With the nation catapulted into the Galwan face-offs and ugly Stone Age fighting in the desolate heights of Ladakh, the lack of a coherent policy and a lackadaisical approach to national security came back to haunt us once again.
The following of border management protocols in a purely military confrontation that led to hand to hand combat, and the proverbial intelligence miss on the Chinese buildup have led to the defence forces either being surprised or unprepared in the face of aggressive Chinese action.
The events on the LAC since May 2020 have clearly highlighted the ‘fits-and-starts’ approach that defence policy makers and planners have towards strengthening India’s defence preparedness.
Daniel Byman a senior fellow as Brookings institution has commented, “The fear that terrorism generates can distort public debates, discredit moderates, empower political extremes and polarise societies.”
Also read: Balakot and After, or How to Build a Strategic Doctrine for Political Gain
The Uri and Balakot strikes did just that – they generated national fervour and were exploited to the hilt by political parties for their own vote garnering rather than fostering capacity building within the forces. The only visible and obvious result of the actions have been to drum up fear and justify polarisation by painting the dispensation as being patriotic and strong on national security – all well timed to coincide with crucial national and regional electoral exercises.
Apathy towards defence modernisation
Successive governments have short shifted the defence forces despite proclaiming them to be the holy cow.
Defence spending, procurements and modernisation have all been victims of government apathy and a propensity to go for populist schemes such as debt waiver and subsidies have all been to garner votes and power. A larger than life importance has been attributed to countering terror and insurgencies with conventional war fighting and modernisation of equipment has been given the go by.
Also read: Indian Army Has Been Operating Without Crucial Carbines for Decades Now
Consistent pressure for reduction in defence budget and raised eyebrows at the ‘high’ costs of defence pay and pensions have taken primacy. Why blame the politicians and bureaucrats, there is a massive military constituency of self-proclaimed experts which also subscribes to the ‘there-won’t-be conventional-conflict’ theory and thrives on its benefits.
The case of shelving of the mountain strike corps highlights inconsistency in planning and implementation. Hopefully, China’s latest forays on our northern borders have shaken the establishment out of this stupor.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh poses for a group photo with troops who took part in para dropping and other military exercises at Stakna, in Leh, Ladakh, Friday, July 17, 2020. Photo: PTI
Bureaucratic interference in the garb of ‘civilian control’ which rightfully means control of armed forces by the elected representatives (and not bureaucrats) presents a strong case for curbing them bureaucrats from taking actions that exacerbate and vitiate the working climate in the Ministry of Defence.
The strong urge of the bureaucratic fraternity to maintain supremacy over the defence forces focuses more on seniority and power play issues rather than comprehensive security needs.
Contrasting reforms
The present government kickstarted major restructuring when it approved in March 2019 what is seen as a first phase of reforms in the Indian Army.
Also read: A Logistical Battle Awaits the Indian Army’s Troops in Ladakh
A few more noticeable actions have been the creation of the Defence Procurement Committee (DPC) headed by the NSA to streamline defence procurement. This move has not been supported by budgetary provisions. ‘Make in India’ especially in the defence sector is largely JV-based with indigenous capacity taking a hit.
There, however, is one obvious noticeable difference in the Chinese ‘transformation’ and Indian ‘reforms’. The reforms while suggesting new structures and reductions stem primarily from a realistic assessment of the restrictions on defence spending and budgetary constraints.
In all, there has been a drastic reduction in defence spending as ruling political dispensations have without exception relegated national security to overtures by diplomats and showcasing of joint training of defence forces with foreign armies. The underlying theme and hope is that of conflict avoidance. However, given the hostile neighbourhood that India is saddled with, these hopes are pipe dreams despite a few personalised one-on-one summits and lofty declarations of peace and friendship.
Also read: Despite Advances in Strategic Arms, Country Fails ‘Make in India’ Test for Basic Equipment
Meanwhile, the Chinese PLA in the intervening years has undergone a drastic reduction in size in exchange for leaner and more mobile battle formations. The PLA has reduced its size by half by retrenching and restructuring to strengthen its Air Force and Navy and created new strategic units. The ‘transformational changes,’ as they have been termed, have seen the rocket force and the strategic support force gain in prominence in line with China’s thrust to make the PLA less a homeland defence force and more of a force that can project its might overseas.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers deployed for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions give a demonstration of their engineering and combat skills at a military base in Qinyang, Henan province, China, 15 September 2007. Credit: EPA/Michael Reynolds via The Conversation/File Photo
The speed and range of the reforms stem from Xi- Jinping’s personal involvement and impetus to them, albeit to consolidate his and the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on the PLA. Pakistan too has initiated reorganisation of its rapid reaction forces and frontline formations. Apparently, both China and Pakistan are far ahead in their respective restructuring of forces.
Gaps in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities (ISR) have always been a concern and have led to the present massive build up and stand-off. Severe shortages in major equipment such as fighter aircraft, artillery guns and ammunition for weapon systems have manifested over years due to low priority for defence procurements. Some of these have figured prominently in the purchase agreements inked during the defence ministers visit to Moscow for the RIC summit.
Also read:
Defence minister Rajnath Singh at the Victory Day Parade at Red Square in Moscow.
Ammunition shortfalls have been a limiting factor for Indian conventional force operations in the past, especially for the Indian Army.
India’s official audit agency assessed in 2016 that India lacked sufficient reserves in around 85 out of 170 critical ammunition categories for a scenario of an intense 10-day war.
The defence forces have now ostensibly been given a free hand to go shopping for their shortfalls in a crisis mode. Obviously, we will procure items by paying enormous premiums for what could have been procured by sensible and long term contracts placed well in time had we resorted to prioritised capacity building.
These short term measures notwithstanding, it is the mid and long term focus that needs to be calibrated without any political agenda and with an all-party consensus.
Restructuring of the existing command and control organisations, integrating all ISR resources, modernisation of equipment, creating a robust logistics network and the incorporation of technological advances in war fighting needs impetus. While defence spending is likely to be capped at the present levels, the in-house expertise in space and software development can be honed to provide a battle winning edge.
The means and structures to tackle emerging and existing non-conventional threats such as cyber and space based threats need to be addressed as the Chinese have built a formidable capacity in these domains.
The nation’s security structure has to be based on modern weapons and equipment wielded by a committed fighting force. The need for consistency and objectivity in handling the defence forces and their employment, including maintaining the status they deservedly ask for, needs to be urgently addressed by the government.
Defence reforms will need to be comprehensive and in synchronisation with each other. The government will have to ensure that one reform does not fall by the wayside for the other. There is a long road ahead but a committed start has to be made.
Maintaining continuity with a long term perspective in capability development must stand the test of leadership changes both in the hierarchy of the army and in government over the long run.
Major General Amrit Pal Singh (Retd) was Divisional Commander of an Army division in Northern command and Chief of operational logistics in Ladakh (2011 to 2013). He has experience in counter insurgency operations in J&K and conventional operations in Ladakh and is co-author of a book ‘Maoist Insurgency and India’s Internal Security Architecture’.
