A version of this article first appeared in The India Cable – a subscribers-only newsletter published by The Wire and Galileo Ideas. You can subscribe to The India Cable by clicking here.
Earlier this week, the government announced that Lieutenant General Manoj Pande would be the 29th Chief of Army Staff, succeeding General M.M. Naravane, who retires at the end of this month.
In itself, this is a fairly routine announcement except that he will be the first officer from the Corps of Engineers to become the chief.
A chief from what is technically a ‘support’ arm was long overdue. In warfare, combat engineers play as much of a battle-winning role as the so-called combat arms ― infantry, armour and artillery. They are up there in front, right amidst the bullets and shells, shaping the battlefield by building bridges, removing explosive hazards, facilitating the movement of their own forces and creating obstacles for the adversary.
Though you never know with this government, there are expectations that General Naravane will be elevated to the position of Chief of Defence Staff, which has been lying vacant since its incumbent General Bipin Rawat died in a tragic accident in early December 2021. It is a bit strange that a top office relating to the country’s security has been left vacant for more than four months.
General M.M. Naravane interacts with troops while reviewing operational situations in Eastern Ladakh, Wednesday, June 24, 2020. Photo: PTI/File
It is possible that Lieutenant General Pande had already been identified as a potential successor to Naravane. If so, why the government had to go through the charade of appointing Pande vice-chief on February 1 for just three months is not clear.
But another troubling element emerges from Pande’s appointment. It has nothing to do with the individual – his record is exemplary, he has met all the criteria of staff and command appointments for the top office and was, at the time of his appointment, the senior-most among the pool of officers who were considered for the office.
The issue is systemic.
Lieutenant General Pande was Vice-Chief of the Army Staff for just three months, from February 1 to April 30. Before that, he headed one of the more important Indian combat commands, Eastern Command, for just eight months, from June 1, 2021 to January 31, 2022. Prior to that, his tenure as Commander-in-Chief, Andaman & Nicobar Command, also lasted just one year, from June 2020 to May 2021. And before that he commanded the important IV Corps that looks after Arunachal Pradesh for just one year between December 2018 and December 2019.
Also read: With Recruitment Suspended Due to COVID, Indian Army Stares at Operational Challenges
Lieutenant General Pande’s career track is not unusual. The steep promotion pyramid in the Indian Army makes it the normal track that must be followed if you are to make it to the top.
Short tenures short-change the officer concerned and the job he’s tasked to do.
Take the Vice-Chief’s job. In practice, he is the CEO and CFO of the Army, while the Chief is the chairman. He oversees the functioning of operations, intelligence and logistics directorates and all three Deputy Chiefs report to him. Long-range planning, acquisitions, and so on all work through him. Pande would have achieved nothing in three months, and the same would be true of his tenure in Eastern Command.
Late Gen Bipin Rawat with former Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane (L), former Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh (2ndL) and former Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria at South Block lawns in New Delhi, Wednesday, Jan 1, 2020. Photo: PTI/Kamal Kishore
As we noted, Pande’s profile is not unusual. If you look at the tenures of vice-chiefs of the army for the last decade or so, they have ranged from three to four months to one year or so. Tenures of the Eastern, Northern and Western Command chiefs, too, ranged from less than a year to two years plus.
The situation with the Army Chiefs is a shade better ― they have had tenures of about two years plus, with the rare incumbent making it to three years. By way of comparison, the US Indo-Pacific Command and Central Command chiefs’ tenures are nearer to three years.
Clearly, there is an urgent need to fix this system and ensure that each incumbent has a reasonable tenure, to allow him to get a grip on his job and to make a difference.
But this would require the military and the Ministry of Defence to ruthlessly insist on a minimum tenure, regardless of how many officers are superseded. In turn, this would also need the government to be sensitive to the material needs of officers who may be first rate, but have to be superseded and retired early to enable reasonable tenures for their senior officers.
Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
