P. Raman 
Over two years back, this writer wrote about the fate of the victims of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Dhritarashtra embrace. Since then, politics has moved pretty fast, with most Bharatiya Janata Party allies losing heavily in the Lok Sabha elections.
When Modi took oath in 2014, the BJP had two dozen allies. Most of them have since deserted the National Democratic Alliance. This is because the alliance with Modi was essentially unequal and based on a patron-client relationship.
All previous coalitions in India had an agreed policy matrix. The United Front, though short-lived, functioned on the basis of a common minimum programme and coordination committee. For the United Progressive Alliance, Left leaders and P. Chidambaram drafted the common minimum programme. The alliance also had a functioning coordination committee. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s first government had its agreed national agenda for governance drafted by Jaswant Singh. Revised in 1999, it committed to “set the Indian polity on a new course for the future” and promised “federal harmony” and “full protection of minorities”. Vajpayee avoided forming a coordination panel, but was ready to meet allies and discuss their demands at any time. He had an accommodative style.
Modi does not believe in coordination or discussions and has persistently avoided any internal scrutiny – from allies or party colleagues. He himself decides the country’s policies and programmes, often drafted by his expert groups, and himself announces them on behalf of the government. And that becomes the NDA’s policy. Under this paradigm, neither the allies nor his own MPs have any say. They are all expected to accept it as government policy. This has been the Modi style of governance since the Gujarat riots in 2002.
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This explains the desertions from the NDA over the years. Those days, Modi could overlook the allies’ demands because he had an overwhelming presence. The humiliated allies left the NDA as their very survival was challenged. The same Chandrababu Naidu who is propping up the Modi government now had angrily walked out of the NDA in 2018, alleging that the prime minister found no time to even meet the allies. Naidu charged Modi with being arrogant and authoritarian.
The issue was the Telugu Desam Party’s demand for special category status for Andhra Pradesh, which the Union government had refused. Naidu then said: “Modi is known for making promises to the allies and then going back on them.” For months Amit Shah, then BJP president, and Naidu attacked each other:
- The doors of the NDA are closed to Naidu ‘forever’, Shah said in February 2019. He predicted that Naidu would seek re-entry into the NDA soon but would not get it.
- Naidu retaliated saying the BJP would never be allowed to open its account anywhere in the south.
- Shah said there was ‘no bigger opportunist’ than Naidu, accused him of indulging in ‘huge corruption’, and said he was only interested in promoting his son.
- ‘Where was this Amit Shah before 2014? What was his history? I can speak a lot but will do it at an appropriate time,’ Naidu said.
And the war of words went on. Now, the two sides are back together.
In the 18th Lok Sabha elections, like the BJP, all its loyal friends too suffered a backlash.
For analysis, the BJP’s coalition partners can be categorised broadly into four groups. In the first are those who have been with the BJP for a year or more, such as the Nationalist Congress Party (Ajit), Shiv Sena (Shinde) and Asom Gana Parishad and Tamil Nadu’s three AIADMK factions. They all suffered big losses.
The second category includes Janata Dal (United), TDP and Chirag Paswan’s Lok Janshakti Party, with whom the BJP had hurriedly forged an alliance just before the elections. All the three are former allies who had left the NDA. This partnership brought windfall gains, with JD(U) bagging 12 seats, TDP 16 and Chirag six seats. Their support enabled the 240-MP BJP to cross the 272 magic figure and form the government.
In the third group are the regional parties like YSRCP, Biju Janata Dal and the Bharat Rashtra Samithi of Telangana. As ruling parties in states, they fought the BJP locally but supported the party in parliament during all crucial trials of strength, including the abolition of special status for Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act amendments, Citizenship Amendment Act and no-confidence motions.
Why Naveen Patnaik, Jagan Reddy and Chandrasekhar Rao supported the Union government in return for no gains remains a puzzle. Was it for fear of the Enforcement Directorate and the Central Bureau of Investigations? Or a desire to be safely on the side of power? Whatever the reason, it highlighted a sharp contradiction and was politically unexplainable. The voters hit back. The BRS and the BJD ended up with zero seats each and YSRC, hitherto a ruling party, won just four seats out of 25.
Patnaik, with no representation in the Lok Sabha, now says he will be with the opposition. He has appealed to his workers to function as a strong opposition.
Then there is a fourth category of BJP allies that includes former long-time bedfellows as well as occasional supporters. The Shiromani Akali Dal was in alliance with the BJP right from 1996. After extending support for over 24 years, it left the NDA in September 2020 on the issue of the farmers’ agitation. But by then it was too late. After being an appendage of the BJP for so long, it found its real political space had been taken by other parties. At the moment, the 100-year-old party is in the midst of a serious internal rebellion.
Similar is the case of the AIADMK, which has been a BJP ally for a long time. Modi’s divisive politics is believed to have led to an erosion of the AIADMK’s support base. While some of its splinter groups continued to back the BJP, the dominant AIADMK group led by Edapadi Palaniswami snapped ties in September amidst great jubilation in its ranks.
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The PDP of Jammu and Kashmir led by Mehbooba Mufti had an alliance with the BJP to form a government in the state. But, as expected, it did not last long and in June 2018 the rocky coalition ended.
The reasons for Bahujan Samaj Party’s ignominious show in this election are different. Under the shadow of the ED and CBI, Mayawati claimed ‘equidistance’ and fielded candidates who could split opposition votes and thus help the BJP. The result: Uttar Pradesh’s former ruling party ended up with just 2.04% votes and no representation in the Lok Sabha.
The JJP, led by Dushyant Chautala, who was a long-time coalition partner in Haryana, lost miserably.
When Ghulam Nabi Azad left the Congress in September 2022, the godi media trumpeted it as the final stage of a ‘Congress-mukt Bharat’. Azad was promptly made a member of the committee on simultaneous elections led by Ram Nath Kovind. But in the Lok Sabha elections this year, his party lost the deposit in all the seats it contested.
Even the Congress unit in Madhya Pradesh, with its half-baked ‘soft Hindutva’ as a counter to BJP’s Hindutva, drew a blank.
Ironically, the issue on which Naidu quit the NDA – special category status or economic package for Andhra Pradesh – is re-emerging as the government’s Achilles heel. He came to Delhi with a long wish list and met Modi and other ministers.
To complicate the issue for the prime minister, similar demands are coming from other states. The JD(U) has passed a resolution seeking special status or a special package for Bihar. Nitish’s demand was supported by another Bihar ally, Chirag Paswan.
The latest to raise the demand for a special package are Congress-ruled Karnataka and Left-ruled Kerala. As far back as 2020, six other states – Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Odisha, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal – had pressed for a similar special package.
For Modi and Shah, the special package opens a proverbial Pandora’s box.
P. Raman is a veteran journalist.