Rekha Chowdhary 
During last few weeks, two Ladakh-based amalgamations of religious, social and political organisations – the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance – have been seeking national attention on the demands raised by them in relation to the Union Territory of Ladakh.
On January 15, these organisations held a joint protest march in Jammu where they declared their intention of intensifying their struggle and holding a protest demonstration in Delhi’s Jantar Mantar, very soon. The two bodies have been demanding full-fledged statehood for Ladakh, constitutional safeguards under Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution, increased political representation in the form of two Lok Sabha and one Rajya Sabha seat, reservation of jobs for Ladakhis, and the immediate recruitment and formation of Ladakh Public Service Commission. The immediate trigger for the protest march was the Union home ministry’s announcement of the formation of a 17-member High Powered Committee (HPC) to respond to these demands.
Rejecting the HPC on the ground that the agenda before the committee falls much short of the demands and the membership being arbitrary, these bodies have decided to continue their struggle.
What makes the protest – as well as recent Ladakhi politics – peculiar, is the coming together of Leh and Kargil-based leadership on the common platform. As the history of Ladakh’s politics clearly reveals, the two districts of Ladakh have been, till very recently, following mutually exclusive politics and taking divergent political positions.
Also read: Leh, Kargil Groups Accuse Centre of Trying to Break Unity Over Statehood Demand
The divergence between the two regions was clearly reflected in the wake of granting of Union territory status to Ladakh. While Leh district celebrated the decision (UT being its long standing demand), Kargil protested since it was from the beginning opposed to this demand.
With the overcoming of the historical differences between Leh and Kargil, a new chapter has been added to the Ladakhi identity politics. While the earlier politics was exclusive in nature and fragmented both on sub-regional as well as on communal lines, the new politics is inclusive of all Ladakhis, irrespective of internal socio-political differences. While seeking political empowerment of Ladakh and Ladakhis, it seeks protection of rights of local people, resources, land, environment and ecology.
Moreover, this politics is also much more federal in nature. While the earlier Leh-based demand for UT was looking for substitution of Kashmir-centric rule with a direct rule of the Union government over Ladakh, the new politics is based on resistance against centralisation and demanding replacement of the rule of the Union and Central cadre of bureaucracy with a locally representative system of governance.
This new direction of the Ladakhi politics, particularly the joint struggle and joint agenda of Leh and Kargil leadership under the auspices of the Apex Body of Ladakh and the KDA has put the Union government in a situation of quandary.
Till now, the Bharatiya Janata Party government has been responding to the exclusive demands of the Leh Buddhist leadership, which fitted in its ideological agenda. But the demands raised jointly by Buddhist-Muslim leadership of Leh and Kargil are quite different from this agenda. Some of the demands negate the very ideological basis of bifurcation of the state of J&K and withdrawal of its special constitutional status, especially, the protections provided by Article 35A.
Ladakh: A history of internal strife and fragmented Identity Politics
As stated above, Ladakhi identity politics till the formation of the UT was internally fragmented.
It was the Leh-Kargil divide that overlapped with the Buddhist-Muslim divide. It may be mentioned in this context that two-third population of Leh comprises Buddhists and three-fourth population of Kargil comprises Muslims (mostly Shia Muslims). As per the 2011 census, 66.39% people in Leh district are Buddhist, 14.26% are Muslims and 17.14% are Hindus. In Kargil, 76.87% people are Muslim, 14.21% are Buddhists and 7.34% are Hindus.
The initial base of Ladakhi politics was laid down by the Buddhist leadership of Leh under the auspices of Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) and its later avatar, the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). This politics, however, was quite exclusive as it sought to define Ladakh from the perspective of Buddhist-majority Leh, completely making Shia-majority Kargil invisible, in the process.
Right from the time of accession of J&K to Indian Union, Leh’s Buddhist leadership started demanding separation of Ladakh from this state. The logic of the demand was based both on grounds of distinct religious and cultural identity of Ladakh as well as on the grounds of ‘neglect’ and ‘discrimination’ of the region in the hands of ‘Kashmir-centric government’ of J&K.
During late 1980s (particularly during its anti-Muslim agitation of 1989) LBA clearly articulated the demand for Union Territory of Ladakh. The demand for UT persisted in Ladakh during the later decades. Even after the region was granted Autonomous Hill development Councils – one each of Leh and Kargil (in the 1990s) the demand persisted. So central was the demand for UT to Leh’s politics that all political parties located in this district, despite their ideological differences, sought to locate their politics in this demand. The demand however was centrist in nature – substituting the rule of Kashmiri leadership with direct control over Ladakh by the Union government.
Kargil initially was politically invisible and did not have much voice. It was only after 1979 when it was granted the status of district, that the leadership here started asserting itself.
Much of such assertion, however, was in response to the political stance taken by Leh-based LBA – particularly the demand for separation of Ladakh from J&K state. From the very beginning, Kargil leadership was staunchly opposed to the idea of UT. Meanwhile, it also raised the issue of backwardness of Kargil and its neglect vis-a-vis Leh.
Thus, while the logic of Leh’s politics was governed by Ladakh’s disempowerment vis-a-vis the rest of the state and discrimination at the hands of Kashmir-centric politics of the state, the logic of Kargil’s politics was defined by the relative deprivation of Kargil vis-a-vis Leh. It is for this reason that while Leh sought to separate from Kashmir, Kargil leadership sought a closer association with Kashmir-based parties and identified with their politics. In its sense of disempowerment vis-a-vis Buddhist Leh, this leadership sought comfort from the muslim-majority character of the state and its special constitutional status.
Political divergence between Leh and Kargil often led to irritations and tensions between the two sub-regions of Ladakh. Many a times such tensions also had underlined communally divisive tendencies. With Buddhist-Muslim binary overlapping the Leh-Kargil binary, the effect on Ladakhi identity was quite disastrous. Rather than a common sense of belonging to Ladakh, there had evolved two mutually conflicting identities – Ladakhi Buddhist identity and the Ladakhi Muslim identity.
Formation of UT and after
August 2019 announcement about reorganisation of J&K state and granting of UT status to Ladakh, generated opposite reactions in Leh and Kargil. Leh celebrated the decision and saw it as a fulfilment of its long-pending demand.
Even when the Ladakh was to be a UT without a legislature and was to be directly governed by the Centre, the immediate satisfaction was the fact of its separation from Jammu and Kashmir state (particularly Kashmir). The power of Union Parliament to legislate was specifically celebrated and it was hoped that it would now be convenient to get pro-people laws passed by the Parliament and it was also hoped that tribal status to the Ladakh would be declared as a tribal area.
Kargil leadership, on the other hand, protested the decision of being granted UT status for Ladakh. Initially, it joined the Kashmiri leadership in demanding the restoration of pre-August 2019 status quo – not only in terms of the reorganisation of the state of J&K but also in terms of withdrawal of the special constitutional status under Article 370.
Apart from that it also raised concerns about Kargil being reduced to subordinated position within Leh-dominated UT of Ladakh. A Joint Action Committee that was formed to formally articulate Kargil’s response came out with 14 demands. Though the major demand of this Committee was reversal of decision of formation of UT for Ladakh, it made other demands as well – a separate UT for Kargil (in case reversal may not be possible); renaming the UT as the UT of Leh and Kargil; equal development and equal representation of Kargil at par with leh etc.
Meanwhile, in Leh, after the initial euphoria about being granted the UT was over, leadership started expressing concerns about the implications of the new set up. These concerns mostly emanated from the disillusionment related to the expectations that being comprised mostly of tribals, Ladakh would be given some kind of constitutional protection in relation to the land and jobs. But the Reorganisation Act by which the UT of Ladakh was established did not incorporate any such provision.
This seemed to be a big backsliding for Ladakhis since as part of J&K state, they shared the privilege along with other permanent residents of the state to have exclusive rights over the land and jobs within the state through the law providing special privileges to the Permanent Residents of the state. Only the holders of Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC) were eligible to be employed in the state, hold the land and enjoy various other rights. With the abrogation of the special constitutional status and the removal of Article 35 A, the PRC became redundant.
In this situation, Ladakhis felt vulnerability about jobs, land, heritage and ecology. With the land situation of Ladakh being very precarious, apprehensions started being expressed about the exploitation of land by land mafia and endangering of Ladakhi culture and environment. The demand therefore was made for the constitutional protection under the provisions of Article 371 and Sixth Schedule of Constitution.
Also read: Why Citizens’ Groups in Ladakh Are Turning Down the Union Home Ministry’s Olive Branch
In the context of the direct governance by the Centre through the Lieutenant Governor and the Central cadre bureaucracy, the impact of a political void was also felt by the leadership in Leh and the concerns started being raised here around the lack of political representation.
In the earlier dispensation, Ladakhis were quite well represented politically with one MP, four MLAs, two MLCs, one or two ministers in the state ministry. As members of various political parties, they were also able to assert their political voice in many other ways. But now, with only one Member of Parliament, they did not have much political space. The Hill Councils were there but in the absence of any clarification about their role in the new system, these Councils were almost becoming powerless bodies.
The feeling of discomfort with the lack of basic protections as well lack of political representation came to be clearly manifested in Leh, in less than one year after the UT was formally established.
In September 2020, most of the Leh-based parties under the auspices of Apex Body of People’s Movement for Sixth Schedule of Ladakh (Apex Body of Leh) took the decision of boycotting the ensuing 6th Ladakh Autonomous Development Hill Council (LADHC) Leh election ‘till such time the constitutional safeguards under 6th schedule on the line of Bodo Territorial Council is not extended to Ladakh and its people’.
While the government was forced to postpone the election, it was only after an assurance was given by the Union home ministry that the concerns of Ladakhis would be addressed that these elections could be rescheduled.
Soon after the formation of the Apex Body, the Kargil-based political parties, social and religious organisation came together to form Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA).
Initially, the KDA did not approve of the agenda of the Apex Body of Leh. Rejecting the demand for protection under 6th Schedule of Indian constitution, it demanded the restoration of the August 2019 position of Ladakh especially the restoration of the special constitutional status under Article 370 of the constitution. Alternatively, it also articulated the demand for statehood for Ladakh.
Leh and Kargil coming together
It was in December 2020 that efforts started being made by the two organisations to come together on the common platform and work for a joint strategy for the fulfilment of their demands. By August 2021, the differences between the two bodies were sorted out and they came came out with joint agenda of demands.
This joint agenda comprised the demand for full-fledged statehood for Ladakh; constitutional safeguards whether under 6th Schedule or under Article 371 of the constitution, two Lok Sabha and one Rajya Sabha seat for Ladakh and immediate filling of government jobs vacancies pending since the establishment of the UT.
To wage the common struggle, it was decided to hold dialogues with the Union government only through a joint committee representing whole of Ladakh.
For more than one and half years now, Leh and Kargil leaders have been sticking together. Clearly understanding that the internal sub-regional (Leh versus Kargil) or communal (Buddhist versus Muslim) divide would taper the negotiating power of Ladakhis vis-a-vis the Union government, they have been cautiously working on maintaining their unity.
This is more so due to the fact that local BJP is maintaining its distance from the Apex Body. In the context of powerful influence that the BJP has had in Leh in last few years, there is always the danger that the new-found bonhomie between Leh and Kargil may fizzle out at any point of time.
It is for this reason that the Apex Body of Leh and KDA are working even in the direction of resolving the long-standing conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims. One such conflict that had the potential to generate tensions between the two communities recently was related to construction of a Buddhist monastery in Kargil for which there was strong opposition by the local Muslims (on the ground that there is no Buddhist population in the immediate vicinity of the proposed site of Gompa).
As tensions started building in June 2022, the issue was resolved with a decision taken for allotment of two kanal land to LBA for the construction of Gompa through the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council.
Also read: ‘Clear Motive of Disturbing Peace’: Kargil Residents Doubt Monk’s Campaign for Monastery
A major factor that pushes the two bodies to maintain the unity can be located in the far-reaching changes that have been taking place in the Union territory of J&K during this period. In J&K, the law providing special privileges to the permanent residents of the state in the matters of land and jobs has been demolished and a new domicile law has been introduced.
As per this law, it has been possible for non-permanent residents including those with a stay of 15 years or less (in case of Union government employees or the students passing out of Class 10 or 12) to seek jobs in this UT. Meanwhile, changes have been made in the laws related to purchase of land. While the right to purchase non-agricultural land here has been extended to all Indians, the sanctity of the agricultural land has also been compromised. The process of changing the status of land from agricultural to non-agricultural has been made quite easier. With these and many other policies – the protection provided to local land, jobs and trade on the one hand and local control over resources, has been undermined.
It is this scenario in the neighbouring UT of J&K that has led the Ladakhis to persist in their struggle for protection of their jobs, land and other resources. They have been successful so far in restraining the Union government from extending the new laws introduced in the UT of J&K to Ladakh. In relation to non-gazetted jobs, they have also succeeded in compelling the Union government to acknowledge the sanctity of the PRC.The Ladakh Resident Certificate which is required for applying for these non-gazetted jobs, takes PRC as the basis for defining a person as Resident of Ladakh. The Ladakh Resident Certificate Order, 2021, defines those people as Residents of Ladakh who posses the Permanent Resident Certificate or are eligible for the same.
Though the Apex Body and the KDA have demanded statehood for Ladakh, however, the core of the demands raised by these organisation revolves around two things: the constitutional safeguards for Ladakh (under the 6th Schedule of the constitution or otherwise) as well as the political representation for Ladakh.
One can see that it is not very easy for the Union government to respond to Ladakhi demands for two reasons. First, these demands, reflect a paradoxical situation for the BJP. In the context of its narrative of negative impact that Article 370 and Article 35A had for J&K – it is difficult for this government to accept the need for special constitutional provisions for the UT of Ladakh. Replacing Article 370 with Article 371 does not make a good case for this party. That is the reason that the government instead has been insisting on development of Ladakh and free flow of funds to the region.
Secondly, bringing any special constitutional provisions for Ladakh may generate an adverse impact in the UT of J&K where the Union government has succeeded in radically changing positions both in case of lands and jobs. People of J&K have so far acquiesced to the changes without any protest but a different model of protection of rights in Ladakh could trigger some kind of response there as well.
How will Ladakhi politics turn in the future? The answer to this question would depend on the continued unity between Leh and Kargil.