The following is the full text of Zoya Hasan's lecture under the Sukhamoy Chakravarty Chair at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning (CESP) at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

It is a singular honour to deliver this lecture under the Sukhomoy Chakravarti Chair, hosted by the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning. I am deeply grateful to Professor Praveen Jha, Sukhomoy Chakravarti Chair Professor, for this kind invitation.

How well is the world’s largest democracy holding up? In short: with difficulty. India’s democratic framework remains formally intact. Procedurally, India’s democracy continues to function; elections are held with clockwork regularity, voter turnout remains high, often exceeding that of many Western democracies, and elections across the states remain competitive. Yet beneath this participatory vigour, the integrity of key institutions has steadily eroded. This erosion is driven by a deliberate political project of the Hindu right, aiming to reshape liberal democracy into a majoritarian order, a dynamic documented extensively by recent empirical data and political analyses, as explored in this lecture. 

Historical Context

India’s emergence as a democratic republic in 1947 marked a defining moment in world history. Solidified by the 1950 Constitution, Indian democracy built robust institutions, a vibrant press, a multiparty system, and protections for minority rights. This audacious experiment was exceptional in the post-colonial world, where newly independent states often veered toward authoritarianism or single-party rule. India, by contrast, maintained democratic governance over decades, institutionalising electoral competition, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, interrupted only briefly during the Emergency (1975–1977).

A foundational strength of Indian democracy has been its refusal to define national unity in terms of any single identity, religious, linguistic, or ethnic. The constitutional order explicitly accommodated diversity, protecting minority rights and promoting federalism in a society where difference was the norm. Yet in recent decades, these pluralist foundations have come under strain. The balance envisioned by the founders has changed. This shift sets the stage for the emergence of a political system increasingly defined by majoritarian dominance. 

The post-2014 turn

India’s pluralist democratic equilibrium began to shift with the rise of Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014. That year, the BJP displaced the Congress party at the centre, securing a decisive Lok Sabha majority with 282 of 543 seats and bringing Narendra Modi to power as prime minister. The party consolidated its dominance in 2019, expanding its majority to 303 seats. Its leadership interpreted this mandate as a licence to advance an ambitious ideological agenda, one that has driven a fundamental reconfiguration of state institutions along majoritarian lines. Ideas once considered far-right, previously confined to the margins, have now moved into the mainstream, shaping government policy and public discourse and signalling a significant shift in the country’s broader ideological orientation.

The government wasted no time in translating its vision of a majoritarian India into policy. Among the most consequential moves was the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A in August 2019, which stripped the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir of its special constitutional status and downgraded the state into two Union Territories. This was followed by the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya verdict that effectively legitimised the Babri Masjid demolition and aligned the judiciary with dominant political narratives. This shift was deepened by the Citizenship Amendment Act and the proposed NRC, which introduced religion as a criterion for citizenship. These measures laid bare an ideological shift toward a Hindu-centric national vision, departing sharply from the republic’s secular, inclusive foundations.

The new political order that came into existence through these policies and processes rests on three interlinked pillars: majoritarianism, which privileges the ethnic majority, an increasingly centralised exercise of power, and a close alliance between the ruling party and big capital and international capital. Together, they produce a landscape where inequality, centralisation, and illiberalism reinforce one another to entrench dominance. 

Democratic backsliding

Unlike the Emergency of 1975–77, when democratic procedures were formally suspended, the sweeping transformation since 2014 has been carried out through legal and administrative channels rather than the formal suspension of democracy. Power has become increasingly concentrated in the executive, with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) wielding disproportionate influence and diminishing the roles of Parliament and state governments. This reflects a broader shift toward personalised governance, where key decisions such as the 2016 demonetisation, the 2019 cross-border surgical strikes, and the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown were taken unilaterally, often bypassing institutional procedures and federal coordination mechanisms. Simultaneously, key oversight bodies, including the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), National Investigative Agency (NIA), Central Information Commission (CIC), and the Election Commission, of India (ECI) have faced significant erosion of autonomy, weakening the country’s system of checks and balances.

Concurrently, the space for political opposition has narrowed. This trend is evident in the BJP’s pursuit of a “Congress-free India,” which extends beyond electoral rivalry to a broader effort to marginalise political rivals. The objective appears to be the construction of a hegemonic party system in which dissent is institutionally and discursively weakened, both in formal forums (such as Parliament) and in the public sphere. This reflects a pattern observed in many countries, where opposition parties are allowed a formal existence but are functionally excluded from meaningful participation in democracy.

Although this regime wields unprecedented power, it is markedly more intolerant of criticism, driven by a sense that its project of thought control remains incomplete. It seeks to monitor and discipline anyone who thinks independently, branding dissent as “anti-national” and coercing social groups that protest or resist. This systematic delegitimisation of dissent, coupled with the targeting of human rights defenders and the erosion of institutional autonomy, forms the foundation of the new political order.

Civil society’s space has sharply contracted as the state curtails NGO activity through increasingly restrictive FCRA amendments, which have choked foreign funding and led to the cancellation of thousands of NGO registrations since 2020, over 20,000 in 2021 alone. Critics are routinely labelled “anti-national,” a tactic that equates dissent with disloyalty and echoes similar rhetoric in countries like the United States, Turkey, and the Philippines. Suppression of protests and other forms of dissent has become a defining feature of this playbook.

Academic institutions, once centres of critical inquiry, now face mounting pressure. The UGC has imposed tighter controls on foreign collaborations, dictated syllabus content, and promoted “patriotic education,” while campuses have seen repeated efforts to curb protests. Faculty critical of the government face harassment or legal action. These interventions aim to narrow the scope of permissible discourse and align academic work with a majoritarian agenda, echoing developments such as Hungary’s expulsion of Central European University from Budapest and a series of dismissals and suspensions in Türkiye targeting university staff and teachers accused of links to a 2016 coup attempt, particularly the Gülen movement.

The media landscape has undergone a similar transformation. Government control over advertising revenue, the use of regulatory agencies to penalise critical outlets, and the consolidation of ownership among business groups aligned with the ruling party have produced a homogenised media environment where state-aligned media outlets dominate, and critical voices are pushed to the margins. Investigative journalists face legal harassment and intimidation, while tightened social media rules and content takedowns further restrict digital spaces for dissent, ensuring government-friendly narratives prevail in the public sphere and reducing the visibility of opposition perspectives. 

Unprecedented economic inequality

These political transformations have unfolded alongside, and often reinforced, a dramatic rise in economic inequality. India now faces a sharp escalation in economic inequality. According to the Paris-based World Inequality Lab, the share of the top 1% of the population in national income, which was around 12% at the time of independence, after falling to about 6% in 1982, has surged to roughly 23% in 2023, its highest level in a century. The concentration of wealth, unprecedented even in colonial times, marks one of the most severe gaps between rich and poor in India’s modern history.  

This extreme inequality is deeply linked to an intensified state-corporate nexus, defined by the increasing proximity of business elites to political power. India’s largest corporations now lead not only in revenue and assets but also in their ability to shape policy and political outcomes. Their reach spans critical sectors, including airports, power generation, and infrastructure and extends into political finance through instruments such as electoral bonds and the PM CARES Fund. This concentration of corporate power has depended on sustained policy support, reinforcing a pattern in which business interests leverage political ties to secure regulatory advantages and lucrative, often opaque, opportunities. Corporate magnates such as Mukesh Ambani have historically benefited from political connections, while in recent years the nexus has further deepened, most visibly in Gautam Adani’s rapid expansion, aided by regulatory shifts and major privatisation deals frequently concluded outside transparent tendering processes.

India’s affluent now wield outsized influence over political parties, campaign finance, and the media, reflecting a deepening convergence between corporate capital, the Hindu right, and the state. This mutually reinforcing alliance consolidates corporate power while entrenching majoritarian politics, an arrangement fundamentally at odds with democracy. As millions face joblessness, precarious work, and inadequate basic services, political attention has shifted instead to identity, national security, and symbolic conflicts, redirecting public frustration toward imaginary threats from minorities while leaving underlying economic conditions untouched.

Disquieting political inequality

Economic inequalities have been reinforced by growing political inequality. Political inequality in India now rests on three levers of control: the Election Commission of India (ECI), electoral rules, and campaign finance, all of which have tilted in favour of the ruling party. A pliant Election Commission has given the government undue influence over an institution once lauded for its neutrality, even as it now faces mounting accusations of partisanship in enforcing the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), regulating campaigns, and revising electoral rolls. Erosion of trust in the ECI underscores the importance of institutional independence, transparency, and accountability above partisan interests.  

The introduction of electoral bonds in 2018 further entrenched the unequal playing field and political competition. Presented as a move toward cleaner, more transparent funding, the scheme instead enabled unlimited anonymous corporate donations, mainly to the BJP. Analyses by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and independent researchers further demonstrate that the party secured the vast majority of bond-linked donations. This financial advantage enabled unparalleled advertising campaigns, expansive digital operations, and an organisational reach far exceeding that of its rivals. The asymmetry is compounded by the use of state resources for government advertising, policy announcements timed before elections and disbursements during elections, and welfare schemes targeted at key constituencies.

Concerns about political inequality have deepened with recent changes that threaten the inclusiveness of the electoral process itself. The ECI’s new Special Investigative Revision (SIR) initiative, piloted in Bihar in June and now extended to twelve states, marks a troubling shift in voter registration. By transferring responsibility for enrolment from the state to individual citizens, SIR alters the foundations of universal adult franchise. Global evidence shows that such self-initiated systems lead to sharp drops in registration, especially among marginalised groups. Maintaining comprehensive electoral rolls is not merely an administrative matter; it is a constitutional obligation and a measure of democratic inclusiveness. Democracy depends not just on the act of voting but on citizens’ confidence that every vote is counted and that electoral institutions remain impartial. If trust in the integrity of the vote erodes, so too does the legitimacy of the government that is elected through this process.

Democratic erosion

Domestic concerns over democratic decline are mirrored in global assessments that document India’s democratic backsliding since 2014. Taken together, these findings indicate that while elections continue, the liberal and institutional foundations of Indian democracy have weakened markedly in the post-2014 period.

 To understand why the world’s largest democracy is under stress, we must situate it within a wider resurgence of the right and a global democratic recession. Across continents, liberal democratic systems are showing signs of structural decline. Rather than relying on dramatic coups, today’s backsliding unfolds incrementally through legal and institutional mechanisms, weakening checks and balances, centralising authority, curtailing civil liberties, while retaining democratic rhetoric.

Between 2016 and 2021, right-wing parties rose to power across Europe, North America, Latin America, and parts of Asia. By 2024, the global political centre of gravity had shifted markedly to the right. Major democracies such as India and the United States are now led by figures associated with far-right politics. Political trends in Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Israel, Türkiye, Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere indicate a broader transnational realignment, in which right-wing ideologies have gained electoral success, political legitimacy and sustained influence in government.

This global pattern reflects a fusion of neoliberal economic policies with majoritarian ideologies. The convergence of big capital with nationalist and socially conservative forces has deepened inequality and insecurity, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, and exposed the limits of neoliberalism, rendering its systemic logic increasingly untenable. A key consequence has been the sharp rise in inequality within countries - an upward trend, especially pronounced in the world’s biggest economies. This shift has real and troubling consequences: the politics of hate, exclusion, and dehumanisation increasingly shape both policy and public sentiment. The widespread indifference shown toward humanitarian catastrophes such as the genocide and mass starvation in Gaza illustrates how such brutal violence has been normalised under the global ascendancy of the right. 

India exemplifies this global trend. Unlike many Western cases, what is at stake in the Indian context is a deeply rooted tradition of pluralism and exceptional social heterogeneity. These foundational features are increasingly strained by the rise of religious nationalism, which symbolises a potent dynamic that undermines the very norms and institutional principles that have historically sustained the pluralist model of democratic governance. India’s institutional retreat is therefore far more concerning, for it signals not merely democratic backsliding but the unravelling of a political equilibrium that enabled coexistence within profound diversity. 

This is not an unintended drift but part of a deliberate and sustained political project, one that seeks to systematically recast Indian democracy on majoritarian lines, rewriting the philosophical and ideological foundations of the republic itself while recalibrating the relationship between state power, citizenship, collective identity, and, crucially, using electoral victories to legitimise the continued expansion of executive authority. The strategy is clear: consolidate power by restructuring the rules of political competition, curtailing dissent, and strategically leveraging social and economic divides to cultivate political dependency and secure durable loyalty. Its operational logic is equally explicit - actively engineering and reinforcing economic concentration, promoting one-party dominance, and transforming existing societal cleavages into political instruments that reward allegiance while penalising dissent. 

Conclusion

India’s recent political experience underscores a central lesson for the world. Elections alone cannot safeguard a pluralist democracy without robust institutional checks; when majoritarian politics is intertwined with corporate power, it can erode pluralism from within. The political consequence is not merely rising inequality, but who succeeds in mobilising it. Economic frustration can be captured more readily by majoritarian appeals than by inclusive redistributive movements when institutions lack public confidence and opposition forces struggle to sustain organisational cohesion. Progressive economic agendas can compete with majoritarian narratives but only where institutions command public trust and movements succeed in evolving into durable political formations. Such institutional confidence and movement-party alignment remain far more elusive in India’s democratic ecosystem.

Over the long arc of its democratic journey, India has endured cycles of regression and renewal. From the resistance to the Emergency to mass mobilisations around the CAA and the sustained farmer agitations, India has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for democratic self-correction driven by courts, movements, and civic action. These counterweights remain active, yet operate today in a far more structurally constrained environment, where financial asymmetries in politics, constraints on dissent, and executive dominance test the durability of constitutional safeguards. Reversing these trends will require action both within and beyond the state to reclaim the republic’s founding vision, a task made urgent and complex under a right-wing dispensation. 

So, how is the world’s largest democracy holding up? The verdict is mixed and uneven. India’s electoral arena continues to show remarkable resilience, reflected in mass participation and the regular transfer of power through voting. While the act of voting still draws extraordinary public enthusiasm, the institutions designed to secure equal rights, accountability, transparency, and political parity face unprecedented pressures. The future of India’s democracy will depend on restoring and fortifying the guardrails that surround it, not just the right to vote itself, but the reinforcements that keep electoral power institution-bound and rule-governed, rather than distorted by structural imbalances. 

Zoya Hasan is Professor Emerita, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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