Ex-Chief of Army, M.M. Naravane Bats for Continued, Heavy Troop Deployment on Borders
New Delhi: Former chief of the Indian Army, M.M. Naravane has said there was a need for India to not let up on heavy troop deployment on its borders. Naravane, who retired as army chief in April 2022, particularly cites religious centres close to the border, as reasons for his concern.
In an opinion piece for The Print, Naravane writes, “Strategic depth — the prevalence or absence of it — is a key determinant of a country’s National Security Strategy”. He defines strategic depth as “the distance between the front lines, also called the Tactical Battle Area or TBA, and the base, from which the Army draws its strength, in terms of men, material and resources. The space in between, through which pass the roads and railroads connecting the two, the lines of communications, is known as the Communications Zone or Comn Z.”
When a country has “neither the luxury of strategic depth, nor a friendly neighbour”, he writes, “this depth has to be created by occupying territories beyond one’s own boundaries. Israel is a case in point.” On the six-day war of 1967, he compliments Israel for its “occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, as it afforded them the depth against any surprise offensive by Egypt from the South.”
About India, the former Army chief says that while it is blessed to have the advantage of a large land-mass, “many…lucrative targets also lie within or close to the TBA where they could be over-run in the initial stages of an enemy offensive. Therefore, it has to carefully calibrate its strategy with respect to its potential adversaries, China to the North and Pakistan to the West.”
Different strokes for different folks?
On the Western Front, Naravane opines that “in the desert sector,” India could afford to be less densely deployed, “due to the lack of any inherent natural resources, especially water. However, the same would not be true further North.” But, major population centres having political and religious significance, Amritsar for example, which is just about 30 plus kms from the international border, and well within the range of enemy long-range artillery, would have to be defended at all costs. Its fall would do irreparable damage to India’s reputation, both domestically and internationally.”
On the front with the Chinese, post the Galwan clash of 2020, both the People’s Liberation Army and the Indian Army, Naravane notes with relief, have fortified their positions and are forward deployed, with neither side inclined to cede any space to the other.
In the central sector, bordering Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand lie places of religious importance, which once again have to be defended strongly right from the outset. The same is true for the Sikkim and Tawang areas of the eastern sector.
The bottom line, he argues is that while India has a large landmass, its strategic depth is of little value “due to overriding domestic compulsions.”
Naravane ends on an enigmatic note, taking a line apparently contrary to what the political establishment and his successors have taken with their controversial Agniveer policy of hiring soldiers on short-term contracts. Fresh recruitments in the Army were not done for years with the Union government citing COVID-19. The reason advanced for Tour of Duty or short term contractual soldiering was that ‘technological changes’ make troops somewhat less necessary for battles in the future. But, says Naravane, without referring to Agniveer at all, “in spite of technological advances,” deployment on India’s northern fronts can only be done “by having adequate boots on ground.”
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