Do More Members Make a Constitutional Body More Accountable to the Public?
The gradual transformation of constitutional offices in India, from being the responsibility of a single, clearly accountable functionary into large bodies with a collective structure – though that does not guarantee independence – needs far more attention than it has been getting.
A commission may have one member or three. The number of members does not matter as much as the strength they bring to an institution. The better question is: Can more members dilute individual responsibility and make constitutional authority more vulnerable to political pressures? That is the real question to consider.
Consider the original constitutional arrangement concerning the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 338 of the constitution originally provided for a special officer for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, commonly known as the “commissioner”. The commissioner was required to investigate and report on the implementation of constitutional safeguards and submit reports to the President.
The office, therefore, had one constitutional functionary, one identifiable responsibility and it would prepare just one report – but all three stages carried an unmistakable institutional signature.
Among those who served in this tradition was Dr B.D. Sharma, an eminent civil servant and scholar whose work on tribal affairs and marginalised communities earned considerable respect.
In 1990, however, parliament passed the Constitution (65th Amendment) Act. It replaced the single commissioner with a national commission consisting of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and members.
The new arrangement came into effect in 1992, when the office of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commissioner was abolished.
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There were arguments, legitimate or not, behind the change. Parliament had heard concerns that one individual could not adequately monitor the enormous geographical, social and administrative problems confronting members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. A commission could bring multiple perspectives and institutional capacity.
Yet, another side revealed itself as time progressed.
Whereas a single constitutional officer is difficult to hide behind, a commission introduces layers. It has members, procedures and internal deliberations and its wields collective responsibility. Indeed, these may help strengthen an institution, but they can also make accountability less personal and less transparent.
In 2004, the combined commission was further split in two, creating more paperwork, more records – and yet, as reports point out, the basics remained unresolved, even crucial posts were not filled in the new national commissions.
The same institutional evolution is visible, in a different form, in the Election Commission of India (ECI). For nearly four decades after Independence, the body functioned essentially through the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). In October 1989, two election commissioners were appointed, making it a three-member body. That experiment lasted barely seventy days. The National Front government subsequently restored the single-member arrangement.
Then came T.N. Seshan.
Seshan’s tenure as CEC from 1990 to 1996 became a landmark in the history of the top election watchdog. The ECI itself records in the book, Leap of Faith: Journey of Indian Elections, that his tenure as one perceived as “an important development in the annals of Indian elections”. It also records that Seshan “asserted the authority and autonomy of the Election Commission, rigorously implemented the Model Code of Conduct, spoke against electoral malpractices and enhanced the prestige of the commission” among voters.
Numerous independent contemporary accounts also describe Seshan’s forceful assertion of the commission's constitutional authority.
In 1993, the ECI, too, was expanded to three members. M.S. Gill and G.V.G. Krishnamurty joined Seshan. Importantly, the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Act, 1991, was also amended, giving all three commissioners equal decision-making authority. Any differences were to be resolved by majority. Seshan challenged the arrangement before the Supreme Court, but the court upheld the framework in 1995.
The constitutional principle is therefore quite clear: a three-member Election Commission is not legally a CEC with two assistants. The commissioners are members of the ECI and participate in its decision-making.
That makes recent developments particularly worth watching.
In September 2026, the Indian Express reported that election commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had recorded 14 objections over 10 months concerning electoral roll management and transparency within the commission. It alleged that certain decisions or communications of the CEC had proceeded without their involvement.
The ECI has rejected the characterisation of these developments as an institutional breakdown and said that differing views are normal and that final decisions, including those concerning the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, were unanimous.
Whatever one’s political position, the episode raises a constitutional question larger than any individual commissioner: What is the purpose of having a multi-member constitutional body if meaningful checks within that body can themselves become uncertain?
Institutions are stronger when power is distributed, disagreement is recorded and responsibility is transparent. But multiplication of offices alone does not create institutional independence.
India's constitutional architecture was designed to prevent the concentration of power. That principle applies not merely to Parliament or the executive, but also to the guardians of constitutional safeguards.
A constitutional office must therefore possess three qualities: independence, accountability and institutional transparency. If adding members strengthens all three, it is institutional progress. If it merely multiplies chairs while concentrating effective authority elsewhere, it becomes something very different.
And that is where the difference is marked between constitutional institutions that remain guardians of the republic or creatures beholden to the very establishment they are expected to scrutinise.
Vijay Lapalikar, a journalist turned activist, left his job at 45 and was a working committee member of Bharat Jan Andolan, worked among tribals until the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This article went live on October first, two thousand twenty six, at five minutes past five in the evening.The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
