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The verdict of the 18th Lok Sabha election has been over analysed. It provides ample scope for different interpretation according to one’s purpose and inclinations. But there are only two indisputable facts: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) does not have a majority in the parliament and still the Modi 3.0 government has come back to power with the same arrogance and agenda. The clear message is of continuity and not change.
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Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty>
Brutal continuity
A cursory look at the post June 4 development makes it amply clear:>
- After the results were announced, Narendra Modi instead of convening a customary BJP parliamentary party meeting convened a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) parliamentary party meeting where he was elected the leader.
- The major alliance partners, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) fell in line with the chorus along with smaller partners in hailing Modi as the harbinger of New India.
- In an unprecedented way, a full-fledged ministry of 72 ministers took oath on June 9, out of which 60 were from the BJP.
- All the decisive portfolios that define the political character of the government like home, defence, finance, foreign affairs, and such other ministries were not only retained by the BJP but also allotted to the same ministers who were in charge in Modi 2.0.
- In a clear message of continuity to the Muslims of the country, non-elected BJP functionaries from Christian and Sikh communities were inducted into the ministry but not a single Muslim BJP member was given a berth.
- Even though this is a coalition government and needs matured and balanced relationship with allies and also with the Opposition for the smooth functioning of the house, the parliamentary affairs ministry is given to Kiren Rijiju who is known for his hardline positions and has been a trouble maker rather than a trouble shooter.
- Even the erstwhile National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and PMO in charge P.K. Mishra were also retained and continued in their respective roles.
- The first messages given by the ministers after assuming offices were endorsement and commitment to the pending Modi 2.0 agendas like Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and implementation of new and draconian criminal laws.
- Prime Minister Modi himself flew to Italy to participate in the G-7 meeting, on an informal invitation to reduce the media focus at home on his electoral setback and also compelling the media to exaggerate his reception there, as one more achievement in making India Vishwaguru.
- Meanwhile immediately after the induction of Modi 3.0, attacks on Muslims in Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Gujarat on flimsy grounds resumed, warning the country of no respite.
- Permitting the prosecution of one of India’s most important voices of dissent, writer Arundhati Roy, for a speech made 14 years ago and deliberate communal additions and deletions from NCERT texts are two more recent examples that prove the new government is an unconstrained continuity of the earlier majoritarian and authoritarian regime of Modi.
Also read: Modi’s Cabinet: Six With Rs 100 Cr+, 28 With Criminal Cases From Murder to Crimes Against Women
The above developments demonstrate that the number of seats, whether 240 or 370 is inconsequential, as the Modi 3.0 government is in office. Every single act of the new government is giving a message of brutal continuity. Changes, if any, are cosmetic and for fool’s consumption.>
Hindutva — undeterred, unchallenged>
The audacity of the Modi 3.0 emanates from the hidden message in the verdict itself. Most of the observers and the commentators compare the loss of the BJP with the exaggerated claims of the NDA crossing 400 seats and the BJP crossing 370 and hence overwhelmed by its losses. But this claim turned out to be not an electoral goal of the BJP but an electoral tactic. >
It is true that the BJP was confined to 240, 32-seat short of simple majority. It is true that the BJP has lost 30 seats in Uttar Pradesh, when compared to 2019 and it has even lost Ayodhya and in Varanasi Modi himself won with far lesser margin. In Haryana, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, and West Bengal, the performance of the BJP has been far below the expectation and the saffron party has lost both significant vote share and seats. All these outcomes are definitely a moral defeat for Modi and his team and their arrogance which even the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has hinted at.
But could this be construed as rejection of Modi or Hindutva?>
While the resurgence of the Opposition in this election is a sigh of relief, does it mean people have embraced the Opposition and rejected majoritarian hate? >
A careful and close analysis of the results and the details provided by the post-poll survey data by the CSDS-Lokniti suggest that Modi-tva is intact in the society and people are still influenced by majoritarianism, with some notable temporary shifts among a few sections in very few states. >
Few examples substantiate this aspect:
- While this is the worst performance of the BJP under Modi, it is also the third best performance of the BJP in the electoral history of the BJP and its previous avatar as Bharatiya Jana Sangh.
- The BJP has lost 20% of the seats it had won in 2019. But has lost only 0.8% of its vote share. In 2019, the BJP was supported by 37.36% of voters. i.e. 22.9 crore voters. In 2024, it got the support of 23.59 crore (36.56%), which means an additional 70 lakh Indians voted BJP in spite of its ten years of autocratic rule. While the Congress has improved its vote share to 21.5% from 19%, even though it contested in 100 seats fewer this time — the Congress and other major Opposition allies have improved but barring few states the BJP is far ahead nationally. This is worrying.
- The loss of seats that the BJP has experienced in few states does not show the proportionate decrease in its vote share either. This is the outcome of its well cultivated social coalition and social support achieved through manipulations of the people’s mindsets for more than several decades. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP has lost 50% of the seats it won in 2019, which came down from 63 to 33. But its vote share went down by only 8% (49% to 41%). Here the SP-Congress alliance registered its best performance by winning 43 seats. Even though it was 10 seats more than the BJP, the combined vote share of the INDIA bloc was just 2% more than the BJP.
- In Maharashtra, the BJP lost 60% of its seats by winning only nine of 23 it won in 2019, its vote share was down by only 1.62%. In Rajasthan, the BJP has lost 45% of its seats but the loss of votes was 10%. In West Bengal, the BJP has lost only 1.9% votes but lost around 40% of seats compared to the 2019 general elections.
- In Karnataka, though the BJP has lost eight seats, its vote share was 46%, the second best performance of the BJP in the state. Notably, the saffron party performed exceptionally well in the southern state in the 2019 general elections — which remains its best performance — when it had won 25 out of 28 seats in the state.
- BJP swept Odisha, devastated the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) both in terms of votes and seats.
- In the south, the BJP has tripled its vote share in Andhra Pradesh, doubled its seats and multiplied its vote share in Telangana, and opened its account and increased its vote share to around 17% in Kerala. In Tamil Nadu, it has tripled its vote share to 11.24% and has emerged second in nine out of the 20 constituencies in which it contested, a big feat for a Brahminical party in a Dravidian state.
In the first past the post system, the minuscule swing in vote share gave strange results. Nevertheless, in the present electoral system it’s decisive for government formation. But it does not explain the real social and political dynamics of the people’s will. The vote share analysis fills that lacuna partially. And the vote share analysis of the BJP and the Opposition informs that the BJP is still in the dominant position and the combined Opposition is far behind in terms of vote share. One of the reasons for the BJP’s authoritarian audacity comes from this premise. >
The myths and the CSDS survey>
The post poll surveys of the CSDS are a treasure in understanding the voter’s mindset, their preferences, and its relation to their views and choices. The CSDS has published its report in the Hindu and it breaks so many romantic progressive myths built around the verdict of 2024.
Broadly speaking, the CSDS post poll survey indicates that the social support, coalitions and the impact of the BJP’s Hindutva ideology is intact in spite of its seat losses. The euphoria around the relative electoral loss for the BJP has undermined the required focus on these hidden realities. >
For example, many of the analysts and the commentators are inadvertently romanticising the verdict by interpreting results as the rejection of Hindutva communalism by the voters and return of the politics of livelihood, democracy and Constitution. Most of them quote the refreshingly reassuring answers given by voters to the question asked by the CSDS surveyors: “Should the government treat majority and minority communities equally”. An overwhelming 74% of respondents say yes to this question. >
But at the same time when asked if in democracy “will of the majority should prevail over the minority”, the percentage of “fully agree” and “somewhat agree” put together is more than 50%. While only 20% say “totally disagree” more than 11% responded “can’t say” to this crucial and fundamental question. In the absence of alternate political mobilisation or palpable democratic exposure, the evident social prejudice here is but natural.
Likewise even though only 5% of the voters cited construction of Ram temple as the reason for “why Modi should be given one more chance”, more than 22.4% people cited construction of Ram Temple as the “one work liked most in the Modi regime”. >
“Protection of Sanatana and Hindu values” was cited by 4.2% of respondents. “Enhancing the global image of India” was considered by 3.2%. And 66% of respondents concurred with the desirability of a strong leader. As is obvious, these four questions touch upon the four important constituents of the Hindutva and the Hindu Rashtra. And the survey suggests the majority of voters are broadly in agreement with all these. >
Also read: Unexpected Losses and Reduced Margins: What Went Wrong for the BJP in Uttar Pradesh?>
There is also an interpretation of the results which reassuringly declares that voters specially from the poor, rural and backward areas considered unemployment and price rise as more important issues than the Hindutva-related issues. If this was completely true the ideological political project would crumble and pave the way for democratisation of the country. >
But the responses of the voters for the related questions in the CSDS survey suggest it is still a long way to go. Thus, while answering “why BJP shouldn’t be voted again”, 27.2% cited unemployment, 30.4% list price rise as the reason. On the contrary, when asked about the “economic situation of the respondents in the last ten years”, 13.6% have replied as “much better” , 29.3 “better” and 35% have said “same as before”. Only 4.8% responded, saying “much worse” and 12.8% “worse” — which means the perception of 70% of voters about their economic situation does not give them the reason to be against Modi. Along with this 60% of respondents say they are “satisfied fully” or “somewhat fully” with the governance of the NDA. >
Along with this 40.7% of respondents prefer Modi for the prime minister’s post and 27% Rahul Gandhi. Modi’s score has come down when compared to the 2019 post poll survey and Rahul Gandhi’s score has increased. Still the gap between them remains huge by 13%. In Uttar Pradesh, surprisingly, 32% preferred Modi but 36% Rahul — 4% more for Rahul. >
Apart from this survey of voter perception about the values, policies etc., the CSDS survey also provides class-wise, community-wise, region-wise support for different parties in this election which has already been out in the public. The sum and substance of this is that the upper caste vote bank still continues to prefer the BJP, and the bottom-end Dalits in many states have slightly shifted towards the INDIA alliance. But still the hold of BJP on Dalits is overwhelming. >
While the upper OBC like Yadavs have shifted hugely towards the INDIA bloc in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar etc, the BJP’s hold on EBC castes remain dominant.>
Though the CSDS survey says the same about Karnataka upper caste OBCs, namely the Vokkaliga and Lingayats, the comparative constituency-wise analysis of the vote share in Vokkaliga- and Lingayat-dominated constituency where this time Vokkaliga-dominated Janata Dal (Secular) and Lingayat-dominated BJP were in alliance suggest that while the Lingayats predominantly voted for the BJP, the Vokkaligas transferred their votes to the BJP. >
There is small mobility of the EBC towards the INDIA bloc in some states but still the BJP has an overwhelming hold of more than 10% than the INDIA on EBC in comparison. The Tribals have heavily consolidated with the BJP. The minorities, especially Muslims, preferred INDIA parties to the tune of 92%. >
Thus, the post poll survey of CSDS and the ECI data together unveils the hidden danger behind the verdict. >
Thus, the ideological and political foundation of the Hindutva in the Modi 3.0 government does not face any challenge and hence the continuity of Hindutva rule and its arrogance. >
While the results have given minor warning to the BJP and little breathing space to the Opposition, the impact of the Hindutva on the minds of the electorate has gone unchallenged. In spite of the deteriorating economic conditions of the subaltern classes, the Hindutva hegemony over their perception is intact. While in some states, the Opposition is preferred, the shift remains transactional and not political. Hence, not reliable. >
Does Modi 3.0 face challenges from coalition partners? Will the coalition partners bullwork against Modi’s authoritarianism? >
A neoliberal coalition?>
Many people had thought that since the Modi government depends on the support of alliance partners especially the TDP and the JD(U), Modi and BJP might temper and tinker with their hard-core agendas and resort to consultative mode by dissolving the Modi brand of authoritarianism. But except the small murmur by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) partners about not getting a cabinet berth in the ministry, no party has raised any sign of dissent or discord. Rather the JD(U) supremo Nitish Kumar exhibited the gesture of surrender by touching the feet of Modi in the NDA parliamentary board meeting. Other senior leaders of the party like K.C. Tyagi have declared complete support to the BJP’s candidate for the speaker post and have concurred with the idea of BJP’s UCC. JD(U) has even declared that they are not opposed to the Agnipath scheme and request only a review of certain clauses of the scheme. On caste census, JD(U) has only reiterated the need of it without any compelling force. >
The reasons for this capitulation are obvious. The mandate in Bihar does not provide enthusiasm. Both the BJP and the JD(U) have got more seats, but their vote share is diminished compared to 2019 and the INDIA alliance is ahead in terms of vote share. Since the Bihar legislative assembly is going to polls next year, the alliance needs to be intact by showing some visible positive gains of the “double engine sarkar” by getting things like special category status etc. >
On the TDP’s side, the optics at the swearing in ceremony of N. Chandrababu Naidu as the chief minister in Andhra Pradesh and the bonhomie of the prime minister and the chief minister on the dais clearly established the fact that this alliance is going to endure with the Modi government accommodating Naidu’s demands for the resources. >
It is so because, neither the Naidu-lead TDP nor the Nitish-lead JD(U) are ideologically or politically against the neoliberal Hindutva policies of Modi’s BJP. In fact, the JD(U) has already supported all the draconian bills introduced by the BJP intended at undoing the Constitution by surreptitiously establishing a Hindu Rashtra like the CAA, abrogation of Article 370, new Criminal Bills etc in 17th Lok Sabha. Moreover, it is a pre-poll alliance and the JD(U) or the TDP had no objections to Modi’s hateful polarising electoral speeches. >
On the other hand, Naidu’s TDP is senior to Modi in transforming Andhra Pradesh state to a repressive police state for implementing neoliberal economic policies at the behest of corporates during his tenure as the chief minister of undivided Andhra Pradesh between 1995-2004. In fact, he was the convenor of NDA lead by the Vajpayee between 1999-2004 during which Gujarat genocide happened under Modi as the CM. >
Also read: The Unheeded Mandate: India’s Post-Election Landscape>
The smaller alliance partners like Shiv Sena or NCP of Ajit Pawar have neither political ideological problem with the Modi regime nor can they afford antagonising BJP when they are facing existential crisis after this election in Maharashtra. The future of these parties in Maharashtra and the future of Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) and Manjhi’s party in Bihar is intertwined with the future of the BJP. >
The JD(S) of Karnataka which has “secular” in its name and has always been opportunistic on the politics of communalism. It remains responsible for opening the gates of power to the BJP in South India when it allied with the saffron party in 2006. After the assembly elections in Karnataka last year, its social base of Vokkaligas and Muslims were encroached by the BJP and the Congress respectively. This has pushed the JD(S) decisively towards the communal camp headed by the BJP. >
Thus, the Modi 3.0 does not suffer any immediate threat by the coalition partners. >
Nevertheless, the present mandate is not sufficient for Modi to bring in the fourth generation economic reforms which unleashes complete dictatorship of capital over the labour or introduces legislative measures to undo the constitutional mandate of social justice and secularism. Thus, Modi 3.0 might also dissolve the 18t Lok Sabha on some pretext of national importance by playing the victim card where the saviour has been shackled by the lack of mandate etc. >
Such an adventure is quite possible because this mandate reassures the people’s support to Hindutva agenda. >
Need of radical democratic mobilisation of the people >
Thus, the results indicate that the hegemony of Hindutva is intact and still trumps the class and caste consciousness of the subaltern for a very large section of the masses. The preference for Modi as the prime minister is evident in spite of the unbearable hardships people suffered because of his policies in the past ten years. >
Thus, the Congress counter attack through guarantees or such welfarist policies within the framework of corporatist economy or its secularism is not antagonising or aligning with the brahmanical tenets of the Hindutva, and therefore, does not instil confidence or educate people to question the Modi government. Even though the reach of the Congress in this election seems to be better than the BJP, its chronic organisational weakness and its elite and repulsive social elitism makes the organisational work of the BJP and the Sangh easier. >
Given this predicament, BJP is organisationally disposed to make corrections by listening to the warning lessons of this election. Already there are reports that the RSS chief Mohan Bhagawat is having a meeting with Adityanath in Gorakhpur discussing the roadmap of revamping of the party organisation. >
Same cannot be said about the Congress or INDIA parties. They are prone to indulge in finding ways to come to power prematurely rather than building organisation and alternate vision patiently among the people. One cannot or should not hope for such alternatives from the INDIA parties since they are also wedded to the dream of neoliberal India with some softer version of Brahmanical social order. Which when faced with a crisis easily transforms into an Indian form of naked fascism. >
Thus, while the results of 18th Lok Sabha elections which seemed to have postponed the dangers of imminent fascism, has been belied by the way Modi 3.0 is launched and sped. The deeper message of the results is that Hindutva hegemony is undeterred and hence the Moditva juggernaut is going unchallenged . >
When the Opposition is neither intended or equipped to arrest this onslaught the need to build radically democratic grassroots people’s movement has become as necessary as breathing air. >
Shivasundar is a columnist and activist in Karnataka.>
Read all of The Wire’s reporting on and analysis of the 2024 election results here.>