Chandigarh: Despite initiating aircraft carrier operations in 1961 – over half a century before China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – and building decades of operational experience on such platforms, the Indian Navy has now been hopelessly overtaken by its nuclear-armed neighbour in maritime aviation capability.

This reality was laid bare last week, when PLAN commissioned its third flattop, the 80,000-tonne Fujian fitted with a locally developed Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, even as the Indian Navy remained mired in committees and deliberations over its own elusive third carrier. It was, indeed, a grim reminder, if any were needed, that Beijing built ships, while New Delhi amassed files.

This prevailing disparity remains stark and proliferating, as Chinese shipyards were launching a new carrier nearly every four years. Indian docks and military planners, on the other hand, floundered in approvals, reviews and redesigns for the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier-2 (IAC-2), further exposing the yawning gulf between Beijing’s naval modernisation and Delhi’s bureaucratic inertia.

Viewed historically, the contrast is all the more glaring and instructive.

The Indian Navy had the foresight to begin carrier operations 51 years ago, with the commissioning of the second-hand INS Vikrant – the 16,000-tonne British Majestic-class HMS Hercules, acquired in 1957 for Rs 7 crore. Over 36 years of service, Vikrant provided the Indian Navy with invaluable hands-on experience in carrier aviation, eventually retiring in 1997 – some 15 years before PLAN commissioned the Liaoning, its first 66,000-tonne carrier, in 2012.

Yet despite this storied legacy, the Indian Navy now finds itself outpaced in sea-air combat capability by its nuclear-armed neighbour – mired still in endless debate over the need for a third carrier, even as the PLAN fielded Fujian, a quantum leap over the Liaoning and the 65–70,000-tonne, follow-on Type 001A Shandong that was commissioned in 2019.

Also read: Why Indian Navy's Proposal to Acquire a Third Aircraft Carrier May Not Materialise

Naval analysts expected the PLAN to field a 5–6 strong carrier force by the early 2030s, with each platform more advanced than the last – including nuclear-powered variants with far greater range, endurance and striking power.

The Indian Navy, for its part, remains stuck at the drawing board for its second indigenous carrier, even though the Ministry of Defence had sanctioned Rs 30 crore in 2015 for the Directorate of Naval Design to begin work on it. Progress thereafter has remained largely notional, confined to files rather than fabrication.

In the meantime, a quarter of a century before Liaoning’s emergence, the Indian Navy had, in 1987, commissioned its second carrier, INS Virat – ex HMS Hermes – a refurbished 23,900-tonne Centaur-class vessel which it acquired, once again, from the United Kingdom for around Rs 139 crore. Virat was eventually retired in early 2017, after an extraordinary 30 years of service with the Indian Navy and 28 years before that with the Royal Navy.

During its Indian tenure, INS Virat became the cornerstone of the Indian Navy’s carrier aviation capabilities, helping it refine sea-air based doctrines, deck-handling procedures and joint fleet manoeuvres. It hosted successive generations of Sea Harrier fighters and served as a floating testbed for integrating air power with fleet tactics, giving the Navy invaluable operational depth and continuity in carrier operations, unmatched in the region at the time.

But it did not end there: in 2013, the Indian Navy commissioned its third carrier, INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), a 45,000-tonne modified Kiev-class Soviet-era platform in 2013, following a $2.3 billion refit, further enriching its reservoir of carrier-operating experience and sustaining its unbroken tradition of sea-based air power.

This evolution of the Indian Navy’s carrier capability was further reinforced with the commissioning of the indigenously built INS Vikrant in September 2022 – a milestone that nevertheless overshot its completion deadline by six years underwent multiple cost revisions, and, embarrassingly, entered service without its dedicated fighter air group.

After Vikrant’s hysterical commissioning, hailed nationally as revolutionary, former navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash remarked that in India’s “typically disjointed decision-making process”, the selection of carrier-based fighters had become “delinked” from the carrier project itself.

“We knew the ship was likely to be commissioned this year,” he told Reuters in August 2022, “and hence the selection process and negotiations for the fighter should have started well in time – perhaps three to four years earlier.”

But it had not, and this critical operational gap was finally addressed – at least on paper – in April 2025, three years after Vikrant entered service, when India signed a Rs 63,000-crore deal with France for 26 Dassault Rafale-M carrier-capable fighters. Rafale deliveries are expected to begin around mid-2028, and conclude by 2030-31.

As things stand, the Indian Navy’s elusive third carrier – conceived to meet the Navy’s long-standing requirement for three platforms – two operational and one in refit to ensure credible presence across both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal – remains trapped in bureaucratic limbo.

And, even if eventually approved and built, it would merely replace the ageing Vikramaditya, which has undergone mid-life and minor upgrades to extend its service till around 2035, or roughly when the under-consideration carrier would enter service, if sanctioned.

Also read: Time for an 'Accurate and Down-to-Earth Assessment' of Vikrant, Say Veterans

As one former two-star Indian Navy officer put it, this so-called “mythical” platform, if it ever materialises, would merely sustain rather than strengthen India’s maritime airpower: “It will hardly be the force multiplier the Navy has been clamouring for – just a substitute,” he said, requesting anonymity given the sensitivity of the matter.

For now, the unresolved debate over IAC-2 has been plagued not only by its astronomical cost, but also by its overall operational efficacy in an environment of burgeoning anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, honed by India’s two collaborative nuclear rivals, China and Pakistan, against carrier attacks.

The A2/AD is essentially a multi-layered defensive strategy that employs long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, attack drones and cyber weapons deployed on coastal areas, warships, submarines and fast attack craft to deter enemy carrier operations.

Collectively, these offensive/defensive assets were aimed at creating a ‘secure bubble’, which carriers, their combat air arm, and accompanying escort platforms would be wary of challenging because of the potential lethality they could encounter.

Furthermore, recent advances in cruise missile technology had made it easier and cheaper for countries like China and Pakistan to conduct A2/AD operations. So much so that even the United States Navy considered China’s evolved A2/AD strategy a serious threat to its fleet of some 11 advanced 100,000-tonne nuclear-powered carriers.

Besides, even within the Indian Navy, senior officers questioned the monetary logic of building a new carrier at the cost of inducting additional diesel-electric ‘killer-hunter’ submarines to supplement the current strength of 17 platforms, of which 11 from Russia and Germany were between 19 and 33 years old, and nearing retirement. These submarines too were seven boats fewer than the 24 submarines the navy was projected to operate by 2030 in accordance with its Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. Efforts to augment these shortages had continued for over 15 years and were nowhere near to being resolved.

Correspondingly, equally critical surface combatants like corvettes, mine-sweepers, destroyers and frigates were in short supply, as were naval utility helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles and other assorted missiles and ordnance.

These officers’ reasoning centred on the unresolved debate in other navies around the world between operationally pursuing a ‘sea denial’ strategy, largely by deploying submarines, or seeking a ‘sea control’ approach via costly and relatively more vulnerable carrier battle groups that entail an inordinately large number of surface and underwater escorts.

The other principal opponent to financing a carrier for the Indian Navy remains the Indian Air Force, which too is forever competing for a greater share of India’s depreciating annual defence budgets, as it grapples to make good its fighter, helicopter and transport aircraft shortages, amongst other essential equipment.

“We need to prioritise our military equipment procurements in keeping with regional threats and limited financial resources that are fast reducing,” said military analyst Air Marshal V.K. Bhatia (retd).  Under these precarious financial conditions, an aircraft carrier would not only be a costly indulgence, he added, but also entail fielding a platform vulnerable to A2/AD threats.

Also read: Fatal Jaguar Crash Again Raises Concerns Over IAF's Legacy Fleet

Other Indian Air Force officers declared that Anglo-French fighters like SEPECAT Jaguar IM/IS and multi-role Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKIs fitted with enhanced maritime strike capability and extended strike ranges, via in-flight re-fuelling, could project power more economically and securely than a carrier.

The Indian Air Force’s maritime Jaguar IM fleet, for instance, is armed with AGM-84L Block II Harpoon missiles, of which India acquired 24 units in 2010 for $170 million is also being equipped with Israel Aerospace Industries-Elta EL/M-2052/2060 multi-mode active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for sea-borne operations.

And, in early 2020, the Indian Air Force had commissioned its first Su-30MKI squadron, coast armed with the BrahMos-A(Air) supersonic cruise missile with a 292km strike range, at Thanjaur on India’s southeast coast to monitor the country’s eastern and western seaboards and the wider Indian Ocean Region. Military planners said that deploying the Su-30MKIs armed with the BrahMos-A to police the region was a strategically prudent move in response to China’s expanding naval footprint in the area. They said that the Su-30MKI, with its 1,500km operational range – without the assistance of mid-air refueling, and much further with it – would enhance the Air Force's capability to engage potential targets with pinpoint accuracy.

But the steadily declining defence budget remains the principal bulwark to thwart IAC-2. In recent years, the Indian Navy has been forced to tighten its belt by revising its goal of operating 200 assorted warships by 2027 in keeping with its Maritime Capability Plan to just 175. Furthermore, fiscal shortages had, for instance, forced the navy into reducing its long-standing requirement for 12 Mine Counter Measure Vessels to eight and an additional 10 Boeing P-8I Neptune long-range, maritime multi-mission aircraft to just six platforms.

The Fujian, meanwhile, is not just another addition to the PLAN's fleet, but a decisive leap in both technology and capability development. Unlike its predecessors, which relied on Soviet-era ski-jump Short Take-Off-But-Arrested-Recovery systems to launch aircraft, it features the Electromagnetic Launch System, placing it in the same technological league as the United States Navy’s latest carriers.

For Beijing, such capability isn’t about prestige alone – it’s about sustained maritime presence, the ability to project power, and reshaping regional naval balances in both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. Furthermore, through its carrier build-up, Beijing is eyeing the freedom to operate far beyond its near seas, underpinning the maritime dimension of its wider Belt and Road Initiative by effectively weaving sea power into its broader geo-economic and geostrategic framework.

Powered by conventional steam turbines and diesel generators, Fujian’s air group comprises at least 40 fixed-wing aircraft like the 5th generation J-35s, and the 4.5 generation upgraded J-15T fighters, the KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft and 10-12 assorted helicopters, such as the Z-19/Z-9 and Z-20 variants for anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue and utility roles.

In conclusion, China’s carrier surge underscores its dramatic ascent in sea-power projection, while for India, the question is no longer whether it will build another carrier – but whether it can do so swiftly enough to keep pace with its far more formidable rival. China has turned its carrier dream into a doctrine; India’s challenge is to ensure its next carriers don’t remain trapped in mystery, muddle and irrelevance – reducing the Indian Navy to watching events from the shore.

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