On March 17 this year, six Dalit men were playing cards at an under construction structure at Chordiha village under the Salempur Lok Sabha constituency of eastern Uttar Pradesh, when I called on them. They were tense because the police had arrested a youth from neighbouring Patna village for uploading a folksong on Facebook.
“Cast your votes by 12 noon. There will be less chances of manipulation”, Sitaram had suggested to his fellow villagers. They were planning in their own way to get rid of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. They were working out on the strategy to get relief from the ‘reign of fear’ from what they described as “Modi-Yogi’s policemen” had unleashed on them.
Now, the Chordiha villagers are gleeful.
Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty
“We are happy that we have defeated Modi”, said Shriniwas Prasad over the phone. The Samajwadi Party has wrested the Salempur seat from the Bharatiya Janata Party.
“It doesn’t matter who has won and who has lost. We voted for Modi in 2014 and 2019. We have defeated him in 2024 because Modi and Yogi sent policemen at our doors instead of bettering our life”, said Prasad.
“Sanak gail rahal. Ab hosh thekan-e aajayee (He had gone mad. Now, he will be back to his senses)”, murmured a Muslim man to a semi clad Koiri peasant at Mehrauna bridge over the river Gandak that divides Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Both shared their story of how they had gone together to cast their votes at Mehrauna booth in Salempur Lok Sabha constituency.
The loss of Narendra Modi’s brand of Hindutva runs deeper than what the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief, Mohan Bhagwat’s utterances against the ‘sevak (read Prime Minister)’ and the pressure from the allies—Nitish Kumar and Chandrababu Naidu– might cause to his third term in office.
More than the voluble rural elites, upper castes and urban business communities, the peasantry battling the rural distress of worst order, gargantuan inflation and growing police excesses, came together to defeat the radical Hindutva in the Hindi heartland.
They worked in their farm fields and struggled hard to earn for their daily needs. They were not articulate. They were shy of engaging with the media. But they have spoken through their votes, breaking the strangleholds that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had created by enforcing its version of nationalism that segregated the Muslims through the machination of the militant Sangh Parivar cadres, administration, and the so-called welfare schemes.
Bihar caste survey report has revealed that the other backward classes, scheduled castes and Muslims constitute 63.14%, 19.65% and 17.70% of the state’s population respectively. Uttar Pradesh hasn’t carried out such an exact caste-survey. But the election results in the two states from 2014 onwards suggest that the BJP had made deep inroads among the OBCs and Dalits combining them with the upper castes and urban middle class to establish its supremacy over the regional parties and the Congress in the region.
The 2024 Lok Sabha election results appear to have indicated that the BJP continues to have its sway over the upper castes and urban elites but has lost the same over the OBCs and Dalits who constituted the backbone of the Hindutva party particularly from the 2014 election onwards.
Deeper Loss for Hindutva
The saffron party’s loss is deep rooted and systematic. It has happened in the background of the crescendo created by the consecration of Ram temple at Ayodhya, Modi’s call for “chaar sau paar (over 400 seats)” and his virulent attack on the Muslims during the campaigns. The trend is likely to gather more strength with the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) parties detaching themselves from the religious politics and focussing on the measures to address the real issues of unemployment, farm distress, social disparity, and growing poverty.
What might have shocked Modi and Uttar Pradesh chief minister, Yogi Adityanath more was that the mysterious death of Mukhtar Ansari in captivity created huge sympathy among the OBCs and Dalits for his brother Afzal Ansari in the Ghajipur constituency and beyond. The peasants deserted Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which is believed to have been helping the BJP and voted for the Samajwadi Party candidates with vengeance.
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The Karakat, Arra, Sasaram, and Buxar seats in Bihar and Salempur, Ghajipur and Varanasi seats in Uttar Pradesh have similar demography and reflected similar voting behaviour. If the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Congress wrested the BJP’s strongholds of Buxar and Sararam in Bihar respectively, the voters sent shivers down Modi’s spine by voting miserly for him in Varanasi.
The Rahul, Akhilesh and Tejashwi effect
Though a little delayed, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi and the Samajwadi Party chief, Akhilesh Yadav deserve credit for synchronising their actions to inflict a body blow to the Hindutva machine at the grassroots level, particularly in Uttar Pradesh. Rahul preached and practiced unalloyed secularism against the BJP’s divisive agenda. His party brought out the historic nyaya patra (manifesto), promising a plethora of measures to mitigate poverty, unemployment and ensure increased representation for the OBCs and Dalits in jobs and governance.
Akhilesh’s “Pichhara, Dalit, Alpsankhyak (PDA) formula has worked stupendously. He fielded his candidates exactly in adherence to this formula. As a result, the Samajwadi Party’s Awadhesh Prasad Paasi, wrested the Ayodhya seat from the BJP’s Lallu Singh, demoralising the Hindutva party to the hilt.
Tejashwi fell short of achieving in Bihar what the Rahul-Akhilesh combine did in Uttar Pradesh. The INDIA under Tejashwi’s stewardship did phenomenally well wresting the Patna Sahib, Karakat, Arra, Buxar and Sasaram seats comprising the Bhojpuri belt of central Bihar from the BJP.
But it didn’t achieve the desired results in the Mithila region and large areas of north Bihar. It was because chief minister Nitish Kumar held on to his Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) and Mahadalit (poorest among the Dalits) voter base. In fact, Nitish though his steady interventions to empower the EBCs and Mahadalits through more reservation to them at the local bodies, myriad welfare schemes and also representation in his party structure stopped the “wave of anger” against Modi-Yogi raaj in U.P. from entering in Bihar. The EBCs and Dalits which constitute over 36% and 19% of Bihar’s population respectively stayed largely loyal to his party. Besides, the presence of the Dalit leaders, Chirag Paswan and Jitam Ram Manjhi also added to the NDA’s strength.
But Tejashwi’s efforts paid off too. The NDA had won 39 out of 40 Lok Sabha seats in Bihar, with the Congress winning the lone Kishanganj seat in 2019. The INDIA has taken its tally to 10 from one with the Purnea MP, Pappu Yadav announcing his intention to stay with it.
Tejashwi attracted the youths in a big way because of his focus on the job, bhaichara (communal amity) and livelihood that has found reflection in the INDIA’s increased vote-share in the state. His efforts might bear better results in assembly elections due in 2025 with Nitish receding to the twilight of his life without creating a second rung of leadership in his party, Modi losing his magic and the BJP losing support base of the peasantry in the Hindi heartland.
Nalin Verma is a senior journalist, author, media educator and independent researcher in folklore.
Read all of The Wire’s reporting on and analysis of the 2024 election results here.
