An instrument of last resort, war is legitimate only after diplomacy has failed to safeguard a nation’s security and economic interests in the face of attack. No country wants war, barring expansionist regimes that nurse centuries-old illusions of grandeur.
India has fought five wars since Independence, including the undeclared one in Kargil. It was taken by surprise in all wars, except 1971. Our army always had to fight reactively since it received no forewarning from the politico-bureaucratic establishment and intelligence agencies. Thus, it had to forego surprise, deliberate planning and preparations, and the full complement of weapons, munitions and logistics. In the 1962 war, the army had to fight with antiquated bolt-action rifles, without winter clothing and boots.
The 1971 war was a spectacular victory that split Pakistan and created Bangladesh in just 13 days. Indira Gandhi’s resolute leadership ensured that the bureaucracy and armed forces worked together to create history. She astutely concluded the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and toured world capitals to highlight India’s burden of sheltering 10 million refugees. The exceptional professional acumen of General Sam Manekshaw and other service chiefs ensured meticulous planning and preparation and the high morale of troops.
The Kargil war in 1999 resulted from terrible intelligence lapses. Since Pakistani troops had surreptitiously occupied all the dominating peaks, Indian soldiers had to assault along precarious ridge lines above 16,000 feet. Displaying exceptional bravery, they recaptured these heights with massive artillery and air support. We paid a very heavy price though, with 527 dead and 1363 wounded.
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), under the eminent strategic expert K. Subrahmanyam, analysed the reasons for the intelligence failure. Its report discussed issues like the intelligence set-up, apex decision-making, national security management, nuclear policy, the defence budget, modernisation etc. A group of ministers examined the recommendations and endorsed most in 2001, but bureaucrats sat over them. In 2011, the government dug out the report and set up another committee under Naresh Chandra to re-examine the earlier recommendations.
The KRC had recommended a full-time national security adviser (NSA), chief of defence staff (CDS), a National Intelligence Agency (NIA), National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), deputing military officers to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the creation of a National Defence University. Bureaucrats cherry-picked items that suited them, such as the NSA, NIA and NCTC but put the rest, including the CDS, in cold storage. India’s CDS was finally appointed only eight months ago.
Also Read: Intelligence Failure on PLA Intrusions in Ladakh Brings Back Memories of Kargil
Santayana’s paraphrased quote, ‘Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it’, has returned to haunt us during the current standoff with China in Ladakh.
Since early-January, global security experts were commenting upon the massive Chinese mobilisation in Tibet for a major exercise. Although the frequency of People’s Liberation Army exercises in Tibet has been increasing, this year the large scale, with helicopters, tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles participating, was menacing. By April, many PLA formations had moved closer to the border.
Only the June 15 Galwan Valley clash, where we lost 20 soldiers, fortuitously alerted our higher defence organisation about China’s designs. Would our reaction have been as intense had the commanding officer of the men not been killed? We might have taken them as the usual PLA ‘intrusions’ and not treated them as particularly alarming. The deaths triggered urgent mobilisation and troops were rushed to several places, especially where Chinese intrusions across the LAC were deep, as in Depsang, Pangong Tso and Gogra.
Intelligence failure? Or leadership’s failure to act?
Why were the Research and Analysis Wing, National Technical Research Organisation and Defence Intelligence Agency – with a multitude of human, electronic and imagery intelligence and aerial reconnaissance resources – unable to monitor such a huge mobilisation? Despite the augmented intelligence network, this was a serious failure and the army again was in reactive mode.
There is chatter in intelligence networks that information was passed on to the leadership, which downplayed the threat. They seemed confident that the Modi-Xi Jinping rapport on show in the ‘Wuhan Spirit’ and at Mahabalipuram would ensure peace. However, a nation’s security cannot be hostage to hope that the adversary will maintain good faith. No nation can dispense with standard precautionary deployments when adversaries conduct exercises near the border.
Also Read: LAC Tension Means Indian Army’s Advanced Winter Stocking for Ladakh Needs Major Rejigging
Like Kargil, Indian officials are once again frantically scurrying the world to purchase weapons and munitions. Will these reach and become operational in time? Why is the Army always left holding the baby, ill-prepared and ill-equipped due to intelligence and bureaucratic lapses? Who is accountable?
With his intelligence background, NSA Ajit Doval should have streamlined interactions between various agencies. Several lapses have taken place on his watch like the terrorist attack on Pathankot airbase. Notwithstanding his role as advisor, he controlled operations from Delhi, although senior commanders and troops were available locally. Agencies failed to detect the smuggling of 80Kg RDX and the Pulwama plot. However, he still enjoys Prime Minister Modi’s confidence.
We have a multi-tiered higher defence organisation that includes the cabinet committee on security and the National Security Council. The defence secretary is responsible for national defence, regardless of whether his experience has been in animal husbandry or rural development. Given the axiom that responsibility, authority and accountability go together, has he ever been held accountable?
Missing: An overarching security strategy
Bureaucracies and global conglomerates have to contend with complex interdependence, which causes sluggish decision-making and lack of coordination. Global enterprises attain operational efficiency under the overall framework of corporate vision, responsive structure, and collegial culture. Higher defence management too can be more effective following similar principles, within an overarching national security strategy that integrates all elements of national security.
The US has had five formulations on national security since 2002. China has articulated its approach to national security in white papers thrice in the past decade. Russia, the UK and other major powers have similar formalised strategies. Amazingly, 73 years after Independence, India does not have a national security strategy. Little wonder that we have lurched through crises with ad hoc responses and never prepared proactively.
The formulation of such a strategy is an executive responsibility and hence the vision, core national interests and key directives must come from the prime minister. Bureaucracy, in consultation with domain experts, must then flesh out the strategy with all details.
Why did India’s officialdom fail to produce such a critical document? Is it apathy, preference for status quo, or turf considerations? Bureaucrats have a proclivity to remain ambivalent in formal documents as this enables them to exercise discretion, which is another word for patronage, and prevent any dilution of their pre-eminent status.
The principle of civilian control over military implies political and not bureaucratic control. While the military actually does the fighting, the bureaucracy plays an enabling role by ensuring it has the necessary wherewithal of modern weapons, munitions, logistics and infrastructure commensurate with threats. Regrettably, in India, an adversarial relationship has manifested between the bureaucracy and the military.
Battling the wrong adversary
National security is not just the absence of military threat to a country’s frontiers. It is more complex because besides military threats there are threats to the economy (sanctions; tariff-war; blockades), terrorism, subversion (fanning secession; social strife), cyber threats (to communication, data and power grids), anti-satellite systems, and biological threats that cause pandemics and wreck economies (COVID-19). An integrated framework is required to analyse these threats holistically.
National unity and internal stability are imperative for overall security and power. The six factors contributing to it are
- National will and ethos (patriotic fervour, unity, resilience);
- Political morality and stability (supremacy of constitution, fair elections, probity in public life);
- Social cohesion (no religious, caste or regional polarisation);
- Robust economy with inclusive growth (no monopolies; low-income disparities);
- Institutional integrity (independent judiciary, rule of law, free media) and
- Human capital (health, education, employment).
These dimensions are mutually supporting; hence trouble in one affects others too.
After independence, India’s visionary leadership, constitution, ethical politics and nation-building zeal laid the foundations for industrial and economic development. When that generation faded away, deep-rooted traits of parochialism, greed, feudal mindsets and lust for power gradually manifested. Political malfeasance grew rapidly, leading to electoral fraud, polarisation, social strife, compromised institutions, crony capitalism, income inequalities, corruption and increased crime even in high places.
Bureaucrats are indispensable to politicians as conduits for extending patronage and negotiating deals. The politico-bureaucratic nexus with big business has institutionalised corruption in our system and society. And even critical national security issues are not immune.
Politician-bureaucrat nexus
K. Subrahmanyam explicitly noted in the KRC report that “political, bureaucratic, intelligence and military establishments have a vested interest in the status quo”. Which are those vested interests? This merits deeper analysis since the dire consequences of the sluggish higher defence organisation, intelligence lapses, and deteriorating civil-military relations are staring us in our face in Ladakh today.
Debate about civilian control over the military has raged since Cromwell established a military dictatorship during the English Civil War in the 1640s. Later, to ensure balance, most democracies divided civilian control between the executive and legislature. India’s bureaucracy, however, has converted civilian control into bureaucratic control. After Independence, it got the post of C-in-C abolished and downgraded the services in the warrant of precedence. Citing military coups in developing countries, it stoked paranoia among politicians. It kept the services outside the MoD, as attached HQ. It has adamantly ignored recommendations for inducting service officers into the MoD. The bureaucracy has interposed itself between the political leadership and service chiefs and created procedural barriers to deny direct interaction.
Feudal mindset and rivalry have steadily worsened the relationship, resulting in adverse Pay Commission awards and lowering parity with civil services and even the Central Armed Police Forces. The MoD’s sly tinkering with pensions, disability awards, and contesting all Armed Forces Tribunal awards in court, has intensified resentment. Its pathological antagonism was evident when a senior bureaucrat retorted, “OROP (One Rank One Pension), over my dead body.”When OROP was granted due to the political expediency of the 2014 polls, babus deviously truncated it.
Promoting favourites as service chiefs by superseding distinguished seniors is dangerously politicising the military since senior officers now ingratiate themselves to netas and babus for promotions. Such officers readily do their bidding; even disregarding service interests. One area where netas and babus are very hands-on is foreign arms purchases – from oversight on qualitative requirements (QR) to user trials and short-listing vendors. Politico-bureaucratic expediency demands having ‘trustworthy’ military officers in the process, who will hold their peace.
The nexus zealously guards fiefdoms like the Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which have huge budgets but are under their patronage, with no proper audit. Forces are captive buyers of poor quality products from the OFB at uncompetitive prices.
India needs military-industrial capabilities with private sector participation to produce modern defence systems for domestic use and export, to finance modernisation. However, the MoD forces the services to either accept DRDO systems that do not meet QR or clamour for imports. The private sector, in collaboration with global majors, must undertake licensed production and R&D in India. We spend only 1.48% of GDP on defence, compared to 1.9% by China, ignoring that China spent trillions of dollars to complete its force modernization long back. Ironically, despite oft-cited budget constraints, we spend huge amounts for urgent purchases when facing sudden crises.
Danger of Hindutva
To mould Indian soldiers of all denominations into a fighting machine for their wars, the British had dispensed with their divide and rule policy with which they enslaved India. The apolitical and secular ethos they infused into soldiers remain invaluable assets. Lately, however, there are signs of erosion in those traditions. While the Hindutva ideology has crept into most institutions, it is extremely dangerous for the military where the religion of comrades in a bunker, tank, gun detachment, aircraft or warship should never matter.
In 2008, the journalist Saikat Datta had documented Col (retd) Chitale’s boast of indoctrinating Col (retd) Purohit and 1000 students at the Maharashtra Military Foundation, who later joined the military. Former army chief General V.K. Singh’s controversial public appearance in RSS uniform was likely a trial balloon, and signal that Hindutva is now legit even within the military. Ominously, many veterans now function like pracharaks on social media, disavowing their secular ethos and breaking age-old friendships. This must be curbed ruthlessly, lest we see a repeat of 1984. Such polarisation will ruin camaraderie and fighting capability and take us back into history.
If India is to face up to the current challenges, and prepare for future ones, all of these problems need to be addressed urgently.
In Ladakh, we have seen how diplomacy has again failed to maintain peace. China’s obdurate refusal to vacate occupied territories implies that the forces may have to evict them forcefully. But if they are forced to fight, Indian forces will again have to do so without essential capabilities for confronting China due to bureaucratic delays. Will the NSA and defence secretary be accountable for lapses that have brought the abtion to this pass?
Deepak Sethi is a retired brigadier of the Indian Army and now professor of International Business Strategy and Management in the United States. He can be contacted at 30foxtrot@gmail.com
