+
 
For the best experience, open
m.thewire.in
on your mobile browser or Download our App.
You are reading an older article which was published on
Jan 09, 2021

As Gujarat CM, Madhavsinh Solanki Was the Precursor to Mandal Politics

politics
He rode to power after uniting Gujarat's marginalised classes, but was unable to politically empower these sections.
Madhavsinh Solanki. Photo: PTI
Support Free & Independent Journalism

Good evening, we need your help!!

Since May 2015, The Wire has been committed to the truth and presenting you with journalism that is fearless, truthful, and independent. Over the years there have been many attempts to throttle our reporting by way of lawsuits, FIRs and other strong arm tactics. It is your support that has kept independent journalism and free press alive in India.

If we raise funds from 2500 readers every month we will be able to pay salaries on time and keep our lights on. What you get is fearless journalism in your corner. It is that simple.

Contributions as little as ₹ 200 a month or ₹ 2500 a year keeps us going. Think of it as a subscription to the truth. We hope you stand with us and support us.

Madhavsinh Solanki, who passed away at the ripe old age of 93 on Saturday, will be remembered for being the precursor to what later came to be known as Mandal politics under V.P. Singh’s prime ministership which sought to empower the other backward classes (OBCs). He became Gujarat’s chief minister after leading the Congress to win 142 assembly seats in 1980, followed by 149 seats in 1985. Keen political watchers attribute Solanki’s success to uniting backward castes, Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims.

As the story goes among Congress circles, Indira Gandhi advised the party’s Gujarat leaders in the late 1970s to work out ways to “consolidate” four major sections of the population – backward castes, Scheduled Tribes, Dalits and Muslims. It prompted two senior Congressmen, Jhinabhai Darji and Sanat Mehta, to work out what later came to be known as the KHAM theory, uniting Kshatriyas (included the two main OBC groups Thakores and Kolis), Harijans (a term no longer used, refers to the Scheduled Castes), Adivasis and Muslims. They constitute nearly three-fourths of the state’s population.

Solanki’s job, as chief minister, was to galvanise the administration to implement the KHAM theory. Himself a Thakore, a community mainly consisting of descendants of the foot-soldiers during the British rule, he concentrated on the OBCs, to whom he gave 21% reservation. “This virtually led to the entire OBC population – nearly half the state’s population – to support Solanki”, said a senior Congress leader. “It showed during the polls, though at the expense of losing the support of the Patels and upper castes.”

Even though KHAM helped Congress win big – 142 seats in 1980 and 149 seats in 1985 – Solanki failed to politically empower any of the sections which had helped him become the chief minister. Facts show the majority of those who won on Solanki’s KHAM-cum-reservation campaign in 1985 were non-OBCs.

A breakup worked out by social scientist Ghanshyam Shah suggests only 31 out of 149 seats Congress won went to OBCs, consisting of Kshatriyas, Kolis and Ahirs; 29 to “middle castes”, consisting of non-OBCs, especially Patels; 36 to upper castes (Brahmins and Banias); and eight to Muslims. Congress won 25 of 26 seats won by Scheduled Tribe candidates and all 13 won by Scheduled Castes.

With his exit, Congress’s downfall began

In his second term, which began in 1985, Solanki was forced to resign within months after his victory, at the insistence of the Congress high command – especially Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi – following a violent anti-reservation agitation in the mid-1980s which turned communal. With Solanki’s ouster, the Congress’s downfall began. Amarsinh Chaudhury, an Adivasi, was installed chief minister and forced to suspend the reservations given to the backward castes.

A senior Congress leader conceded that soon, the Congress began losing its core base of OBCs, Adivasis and Dalits. “Unable to keep the flock together, many leaders also began switching over to the BJP,” the leader said.

Solanki was brought back to power in 1989 for a short period, but it didn’t help. Made minister for external affairs in 1991, he put in his papers the next year after meeting the Swiss foreign minister who reportedly told him to halt inquiries into the Bofors scam.

I was witness to his weak handling of the ministry during my Moscow stint as a foreign correspondent (1986-1993). On coming out of the meeting he had with his then-Soviet counterpart, I asked him about the issues that were discussed during the talks. After detailing discussions on several subjects, he said, “We also discussed some outstanding issues.” I asked him what those were. Indian ambassador A.S. Gonsalves intervened, perhaps sensing that Solanki would blurt out differences on the non-proliferation treaty. Later, the then-political counsellor in the Indian embassy, told me, “Solanki had a short nap during the meeting. He looked bored.”

A suave politician, Solanki would proudly say how he helped trigger major social sector shifts – one of them being pan-Indian. He told me about a conversation he had with Indira Gandhi, who expressed “extreme concern” over the high dropout rate among school-going children. “I offered her the solution to provide mid-day meals in schools. She readily accepted this and asked officials to work out details,” he told me.

The mid-day meal scheme was not just adopted in Gujarat but across India and continues to be a major social support system. Another major policy shift which Solanki talked about was bringing down the very high dropout rate among Gujarati girls – one of the highest in India. “We decided to provide free education to girls right up to the university,” he told me, regretting, though, that it was discontinued by Narendra Modi after he became the chief minister of Gujarat in 2001.

Remained private after retiring

One who shied away from public appearances after he said goodbye to active politics in 1991, he lived a quiet life at his residence in Sector 19 in Gandhinagar. Solanki is known to have grievances against Sonia Gandhi’s top aide Ahmed Patel, who died of COVID-19 a few weeks ago. He made a short appearance in a Congress rebel meeting in Gandhinagar, held to hold Ahmed Patel responsible for the party’s “humiliating” defeat in the December 2002 assembly elections.

Popular among the numerically strong OBC Thakore sub-caste, to which he belonged, he was constantly approached by candidates to campaign during polls to galvanise OBC voters. A senior Congress leader, whom I met in 2007 in the North Gujarat town Patan, lamented, “If only Solanki had come to campaign just once, we would win this seat. Without him, this seems difficult.”

Solanki refused to talk politics during personal meeting, or even criticise Modi—except to regret how two of the schemes which he had envisaged – midday meal and free education to girls – had been undermined after Modi came to power. He would instead give details about the new books which he had read, ranging from Hitler’s Mein Kempf to a book on how western medicines were based on traditional home remedies that Indians use in their daily lives. One of those who was called to speak at the golden jubilee celebrations of Gujarat in 2010 in the state assembly, Solanki didn’t utter any work of criticism against either BJP or Modi.

The collapse of Solanki’s KHAM coalition came in handy for Modi to woo the Congress’s OBC politicians. One of them was Udesinh Baria, whom I met covering an election. A top Solanki loyalist and an influential OBC leader from Godhra, Baria kept meeting Solanki to pay his obeisance even after joining the saffron party. According to Baria, in a bid to woo him, Modi said, “I have great respect for Madhavsinh. But in politics, you must move forward to work for a cause. I am an OBC, and so are you. We must come together.”

Make a contribution to Independent Journalism
facebook twitter