The upcoming general elections is a crucial test for the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) and the future politics of the Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi (VBA). It is acknowledged that the VBA holds a significant influence over the Dalit-Bahujan constituencies and without its support, winning the battle against the right-wing alliance in Maharashtra will be a difficult task for the MVA.
Even after such acknowledgement, the failure to forge an alliance between the MVA and the VBA has raised doubts over the ideological commitment of these political parties to defeat the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). For the failure of the alliance, the myopic vision of the MVA and the VBA leaders is responsible. It reflects that the opposition parties in Maharashtra have underestimated the power of the BJP-led alliance and cunningly prioritised temporary organisational profits and personal interests of leaders while deciding the modalities of the alliance.
It is visible that the VBA’s autonomous political assertion will create a third political block and would overtly damage the possibility of a unified vote of the opposition, offering easy victories to the BJP in several constituencies. More than the MVA alliance, it is VBA’s independent Dalit-Bahujan political assertion that would face the allegations that it has betrayed the secular alliance by dividing the anti-BJP votes and relegating the possibility of its independent political representation in Parliament.
The Dalit politics in Maharashtra
The socially marginalised groups, especially the Dalits and the OBCs, represent a vast population in Maharashtra. Their participation and influence in the political power game, however, remained peripheral. After the demise of Babasaheb Ambedkar in 1956, his political party, the Republican Party of India (RPI), attempted to mobilise the Dalits, poor farming classes and the Adivasis under the new banner, however, it succeeded in showcasing its impact only in a few constituencies.
The RPI soon witnessed factionalism on flimsy ideological issues, allowing the Congress party to appropriate the disgruntled leaders of the party. The RPI further ruptured because of petty personal deviations of its own leadership as many established their own political parties to remain relevant in the democratic sphere.
By the mid-1990s, the RPI was divided into as many as 14 different factions, and Mahar-caste leadership dominated most of them. Furthermore, in its desperate attempt to remain visible in the power structure, the RPI fragments forged opportunistic alliances with the Congress and soon it became a negligible force in Maharashtra’s politics.
With the rise of the popular Dalit Panthers movement in the mid-1970s, the Dalit voices have sharpened their intervention in the social, cultural, and intellectual domains. Panthers’ produced a new language, political rhetoric, and militancy within the Dalit youth, and transformed the moribund lethargy that had crippled the Dalit political movement earlier.
It borrowed its ideological values from the Black Panthers, the radical Left and the Civil Rights movement in the United States and improvised it as a substantive Ambedkarite ideological alternative. However, this powerful social movement also collapsed soon due to ideological quarrels between the leadership and the lack of resources to build an impressive mass organisation. In the 1990s, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) also emerged as a decent mobiliser of the Dalit-Bahujan groups, however, it also failed to retain its influence.
In the current political scenario, Prakash Ambedkar’s VBA has emerged as an important torchbearer of the autonomous Dalit-Bahujan’s political assertion, mobilising the ‘Vanchit’ groups (excluded sections) to regain political power. The VBA’s significant entry in electoral politics showcases that the Dalit political consciousness has the capacity to revitalise the politics of social justice and can challenge the conventional ruling elites. Although the party’s presence in the political arena in Maharashtra has introduced the Dalit-Bahujan groups as key claimants of political power, however on the flip side, it has been argued that its electoral strategies appear to have benefitted the ascendency of the BJP.
VBA and the renewal of the Dalit politics
The political institutions in Maharashtra have been dominated by social elites, especially by the powerful and rich Maratha elites for a long time now. In addition, there is a visible ideological shift towards Hindutva politics as the major political parties in the state today endorse the right-wing political objectives.
It has not only relegated the politics of secularism and social justice but also crippled the possibility to build a powerful political front that flags the interests and concerns of the Adivasi-Dalit-Bahujan (DBA) groups.
In the current political turmoil of Maharashtra, Prakash Ambedkar’s VBA has been identified as a new experiment that has revitalised the dormant Dalit movement with innovative slogans and powerful ideological force. It introduced ‘Vanchit’ as a political category to mobilise the worst-off and marginalised social groups and envisaged their dignified role in the electoral battles.
Since its inception, the VBA has reprimanded the mainstream political parties for the neglect of the Dalit-Bahujan groups and evoked a hope that it can launch a third alternative in the state’s politics.
Importantly, it showed aggressive zeal in challenging right-wing politics and bashed the opposition parties (mainly the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party) for not taking an uncompromising stand against right-wing political domination.
In the previous elections, the VBA’s participation drifted a crucial vote share from the secular alliance and indirectly helped the BJP to win a significant number of seats. Therefore, it was expected that for the 2024 general elections, the VBA will not repeat its past actions and in order to build a grand alliance against the BJP led-Maha Yuti, will participate in the Congress-led MVA alliance without much tussle.
Prakash Ambedkar even showed his willingness to join the MVA alliance for the upcoming Lok Sabha elections and in his speech during the INDIA bloc’s rally in Mumbai’s Shivaji Park had indicated the possibility of a broader alliance to defeat the BJP.
However, on several occassions, the VBA has expressed reprehension against the NCP, doubted the commitment of the MVA leaders in fighting against the BJP and demanded a huge share of seats in the alliance. Such a tussle, a non-serious attitude to understand the electoral arithmetic and prioritising organisational interest over the call of unity to defeat the BJP has raised doubts about the VBA’s decision to break the MVA alliance.
VBA’s limitations
The VBA offers a dynamic platform to reassess the politics of social justice and has given a call for the unity of the oppressed social groups to defeat the BJP, however, its political rigidity often appears rhetorical and motivated mainly to achieve contextual electoral gains. Its decision not to be part of the MVA alliance in the earlier elections has showcased that the party has underestimated the capacity of Hindutva’s ideological force to tarnish and uproot the foundational ethics of India’ constitutional democracy.
VBA’s independent electoral contests in the last two elections in Maharashtra have visibly benefitted the BJP and relegated the opposition into periphery. Being a Dalit-Bahujan political party, it is must to examine that among many socio-political enemies, the right-wing political assertion is the main and principle threat to the constitutional values and safeguarding the population from such danger shall be the prime responsibility of the organisation. However, during the season of electoral battles, the VBA swiftly decided not to follow the primary principle.
The VBA is not in a position to defeat both the alliances in the upcoming elections. As witnessed in earlier elections, the VBA’s own capacity to win Lok Sabha elections is limited to a few constituencies. In the 2019 Lok Sabha election, Prakash Ambedkar formed an alliance with Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), and together they secured 7.65% of the votes, which proved decisive in eight seats. Predictably, it harmed the Congress-led alliance more. In many constituencies, the VBA candidates secured more votes than the difference of votes between the winning candidates and the runner ups.
This reflects the VBA’s control and influence over certain sections within the Dalit-Bahujan voters. However, this is also the party’s major limitations in the electoral politics as it managed to cater mainly to the Dalit voters while the rest of the social groups that it vouches to represent (lower OBCs, other farming castes, Adivasis and the Muslims) often vote the other political alternatives.
The VBA has not achieved a major breakthrough in mobilising the other social groups that can make it a winning alternative. In the recent public rallies and events, the VBA showcased its commitment to fight the right-wing and its desire to build a strong social base by addressing the issues and concerns of the vulnerable non-Mahar castes.
It has succeeded in expanding its horizon and has emerged as a party that speaks for the historically oppressed social groups (Vanchit); however, such a framework has limited capacity to make it a formidable political force in the electoral battles. This effort appears to be futile as without the support of major social groups (like the OBCs, Muslims or the Marathas) such social engineering under Prakash Ambedkar’s leadership is insignificant and will only segregate the Dalits and won’t be successful in being a part of a larger alliance to fight against the saffron forces.
The future of social justice politics
The Shiv Sena (UBT) led MVA’s success in the upcoming electoral battle is dependent upon the support from the socially marginalised groups, especially the DBA voters.
It has been recognised that the VBA’s independent contest will only alienate a significant section of these voters, favouring the BJP to have a comfortable sway in winning the Lok Sabha elections in Maharashtra. By offering a dignified space to the VBA in the alliance, the opposition could have avoided such a situation, however, the MVA leadership have also showcased disinterest and lethargy in dealing with Ambedkar’s claims and suggestions.
It was prudent that the MVA leadership shall have acknowledge the merit of Ambedkar’s assertion and his quest to establish the Dalits as crucial interlocutors in the political processes. Further, without the VBA, the MVA alliance looks like a club of social elite leaders that raise social justice slogans without offering equitable representation to the Dalit-Bahujan groups in power. The failure of the MVA leaders to allocate the VBA a sensible number of seats further demonstrate their lack of commitment towards the ideals of social justice and their will to stall the right-wing juggernaut.
For the marginalised social groups, it is always beneficial if the political establishment supplements the values of state welfarism, social justice and secularism. Instead, the current Modi regime offers communal overtones, authoritatively controls the democratic institutions for narrow political purposes and promotes the interests of the powerful capitalist elites .
It is in such dire context, a wider alliance of the opposition parties is expected that will allow the politics of social justice to take the centre stage. Political parties that vouch to promote the ideals of social justice have moral responsibilities in such a context. However, more than believing in progressive ideological values and strategising to protect the general mass from the authoritative rule of the right-wing, it appears that the opposition leaders in Maharashtra are interested mainly in safeguarding petty personal egos and organisational benefits. They lack political prudence and strategic correctness towards building a robust challenge against the right-wing domination in the state.
Harish S. Wankhede is Assistant Professor, Center for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
