The controversy over Jammu and Kashmir’s reservation policy presents a significant political challenge for the three-month-old Omar Abdullah-led government. This became evident when the National Conference (NC) MP Aga Syed Ruhullah recently joined general category students protesting outside the chief minister’s residence, demanding a rationalisation of reservation policies that have undergone significant changes over the past five years.
With these changes, the reserved category for educational institutes and government jobs in J&K has become nearly 60%. This includes 20% reservations for the Schedule Tribes (STs), 8% for Scheduled Castes (SCs), 8% for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), 10% for backward areas, 10% for economically weaker sections, 4% for residents along the Line of Control and international border.
In addition, there is a provision of 4% reservation for children of Defence Personnel and police personnel, and 2% for sports category candidates. After the new government took over, it formed a three-member cabinet sub-committee on November 22, 2024 with a mandate “to assess existing reservation framework and ensure it is fair and equitable.”
Prima facie, the reservation issue seems to be grounded in routine claims and counter-claims of communities in the context of lobbying for affirmative action in their favour. However, the whole controversy around it is not merely a debate around meritocracy, often deployed by upper caste and upper class groups, and the argument that affirmative action is required owing to socio-historical realities. There are many reasons why the raging acrimony over the reservation policy requires a close scrutiny.
First, in a region beleaguered by militancy for the last thirty-five-years, any issue, which is directly linked to the youth, should logically attract immediate attention. Second, the issue is a perfect example of problems arising out of over-centralisation and hasty decisions taken in a former state which has multiple layers of complexity which are difficult to comprehend even with several years of studying the subject. Third, the whole issue requires greater understanding of the context, chronology and unpacking at various levels, including its salience, causation, the effects and bigger systemic defects as it touches on many crucial aspects of federalism in India. Above all, the raging debate on the issue has the potential to further deepen the existing fissures within J&K.
Counter terrorism literature often cites the need for a customised approach to understand the triggers of radicalisation. In J&K, any factor that is leading to youth unrest can be ignored at one’s own peril. Close to 28.5% of J&K’s population fall within the 15–29 age group, a vulnerable group for potential militant recruitment. In the recent past, educated militant recruits have included a PhD scholar. In addition, according to the latest quarterly Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), J&K now has the highest unemployment rate of 32% among jobseekers in the same age group in the urban areas across India. It is in this context that the protest over the reservation policy is taking place.
The immediate genesis of the present flare-up over reservation is the 2020 decision of the Jammu and Kashmir State Administrative Council (SAC), an executive authority of bureaucrats created after governor’s rule was imposed in Jammu and Kashmir in 2018. The council issued a notification for reservation for Pahari-speaking people in both government jobs and educational institutions.
This decision was among many orders that were issued hurriedly to prove to the national as well as the international audience that the abrogation of Article 370 had been in the interest of the people of J&K. The hurried decisions were taken to demonstrate to the outside world that the otherwise marginalised groups, who were once ignored in J&K, had been given extended guarantees of the Indian constitution in the new context.
While extending domicile rights and reservation benefits to some of the earlier ignored and marginalised groups such as Valmikis, a Dalit group, and the 1947 refugees from neighbouring Pakistani Punjab, who are also mostly from the Dalit community, was justifiably done and highlighted, it made a marginal difference to the polity, as the absolute number of these communities was quite small in J&K.
Also read: 2024: The Year of Realisation in Kashmir
The big potential change came with the consideration of a demand by a linguistic group, that is, the Pahari community for ST status or benefits. The Pahari language, as it is recognised today, was once construed to be one of the dialects of Punjabi. It got separate recognition in the 1911 Census in J&K. The catch here is that the Pahari speaking community comprises upper caste Hindus as well as upper caste Muslims and it is the language spoken by people along the areas near the Line of Control (LoC) in both Kashmir Valley and Jammu.
Hindu and Sikh migrants from across the LoC, who migrated in 1947, speak this language, although many of them have since passed away. At a practical level, in all socio-economic classes, there was and still exists a fluidity and cross-fertilisation among Dogri, Pahari and Punjabi speakers due to familial ties and vast similarities in the three languages. For instance, a person can speak all three languages with ease as it is common that he or she or they have immediate family members from all the three groups.
Pahari speakers were the third largest in terms of population after Kashmiri-speaking people and Dogri speakers in undivided J&K. In fact, the three akin-language speakers comprised 1.2 million in population as compared to 1.1 million Kashmiri-speaking population in undivided J&K, as per the 1911 Census. The bulk of the Pahari speakers live across the LoC and in the UK. The territory of Pakistan controlled Jammu and Kashmir, with ten districts, as per the 2017 census, has an estimated population of 4.45 million. Since the linguistic data is unavailable for Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, it is hard to find the exact number or proportion of Pahari speakers across the LoC.
After the abrogation of Article 370, many decisions that followed were marked with confusion. As there was hardly any provision or precedent to give ST status to a linguistic community, the decision taken to accord Paharis ST status was no different. Initially, the Pahari community was placed under the category of Socially and Economically Backward Classes (SEBC) on 20 April 2020 – a separate category from the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes – and they were given 4% percent reservation.
This didn’t satisfy the Paharis whose vote was critical for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to expand beyond Hindus living in the plains in any future elections. In November 2022, a decision of the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) cleared the way for the inclusion of the Pahari ethnic group in the ST list of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
The grant of ST status to Paharis has triggered protests from Gujjars and Bakarwals, who are predominantly Muslim communities in Jammu and Kashmir. At a practical level, before Paharis were given the ST status, Gujjar-Bakarwal formed nearly 99% of the ST population in J&K. Gujjar, Bakarwal, Sippis, Balti, Changpa, Mon, Drokpa, Garra, Purigpa and Bot, Botto were the ST communities in the former state.
The Gujjar-Bakarwal population in Jammu and Kashmir perceives the grant of ST status to Paharis as a threat, fearing it could potentially erode their existing benefits. One of the most prominent and emotional protests came from Chowdhary Masood, a revered figure in the Gujjar-Bakarwal community and a retired senior police officer, who, despite being terminally ill and on his deathbed, protested against the ST reservation for the Pahari community. The Gujjar leadership dispute the Paharis’ claim of being tribal, alleging that the latter have no similarity with the tribals except their language and comprise people from diverse caste groups, including upper-caste Muslims and Hindus.
On the other hand, the Pahari leaders point out that only Bakarwals, who are nomadic tribes, actually fulfil the criterion for tribals. They argued that Gujjars, many of whom are settled and are no longer nomadic, share the socio-economic conditions of Paharis. The Bakarwals are nomads and have flocks of goat and sheep, whereas the bulk of Gujjars are settled and dairy farming is the main occupation for a part of the community.
As per official figures of 2017, nearly 32% Gujjars and Bakarwals have nomadic and semi-nomadic characteristics, with the majority of Gujjars being settled. The fact is that, similar to Hindu Gujjars in parts of North India, particularly in states like Delhi, Haryana, and Punjab, Muslim Gujjars in J&K have traditionally been involved in dairy farming. Notably, in undivided Punjab, the 1901 census reported a significant population of approximately 0.46 million Gujjar Muslims. However, following the 1947 partition, the Gujjar community, predominantly Muslim in undivided Punjab, became a minority in Indian Punjab.
Regarding their social classification, Hindu Gujjars are categorised as Other Backward Classes (OBC) in Haryana and Delhi. In contrast, in Rajasthan, they fall under the Most Backward Classes category, with separate reservation provisions.
In Jammu and Kashmir, against the backdrop of rising militancy and governor’s rule, the short-lived government of Prime Minister Chander Shekhar, supported by the Congress party, granted ST status to Gujjar-Bakarwals in April 1991. A key argument in favour of this decision was made by public intellectual Balraj Puri, who emphasised the importance of outreach to the community, which is predominantly Muslim in J&K, as a crucial civilian deterrent against militancy, particularly in border areas.
As a result, over the past two decades, the grant of ST status has enabled a new generation of professionals and civil servants from the Gujjar-Bakarwal community to emerge. In India, ST status is typically granted based on specific government criteria, although these criteria are not formally codified in law. The main criteria include primitive traits, geographical isolation, social backwardness, economic backwardness, shyness of contact, and prevalence of indigenous practices. Considering these metrics, it is clear that the Bakarwals in J&K deserve ST status.
Following protests by the Gujjar community, home minister Amit Shah visited Jammu and Kashmir in October 2022. Shah assured that the reservation for Paharis would not be at the cost of other ST communities. Consequently, a new proposal was formulated, granting ST status to Paharis and three other underrepresented groups: Koli, Paddari, and Gadda Brahmins. This move did not alter the existing 10% allocation for previous ST communities in J&K.
On March 15, 2024, the social welfare department issued a notification amending the J&K Reservation Rules of 2005. The notification stipulated that Paharis and other newly added groups would receive an additional 10% reservation, supplementing the existing 10% reservation for Gujjars, Bakarwals, and other communities. This decision effectively increased the total ST reservation in J&K from approximately 10% to 20%, alleviating concerns among both Gujjar-Bakarwal and Pahari communities.
Interestingly, the BJP’s attempt to leverage these developments for electoral gains fell flat. The party failed to secure a single assembly seat in either the Gujjar-Bakarwal or Pahari assembly segments during the September-October 2024 elections, which took place after a decade-long gap in a new constitutional and institutional context. In hindsight, this politically expedient decision has created an unnecessary problem. Notably, J&K may be one of the rare places in India where upper-caste groups, including Brahmins, Khatris, Mahajans, and Rajputs, living in Rajouri-Poonch are now eligible for ST reservation benefits.
In practice, even upper-caste members of Pahari-speaking clans, who were displaced from across the Line of Control in 1947 and rehabilitated in parts of South Delhi, particularly Lajpat Nagar, and the Jammu plains, can apply for ST status.
As the details and implications of the March, 2024 order were internalised, particularly by Kashmiri speaking Muslims, it was realised that this has brought a tectonic shift to the reservation policy in J&K. Thus the narrative, particularly in Kashmir valley, started to gain ground that reservation in educational institutions and jobs was more than 60% whereas less than 40% are now left for nearly 70% of the population. A number of advertised positions in the state sector came out where a majority of the seats were in the reserved category and this exacerbated the anxieties.
Unlike other parts of India, Jammu and Kashmir lacks substantial physical infrastructure to foster sustainable, long-term economic security in the non-state sector. Furthermore, the lingering presence of militancy has discouraged private sector investment in the region, despite proactive efforts by successive administrations. Consequently, suitable job opportunities are scarce in both the manufacturing and service sectors.
The public discourse and clamour indicate that resentment against the present reservation policy is felt by Kashmiri speaking Muslims living in Kashmir valley and upper caste Hindus of Jammu plains. While a significant number of talented individuals from the Jammu plains migrate to other parts of the country or abroad for employment opportunities, Kashmiri-speaking Muslims are less inclined to do so due to various concerns, including real or perceived threats to their physical safety. As a result, they feel that the current reservation policy has pushed them to a corner.
In actual terms, Gujjars, Bakarwals and Paharis do live in various parts of the valley apart from Jammu province. The reservation categories such as the SC, OBCs, backward areas and children of defence personnel are more applicable to Jammu’s population though there are many groups from the valley which are represented in the OBC category.
In the public domain, Kashmir valley-based political actors stress that they are not against reservation to any community or group but there should be rationalisation of the whole process. However, the substantive import of the whole contentious debate cannot ignore the ethnic, geographical and religious aspects, and its potential implications.
At the same time, no political executive or Kashmir Valley-based party can openly oppose the reservation policy due to the immediate backlash it would generate, particularly in Jammu’s Rajouri-Poonch areas and Kashmir Valley’s districts, such as Baramulla, Ganderbal, and Anantnag, which have a significant population of Paharis, Gujjars, and Bakarwals. Legislators from the newly reserved categories, including those allied with the ruling NC, have warned that reversing the decision would lead to a “civil war.”
Facts and logic are also becoming victims of acrimony. The recent order increased 4% reservation to 8% for the OBCs. A total of 41 caste groups were identified as OBCs. While one can dispute the inclusion of some of the groups in the OBC, the fact is that the communities in the OBC list are from across the length and breadth of J&K, including Kashmir Valley.
Also, one of the reported demands of the protesters is to amend Rule 17 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reservation Rules, 2005, which states that if a reserved category candidate is selected for an open merit seat, they may be considered for a discipline, stream, or college in their category. The remaining open merit seats are allocated to reserved category candidates selected based on merit, after initial allocations to reserved category candidates in the open merit category. There is an apex court judgment on the issue which clearly reinforces what is being done in J&K. In August 2024, the Supreme Court addressed the allocation of seats in medical college admissions in Madhya Pradesh and said that the open category is accessible to all candidates based on merit, regardless of their social or economic background.
So what can be the solution to this issue? It is true that the present Abdullah-led government had no role in creating the current crisis. Caught in a stalemate due to the potential political fallout of any significant changes to the current reservation policy, chief minister Abdullah has announced that a cabinet sub-committee will submit its report on the issue within six months.
The Jammu and Kashmir Students Association, which recently met with chief minister Abdullah, has demanded an immediate halt to all ongoing recruitments under the disputed policy until the review is completed. They have also emphasised the need to expedite the review process, recommending that it be concluded within three months, as the initial six-month timeline is deemed too long to wait for a resolution.
A petition has been filed in the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh high court challenging the newly amended J&K Reservation Rules 2005. The petition reportedly requested the court to issue a notice for the formation of an expert commission, headed by a retired judge and comprising members from each community and category. The commission’s purpose would be to recommend reservations based on population percentages in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The high court has reportedly sought a response to the plea challenging the validity of amendments to the J&K reservation rules from the government and other stakeholders by the first week of March 2025.
Clearly, the current political executive in Jammu and Kashmir, which shares power with the centrally appointed lieutenant governor, faces a daunting challenge. The executive has two options: either wait for the issue to be resolved through litigation or take proactive measures.
At a practical level, once additional communities have been granted ST status, the reservation proportion for SC and ST populations cannot be altered, as these are aligned with prevailing norms, constitutional guidelines, and judicial pronouncements. These guidelines emphasise that reservations for each community should be proportionate to their population.
Notably, Gujjar-Bakarwals and Paharis now comprise approximately 20% of Jammu and Kashmir’s population, reflected in the current ST reservation figure. The OBC proportion stands at 8%, with little scope for reduction due to potential societal backlash.
One possible solution is to reassess the 10% reservation for backward areas, which could be abolished or significantly reduced. Additionally, reservations for residents living near the LoC require streamlining, as many of these residents are already covered under the 20% ST reservation for Gujjars and Paharis.
While the issue is being litigated and (parallel to that of) a cabinet sub-committee concurrently reviews it, granting statehood immediately is crucial. Even if the political executive devises an optimal solution, the draft may still require assent from the lieutenant governor or Union government, potentially exacerbating the concerns of protesting youth.
An empowered political leadership will be best equipped to take decisions within the context of multi-stakeholder consultations by evaluating the societal ramifications of its decisions and also simultaneously communicate some of the nuances, including constitutional obligations, of the reservation policy to the protesting and aggrieved youth.
If left unaddressed, the current tensions surrounding Jammu and Kashmir’s new affirmative policy may have far-reaching consequences for national security and potentially intensify centrifugal forces within the region’s diverse population.
Luv Puri has authored two books on J&K, including Uncovered face of militancy and Across the Line of Control.
