. While these households leaned towards the MGB (42% to 38%), the survey found that a higher proportion of voters in migrant households (30%) did not cast a ballot compared to non-migrant households (25%).
6. The data shows that political parties, not voters, are the primary barrier to women's representation
Beyond voting patterns, women remained starkly under-represented as candidates and winners. Out of nearly 4,000 candidates, only about 370 were women, compared to over 3,300 men. This translated into a lopsided assembly, with 26 women winning seats compared to 217 men.
The data pointed to a supply-side constraint: the primary bottleneck is the failure of political parties to nominate women in winnable seats, not a systematic failure of female candidates at the ballot box.
7. The NDA overcame a huge deficit in phase 1 by dominating the election's final two phases
Finally, the election's outcome was shaped by the state's geography. The 2020 map showed distinct regional strongholds. The NDA outperformed the MGB in the Ang Pradesh zone, creating a solid bulwark of seats, while the MGB dominated the Bhojpur belt.
These regional results also correlated with turnout, which varied significantly across sub-regions: Seemanchal averaged 62.06% (the state’s highest) and Koshi 61.11%, while Central Bihar had the lowest at 52.43%. However, participation levels did not have a simple linear relationship with victory.
This geographical outcome was directly linked to the election's phased momentum: the MGB's early lead was built on its staggering 67.6% seat share in Phase 1, but the NDA's comeback was powered by winning 52.1% of seats in Phase 2 and a commanding 66.7% in Phase 3.
Placing the 2020 result in historical context reveals its significance. The 57.29% turnout continued a gradual recovery from an all-time low of 46% in 2005, though it remained below the 62% peak of the 1990s. The fragmented result confirmed a long-term trend of no single party achieving dominance, with the major players oscillating in the 16-23% vote share range for two decades. For the JD(U), it marked a dramatic decline from its peak, while for the Left, it was the best performance since 1995.
The efficiency story
In sum, the NDA’s 2020 victory was an efficiency story. Its ability to convert votes into seats was driven by the BJP’s highly efficient vote distribution, a systematic edge across dozens of races decided by less than 2% or 5%, and a geographically broader spread of wins. This was amplified by vote-splitting among smaller parties, independents, and NOTA, which disproportionately harmed MGB candidates in tight races. This combination of factors transformed a near-tie in popular vote into a clear, if narrow, majority in the assembly.
This article was edited to correct a figure in the first numbered item.
This article went live on November thirteenth, two thousand twenty five, at seventeen minutes past two in the afternoon.The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.




