The Ramnath Kovind committee, constituted on September 2, 2023, to operationalise Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s desire of ‘one nation, one election’ (ONOE), an oxymoron for simultaneous elections at each of the three levels of representative government in India, has fulfilled his bidding. The prime minister has been expressing his fancy about it ever since he came to power in 2014. In recommending ‘ONOE’, as part of a 18,600 page report, put together following a 191 day consultation, presented on March 14, 2024, it has fulfilled its obligation.
The Kovind committee will go down in the history of Indian democracy as a rare committee that was asked to find ways of implementing a fanciful, but unconstitutional, idea rather than examining an issue, which it obediently did.
As a former president, Kovind should have kept out of this contentious and unconstitutional issue. A President of India, particularly one who has had no independent political status or eminence before being airdropped on this prestigious chair due to personal loyalty, should at least be left with the honour of being a distinguished citizen beyond the contentious muddied politics of the country. Indeed, former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and later her party, invented and operated with a loyalist president, but since Narendra Modi is revered and projected as a millennial politician-statesman, he could have spared the Rashtrapati Bhawan from being his loyalists’ domain.
The result of the Kovind committee that had two ministers of the Modi cabinet – Union home minister Amit Shah and law minister Arjun Ram Meghwal – along with other saffron loyalists, was a foregone conclusion; only modalities had to be suggested to wrap it in a shroud of a consultative exercise. It was obviously not an independent, but a guided panel.
Modalities
The committee begins with a statement on ‘restoration’ of simultaneous elections, as if simultaneous elections began with a design and a statutory mandate. The beginning of the election process in India in 1951-52 was ‘simultaneous’ not by design. Since elections were conducted only at the two constitutionally designed levels of representative democracy – to elect the first Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabhas, each for a term of five years, simultaneity became ingrained, and stayed for a decade and a half. Obviously, as long as these elected houses completed their designated full five-year term, the five-year cycle of simultaneousness remained.
That the framers of the constitution did not prescribe any compulsive modality to maintain the cycle at both the levels meant that in case of a premature dissolution of a house mid-term poll for a new house with a five-year term in the Westminster tradition was agreed by all.
The Kovind committee’s contention that ‘the cycle of simultaneous elections, which was disrupted after the initial decades of India’s independence’ stresses a non-existent abnormality in India’s electoral process. Defined by Articles 83(2) and 172(1), the elections to the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabhas are for five years ‘unless sooner dissolved’. Obviously, the framers of the Constitution did not see any abnormality if a house was dissolved earlier. In fact, Article 83(2) foresees a possibility of Lok Sabha term extended for a year (at a time) and ‘not extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.’ Article 172(1) unambiguously prescribes the same term for the Legislative Assemblies of the states.
Also read: ‘One Nation, One Election’ Will Further Weaken Indian Democracy
The third tier of the Indian democracy was not clearly defined till the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments became laws in April 1993. Article 243E and 243U make similar provisions for panchayats in rural areas and municipalities in urban areas. The irregularity of their elections in all the states irrespective of the party in power reflects how the grassroots institutions have been treated.
Disruptions?
What has been described as ‘disruption’ by the committee was ingrained in India’s political development since the electoral process was set in motion. Though the dissolution of the Kerala assembly in 1960, by imposing Article 356, was the first sign, the first major ‘disruption’ came in the fourth general elections in 1967 due to a weakened Congress and underdeveloped opposition system. In fact, India’s party system just began reconfiguring.
Wherever a stable alternative emerged, for example in Tamil Nadu, the electoral process stabilised. But the unstable party alteration in the northern states, that gave birth to ephemeral coalitions, characterized by ‘aaya ram, gaya ram’ (defectors) and ‘suitcase’ (money) politics. State Legislative Assemblies were dissolved without completing their term. These imbalances later led to a fractured party system.
Lok Sabha’s first mid-term dissolution in 1971, de-coupled the two levels of polls. The Emergency in 1975 perpetuated the disequilibrium. After that, synchronisation could not be achieved because elected in 1977, the Lok Sabha was dissolved again in 1980. And before that state assemblies were dissolved and re-elected in 1978. On her return in 1980, Gandhi too dissolved the state assemblies and re-elected them in 1982. The disruption of any possibility of simultaneity thus happened due to dynamics of political processes and the undemocratic use of Article 356 of the Constitution by ruling parties at the centre till the Bommai judgment in 1994.
Constitutionally De-creasing the Democratic Process
In recommending the artificial process of ‘de-creasing’ the democratic and constitutional processes, the Kovind committee recommends a two-step process beginning with synchronisation of the Lok Sabha and state Assemblies followed by municipalities and panchayats. The recommendation that the tenure of state legislative assemblies should end with the subsequent general elections to the House of the People, after the ‘appointed’ date, has a compelled artificiality.
The committee introduces two new terms in the lexicon of parliamentary democracy – unexpired term and full term. The former to be used in case a house is dissolved earlier than five years and the latter if a house completes its full five-year term. The committee proposes to amend the constitution to make these concepts parts of the statute.
Obviously, in this new electoral scheme, an elected house would get a five-year or ‘full term’ not only because it has been elected for that term, but only if the Lok Sabha also completes its ‘full term’. The full term of five years thus will not begin from the day of the constitution of a house after election, but a pre-determined date decided following suggested constitutional amendments.
There is a proposed transitory period till synchronisation is achieved. The report also talks of a possibility that elections are not held simultaneously, in such a case an order on presidential advice would be issued to hold a particular election at a later date. In short, the whole scheme proposes an unnecessary tampering with the constitution and electoral process.
Popular Sovereignty
Elections operationalise and legitimise popular sovereignty for different levels of government. Obviously, simultaneity of elections at different tiers of government may not necessarily add to democratic spirit. A compulsive tying up of the lower levels elections with the higher tiers would have the impact of fudging of the issues that are raised at appropriate levels. The voters assert their democratic rights and entitlements by raising and asserting their sovereign will.
The proposed synchronisation up may be good for a particular regime – that would like the elections to be held by equivocating the issues, demands and requirements at the grassroots level with that of the intermediate and/or national level – not for a federal democracy like India where the popular mandate would vary not only at each level, but also regionally.
Ajay K. Mehra is a political scientist. He was Atal Bihari Vajpayee Senior Fellow, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 2019-21 and Principal, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Evening College, Delhi University (2018).
